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Abstract 
The implementation of neo-liberal policies in Mexico during the 1980s caused changes not 
only in the country's economic structure but also in political and social arenas. As a 
response to these changes, a reconfiguration of the Mexican state has been experienced. 
The thesis argues that the intertwining of decentralisation and democratisation policies has 
helped to promote Mexico's global competitiveness at the urban level. The thesis 
examines developments in urban governance in Mexico, with specific reference to Bob 
Jessop's concept of the 'entrepreneurial city'. The theoretical focus is upon three trends: 
the destatisation of the political regime, the denationalisation of statehood and the 
internationalisation of the state. The empirical focus is upon new organisational forms 
within urban governance where government and non-governmental stakeholders 
(including citizens and the private sector) from supranational, national and subnational 
levels interact. 
The thesis is based upon primary research undertaken in two case studies of the historic 
centres of Queretaro and San Luis Potosi (via documentary review, semi-structured 
interviews and non-participatory observation). Data is used to analyse the development of 
new forms of political participation in these areas, specifically regeneration partnerships, 
neighbourhood boards and urban-popular negotiations (during the period 1997-2003). The 
research shows how the historic-centre regeneration partnerships have helped to 
legitimise ideas of collaboration and governance. However, enduring informal 
arrangements among local elites have limited the scope of new forms of political 
participation, particularly in relation to accountability and inclusion. A segmented system of 
participation has arisen, accentuated by the globalisation of the urban system, the 
endurance of social class, and the municipal bodies' lack of coordination in creating 
accountable and inclusive organisational structures. The research demonstrates the 
impact of international organisations upon national strategies related to the regeneration of 
historic centres, political participation and governance. The federal government has, in 
effect, been the coordinator of the policies and programmes followed by sub-national tiers. 
The case studies show how municipal governments have adapted top-down policies in the 
context of specific local pressures. 
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Chapter 1- Introduction 
This thesis is concerned with the role of partnerships and participation in 
contemporary Mexican urban governance. It has three aims: 
" To analyse local public-private partnerships as part of urban policymaking; 
" To research the attitudes and activities of social groups in relation to public- 
private partnerships; 
" To analyse how municipal governments follow national urban policies and 
international organisations' recommendations on urban regeneration. 
The background to these research aims is the implementation of neoliberal 
policies and the democratisation process that Mexico has been experiencing 
since the early 1980s. Neoliberal policies are not only associated with changes 
in the country's economic structure, but also in the political and social arenas. 
The thesis focuses on the reconfiguration of the Mexican state as a response to 
the latter changes, which can be observed through the national and local 
relations between government and civil society. 
Studies of the democratisation process in Mexico generally concentrate upon 
the formalisation of electoral institutions and the changing balance between 
federal powers (executive, legislative and judicial) in order to achieve the rule of 
law (Levy and Bruhn, 2001; Middlebrook, 2004). However, the theoretical 
environment is split between those arguments supporting representative 
democracy and those supporting participatory democracy, which promote civil 
participation in policymaking. Even though these debates have been known for 
centuries, they have achieved a new significance in contemporary literature on 
public policy and political economy insofar as the relationships between 
governmental and non-governmental actors (at different spatial scales) have 
gained in importance (Brenner, 2004; Pierre & Stoker, 2000). 
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The literature on democratisation is vast. Authors such as Guillermo O'Donnell 
and Scott Mainwaring (1992), Larry Diamond (1999), Juan Linz and Alfred 
Stepan (1996) focus on the internal processes that state apparatuses tend to 
adopt in order to ensure a more democratic environment. Other authors such as 
William Robinson (1996), Bob Jessop (2002) and Neil Brenner (2004) have 
argued that democratisation and urbanisation processes have shaped the 
internal reconfiguration of the state which, at the same time, has been affected 
by the global changes that capital modes of accumulation have encountered 
over the last thirty years. Both perspectives are used in this thesis as a way of 
linking democratisation and state reconfiguration (named here as macro level 
processes) with the study of urban politics. 
Based on the local level, the thesis traces links with two other levels of analysis: 
supranational and national. This is achieved by using analytical tools associated 
with the theoretical premises of `governance' (Rhodes, 1996), urban regimes 
(Stone, 1989), and new institutionalism (Lowndes, 2001; Pierson, 2004). These 
tools (referring here to micro processes) focus upon the internal and 
organisational reconfiguration of the state at the urban level. The thesis 
considers that Mexico's high urbanisation rate facilitates the study of the 
reconfiguration of the state. The urban locality has attained more importance 
through decentralisation strategies that the Mexican federal government has 
promoted since the 1980s, supported, at the same time, by international 
organisations such as the World Bank and the Organisation of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD, 1998; Giugale & Webb, 2000). The 
urban locality has also attained significance through subnational governments 
being more autonomous in negotiating with transnational organisations and 
corporations to promote local economic and social strategies. 
In the context of these characteristics, the thesis is based on the theoretical 
concept of the `entrepreneurial city'. The development of the entrepreneurial city 
is associated with three trends: the destatisation of the political regime, the 
denationalisation of statehood and the internationalisation of the state (Jessop, 
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1997a; 2002, ch. 5). This type of city is "concern[ed] to create new combinations 
of economic and/or extra-economic factors which will further urban 
competitiveness" (Jessop, 1997a: 31). In particular, public-private partnerships, 
alongside other forms of political participation, are considered as examples 
where extra-economic factors (i. e. organisational structures) are developed to 
support urban entrepreneurial ism. 
The aims of the thesis are investigated in the case study setting of the historic 
centres of Queretaro and San Luis Potosi. These cities are located in the Bajio 
Region, and have been recognised for their efforts in becoming strategic nodes 
for the country's economic and urban development (Cabrero, et al, 2003). 
However, their social and political context has led to differences in the operation 
of their organisational structures. The historic centres are considered a space 
where political and social relations are created. These relations encounter 
constant change, which contemporary literature associates with the globalising 
trend that political and social relationships encounter (Jones, 2005; Massey, 
1994; 2005). These two historic centres are significant in building each city's 
image and their society's cultural identity. Their value is reflected in the 
conservation of the areas' layout and architecture that can be dated since the 
16t" century. This value is a way of manifesting the local and national identity of 
the people living, using and visiting the centres, which at the same time is 
immersed in a more globalised context. 
The argument of the thesis is developed through bridging a gap between the 
macro level and micro level processes and by focusing on the empirical 
analysis that makes reference to the supranational, national and local levels of 
government. The `supranational' term refers to groups of nations working 
together to achieve specific economic and political standards within a world 
where geographical borders are tending to blur or overlap, creating as a 
consequence new globalised spaces that undermine the traditional state centric 
understandings. The 'national' term refers to the central apparatus of the state 
and is used when referring to federal government's decisions and actions. The 
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`local' term encompasses subnational levels, such as regional and city 
governments but, within the thesis, `local' refers specifically to the state and 
municipal governments. 
Based on this argument, the thesis develops three research propositions: 
" Public-private partnerships are organisational forms that express a tendency 
towards urban governance; 
" Municipal government prefers public-private partnerships over other forms of 
participation as a means to promote the locality's urban entrepreneurship; 
" Municipal governments play a brokerage role to maintain organisational 
forms of `governance' (promoted by national and international standards) 
within a context of specific local pressures. 
Studying public-private partnerships involves a focus on the role of 
stakeholders. These stakeholders are classified as governmental authorities, 
the local elite, and popular groups. The governmental authorities comprise all 
tiers of government: federal, state and municipal; however, a special emphasis 
is given to the role of municipal governments. The local elite is understood as 
the traditional landed classes and the middle class (including bourgeois, 
professional, managerial, academic and white collar groups) as well as local 
politicians. This elite has developed in the context of industrialisation, 
commercialisation and global capital growth. Finally, popular groups are 
considered here as those individuals with no or basic education and that have 
been marginalised from policymaking due to their economic and social status. 
The research propositions are explored using a multiple case study approach, 
with an emphasis on linking theory and practice. This approach has been useful 
for questioning `how' and `why' civil and social organisations react to public- 
private partnerships in the historic centres of Queretaro and San Luis Potosi 
(during the period 1997-2003). The data were collected through methods of 
semi-structured interviews with the three types of stakeholders; documentary 
review of official and private reports and regulations; and non participatory 
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observations of partnership relationships and other forms of participation (and 
the urban context more generally). 
Chapter 2 discusses how the democratisation process in Mexico has shaped 
the reconfiguration of the state at national and international levels. Chapter 3 
argues that the intertwining of decentralisation policies and the democratisation 
process is part of a strategy to promote Mexico's global competitiveness at the 
urban level. Chapter 4 discusses the significance of urban governance as a 
general linkage of macro and micro levels of analysis and as a particular form of 
collaborative arrangement. Chapter 5 explains the research methodology by 
stating in more detail the research aims, theoretical propositions, and questions, 
within a case study approach. Chapter 6 introduces the socio-economic, 
political and cultural aspects of the two case studies. Chapter 7 examines the 
historic-centre regeneration partnerships of Queretaro and San Luis Potosi in 
relation to the theoretical premises of governance. Chapter 8 analyses the two 
historic-centre partnerships within the broader system of participation in the two 
cities. Chapter 9 examines the role of the two municipal governments in 
promoting the regeneration of their historic centres as they encounter national, 
international, and local pressures. Finally, Chapter 10 clarifies the argument and 
contributions of the thesis and reflects upon the limitations of the work and how 
they can be over come through future research. 
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Chapter 2- The democratisation process in Mexico 
Introduction 
Contemporary debates about democracy are numerous and extensive and have 
a long historical tradition (Held, 1996; Weale, 1999). These debates deal with a 
range of issues within democracy: for instance its principles and devices 
(Saward, 2003); and the stages and process that effect its development 
(Diamond, 1999; Linz & Stepan, 1996; Robinson, 1996). From a mainstream 
contemporary perspective `transition' and `consolidation' are regarded as stages 
of the democratisation process. Democratisation in Mexico is interpreted as a 
transition from an authoritarian regime to a more pluralistic political system, and 
leading to the consolidation of its democracy (Cornelius, 1996; Levy & Bruhn, 
2001). Both transition and consolidation have been `open-ended' processes 
with no specific date of initiation. However, for the purposes of this research 
their emergence is located at the end of the 1970s, when neoliberal policies 
impacted upon the academic and political understandings of democratisation. 
Mexican authoritarianism (1930s-1990s) had particular elements like the long 
`one-party rule' system that exercised control over a wide range of interest 
groups to guarantee the state's continuity. The ruling political party was 
represented by the Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI). This system was not 
monolithic as cliques within the central apparatus have been identified, as well 
as fiefdoms scattered throughout different national regions (Cornelius, 1996). 
But despite the factions identified within the system, it was able to persist due to 
the corporatist structures which did not allow competition within the state 
apparatus and other sectors of society. This granted a deliberate 
representational monopoly within respective categories (Schmitter, 1974). The 
different factions and sectors (categories) existing in this system promoted 
personal and deliberative relationships that were not accountable to other 
groups or to the public (Cornelius, 1996). 
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The chapter discusses how Mexico's integration to the global economy 
weakened the authoritarian regime by diminishing its economic interventionism 
and nationalistic strategies. However, what aimed to be an economic 
reformation, involved other changes within Mexico's political structure, social 
relations and state's reconfiguration in both national and international spheres. 
Two perspectives on democratisation are discussed: liberal democracy and 
democracy within a global context. The first section presents a discussion on 
Mexico's transition to neoliberalism and the implications in arenas other than 
the economic. The second discusses the perspective on liberal democracy and 
how its premises are useful in illustrating the Mexican state's internal 
institutional changes. The last section examines the contributions of analysing 
Mexico's economic and political transformation within a global context. 
2.1. Neoliberalism in Mexico 
Studies about the implementation of neoliberal policies in Mexico began with a 
focus on the structural adjustments and reforms that followed the1982 debt 
crisis (Fourcade-Gourinchas & Babb, 2002). The adjustments and reforms 
aimed to restructure Mexico's economy; however, after more than twenty years 
of implementation they have created changes in other arenas such as the 
political and the societal, which were at first not considered as part of the 
economic transition (Rochlin, 1997; Wise et al, 2003). 
The economic restructuring of Mexico responded to an international context 
where globalisation of finance started to be encountered. The globalisation of 
finance resulted from various market developments (Helleiner, 1994: 7) such 
as: (1) An increase in the demand for international financial services that 
accompanied the growth of international trade and multinational corporate 
activity in the 1960s. (2) The ability of international private banks in responding 
to the financial imbalances caused by the 1973 oil price rise, this response 
encouraged deposits by Arab oil-producing states and the borrowing of those 
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funds by deficit countries. (3) The growth of international trade and multinational 
corporate activity created rapid changes in the international financial markets 
that ended with the control of capital mobility (held by a semi-fix exchange 
system) supported by the Bretton Woods agreements, established by the 
banking systems of the US and Europe after World War II. (4) Consequently, by 
the end of the 1970s a floating exchange rate system was adopted by 
developed countries as a way to cope with the pressures generated by an 
increased internationalisation of trade (Helleiner, 1994). The floating exchange 
rate system was supported by American intellectuals and industrialists who 
dominated the financial international market, aiming to position the dollar as a 
world currency, overtaking gold. 
The reforms in the international financial markets implied a climbing of interest 
rates and a collapse of the stock markets that deeply affected those developing 
countries involved with immense amounts of foreign loans, such as Mexico 
(Helleiner, 1994, ch. 8). Just as other Latin American countries, in the 1970s, 
Mexico encountered an external imbalance caused by a decrease of national 
earnings from exports and international capital flows that the import- 
substitution-industrialisation (ISI) model generated (Gwynne, 2004). This model 
was implemented since the 1940s as a way to promote an autonomous 
economic development in the region. The ISI model restricted international 
trade, foreign investment, and the transfer of technology that multinational 
corporations started to develop (idem). These characteristics left Mexico in a 
vulnerable position when it had to encounter the external internationalisation of 
markets and the international financial reform. 
The massive loans that Mexico had incurred by 1982, rendered the country 
unable any longer to service its foreign debt. This announcement prompted the 
US Federal Reserve Bank to secure a bridging loan with the members of the 
Bank for International Settlements in order to stop a likely international financial 
crisis (Helleniner, 1994: 176). This loan was transferred to the Bank of Mexico 
and as a condition of receiving a stabilising loan, Mexico had to implement the 
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International Monetary Fund's strict public austerity package and a restructuring 
programme that moved the country's economy toward an export-oriented model 
(Baer & Maloney, 1997; Levy & Bruhn, 2001, ch. 6). This restructuring 
programme was later encompassed by neoliberal policies that implemented a 
fast liberalisation of trade and interest rates, privatisation of public services and 
benefits, fiscal and monetary reforms, and the decentralisation of the political 
system. In 2005, Mexico was still in the process of consolidating structural 
programmes related to the enhancement of a federalist system and the 
privatisations of pension schemes and the energy sector; all of them supported 
by a range of international organisations such as the World Bank, the World 
Trade Organisation, and the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) (Charnock, 2005; Giugale & Webb, 2000; OECD, 1998). 
Neoliberalism, which can be considered as a set of economic principles based 
on the ideology of free markets, prompted in the Mexican case the creation of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. For some 
scholars this agreement has been considered the `icing on the cake' for 
Mexico's integration to the world economy, especially with the United States 
(Coatsworth, 1999; Fourcade-Gourinchas & Babb, 2002; Wise et al., 2001). The 
NAFTA helped to establish the rules for transnational corporations to locate 
production and market their goods and services in Mexico; taking advantage of 
the country's low salaries, abundant natural resources, weak and unenforced 
environmental laws, favourable tax structures for these type of corporations, 
and on improving infrastructure of road and communication networks (Wise et 
al., 2003). By the late 1990s, Mexico started to negotiate other free trade 
agreements, but this time with Europe and Japan as a strategy to expand its 
external markets beyond the United States and Canada. However, some 
scholars argue that although these strategies aimed to ameliorate Mexico's 
dependency on the US, the latter country is still the most important in shaping 
Mexico's external economic policies (Coatsworth, 1999; Levy & Bruhn, 2001). 
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The implications of NAFTA, at first, tended to be related to Mexico's 
liberalisation of trade. However, as the years went by, academics and 
practitioners became aware that the NAFTA implied other changes that altered 
the traditional understandings of national security and of social relations 
between the state and non-governmental organisations (Rochlin, 1997; Wise et 
al, 2003). The NAFTA formalised Mexico's shift away from more than forty 
years of defensiveness against foreign penetration pursued by the authoritarian 
regime, characterised by the ISI model. The authoritarian regime, governed by 
the PRI, encountered an erosion of the revolutionary nationalism of the early 
1900s. With the NAFTA, national development started to be defined as the 
integration of Mexico into the rest of the world economy. This was reflected in 
the discourse of policymakers (i. e. technocrats)' who concluded that domestic 
policies were failing because they were out of line with the international 
economic imperatives (Levy & Bruhn, 2001: 1995). Also the Alliance for the 
Economic Recovery which brought together the Mexican state and the business 
elite after the 1994 financial crisis, exemplified how trade and international 
markets were considered as an immediate solution to overcome the crisis - 
through the promotion of a suitable environment for foreign investment and 
exports (Kleinberg, 1999). 
The NAFTA has also generated a change in social relations between the state 
and civil society, as well as among national and international non-governmental 
organisations. The NAFTA has mainly generated bilateral flows between 
Mexico and the US in terms of trade, tourism, technology, migration, 
environment, agriculture and social movements (Levy & Bruhn, 2001; Wise et 
al, 2003). On each issue, national governments have played significant roles in 
promoting the agreement. However, actors outside government have also 
played relevant roles in influencing the NAFTA's policy decisions, especially big 
Technocrats are a group of people that bring together the formal state apparatus with a 
network of universities, think tanks and corporate groups, all favouring the implementation of 
neoliberal policies and strategies. Technocrats have been influenced by the American neoliberal 
school of thought developed in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
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business groups (representing transnational corporations originated in Mexico, 
the US or Europe) and NGOs (promoting electoral democracy, human rights, 
and anti-capitalist discourses) (Kleinberg, 1999; Wise et al, 2001). The 
recognition of non-state actors in policy decisions underlines the importance of 
neoliberalism's effects on the processes and outputs of political decision making 
within and outside the state apparatus. 
The internationalisation of the Mexican policy regime through NAFTA, 
accompanied by the involvement in policy of national and international non- 
state actors supports the theoretical view that the contemporary reconfiguration 
of the state involves. This view implies a move away from traditional 
conceptions of `territoriality'. Traditionally, territoriality assumes that all social 
relations are organised within self-enclosed and bounded territorial geographies 
(Brenner, 2004: 38). Instead, the concept of `social space' seems to work better 
within this view of state transformation as it involves an ongoing process in 
which the geographies of social relations are "continually reconfigured and 
where territoriality is intertwined with, and superimposed upon, an immense 
variety of emergent social spatial forms" - from supranational institutional 
structures (i. e. institutions regulating NAFTA decisions) to global financial flows, 
new forms of transnational corporate organization, global interurban networks 
and transnational diasporic communities - "that cannot be described adequately 
as contiguous, mutually exclusive, and self-enclosed blocks of territorial space" 
(Brenner, 2004: 66). 
The questioning of territoriality involves a shift in the academic debate away 
from the Weberian concept of the state. Authors such as Neil Brenner (2004) 
and William Robinson (2004) argue that under the Weberian perspective 
territorial borders work to define a country's political organisation. In other 
words, territorial borders are considered as pre-given, fixed and unchanged, 
reifying the structure of the state within those geographical boundaries. 
However, the development in the modes of capital production towards capital 
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globalisation has rendered nation-states less appropriate units of analysis, ' 
partly because they are no longer the main containers of the diverse economic, 
political, social and cultural processes that are the objects of study in the social 
sciences (Robinson, 2004: 89). This argument can be exemplified in the case of 
NAFTA in Mexico, where scholars have become aware of free trade not only 
having an effect upon the country's economic policies, but also having 
implications within the political and societal arenas, beyond traditional 
geographical boundaries (Levy & Bruhn, 2001: 259). Thus Brenner specifically 
argues that geographical boundaries are best understood as a medium and 
result of political strategies that the states formulate rather than considering 
them as a fixed permanent condition (2004: 77). 
Brenner and Robinson's perspective on how the state is being reconfigured 
differs from the perspective of state reconfiguration understood as the `internal' 
and `external' `hollowing out of the state' (Rhodes, 1997), where the state's role 
is seen as being undermined by the intervention of non-governmental actors in 
policymaking, creating as a result an environment of `governance without 
government'. The former authors argue instead that statehood in the 21st 
century is neither retaining its primacy nor disappearing, but it is being 
transformed and absorbed by the historicity of social space and the polymorphic 
levels and scales that the process of globalisation involves. The reconfiguration 
of the state within this transformation renders the state a pro-activeness that 
scholars have identified with adjectives and concepts such as: `coordinator' 
(between different scales of networks - Stoker, 1996), initiator (of those 
coordinating schemes Pierre & Peters, 2000; Robinson, 2003), or inheritor (of 
2 Capital globalisation is understood as the process encountering deregulation of the 
international financial system and, thus of financial flows taking place in an integrated global 
system; decentralisation of production structures through information, communication and 
transportation technologies; a global presence of transnational corporations and a transnational 
fluid movement of the workforce (Robinson, 2004: 15). In a nutshell, globalisation has been 
achieved due to the flexibilisation of capital and labour and the technologies that have facilitated 
this. 
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old or previous state spatial organisations - Brenner 2004). Subsequent 
chapters will focus upon the pro-activeness of the state, as part of its 
reconfiguration process. 
Under this transformationalist view of state reconfiguration, it is suggested that 
the term `nation-state' is replaced by `national-state'. Nation-state implies `state- 
centrism', which is no longer appropriate as a unit of analysis; however, it can 
be used as synonymous to the terms `country' or 'nation'. Instead, the `national- 
state' term responds better to the reconfiguration of the state, as it is involved 
within the dynamic and 'transformational ist' process of globalisation (Robinson, 
2004). Under the process of globalisation the pre-existing system of nation- 
states is important; however, other processes and institutions not based on the 
traditional concept of the state might also be taking place (Skiair, 2001: 2). 
Some authors opine that international forces played a critical role in Mexico's 
transition to neoliberalism (Fourcade-Gourinchas & Babb, 2002). These forces 
include the globalisation of finance in the late 1970s and the debt crisis that 
affected many developing countries. In particular the debt crisis is considered 
as part of a broader historical process of globalisation (ibid). Mexican 
policymakers during the 1980s were influenced by the American higher 
education system favouring liberal markets (Coatsworth, 1999; Fourcade- 
Gourinchas & Babb, 2002). This influence was reflected in Mexico's adoptation 
of structural adjustment recommendations by the IMF. The restructuring 
measures were adopted in the 1980s, reaching their peak during the Salinas 
presidency (1988-1994). 
President Salinas aimed for political modernisation which had combined 
neoliberal principles with civil society's democratic aspirations. Civil society put 
pressure upon the state as a response to the repressive strategies that the 
authoritarian regime had been implementing since the late 1960s. Neoliberal 
and democratic transitions have gone hand in hand in the study of modern 
politics in Latin America (Conaghan, 1992; Fourcade-Gourinchas & Babb, 
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2002). In Mexico, neoliberal polices broke with the interventionist and 
protectionist character of the authoritarian regime by minimising the state's 
public expenditure and regulation of the economy. As a consequence new 
social forces assumed roles that were performed by government, hence being 
able to challenge the state's authority (i. e. provision of public services by the 
private and voluntary sectors) (Wise et al., 2003). Reduced state 
interventionism weakened the authoritarian regime's corporatist structure, giving 
way to more political spaces where opposition groups could interact. The 
combination of external forces - pursuing the implementation of neoliberalism - 
with internal forces - aiming for an electoral democracy - has enhanced 
Mexico's electoral participation through the rise of opposition forces at national 
and local levels; it has promoted pluralism between actors of the public and the 
private sectors in policy decisions; and has diminished the repressive actions of 
government against rebellious social groups (without being completely 
eradicated) (Rochlin, 1997). 
In the study of the relationship between neoliberalism and democracy, a liberal 
stream of thought has been able to analyse the impact upon political and 
societal arenas (Linz & Stepan, 1996; Diamond, 1999). At the same time, in 
trying to understand this relationship, a radical stream of thought has argued 
that the promotion of democracy aims to support the establishment of 
neoliberalism in Latin America - and global capitalism in a more general context. 
This later stream of thought sees popular democratic principles as being 
undermined by liberal democracy (Robinson, 1996). 
The next sections discuss each of the two streams of thought for understanding 
the process of democratisation in Mexico. The first perspective refers to liberal 
development theories in which the achievement of a democratic state (through 
electoral institutions) offers better prospects "for accountable, responsive, 
peaceful, predictable, good governance" (Diamond, 1999: 3). These prospects 
are reflected in the institutional reforms that Mexico, until the early 2000s, has 
taken to achieve democratisation. The second perspective complements the 
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former by referring to electoral institutions as the starting point for promoting 
democracy at a transnational scale (Robinson, 1996). It also illustrates Mexico's 
democratic tendencies within a global context. 
2.2. Liberal perspective as a base for democratisation 
The liberal democratic perspective considers the process of attaining 
democracy as the best prospect for human development and modernisation. 
The process of democracy requires free and fair elections, which at the same 
time require political rights (such as right of free expression, organisation and 
opposition). The process of democratisation tends to maximise opportunities for 
self-determination and self-governing insofar as persons are able to live under 
the laws they have chosen. In addition, it is argued that democracy under 
liberalism provides the best means for people to protect and advance their 
shared interests which turn around individual property rights (Diamond, 1999, 
ch. 1). 
Latin American studies on democratisation have linked democracy and 
capitalism insofar as the former has been able to provide more stability and 
certainty to global capitalist interests guiding these countries' development 
(Robinson, 1996). The compatibility of neoliberal democracy with global 
capitalism illustrates why it was mainly pro-business groups in many countries 
such as Bolivia, Chile, Peru, Venezuela and Mexico that led the mobilisations 
promoting democratic regimes (Conaghan, 1992; Loaeza, 1991). 
Under this perspective, the first stage of democratisation is a country's transition 
to democracy. Transition "requires open contestation over the right to win 
control of the government, and this in turn requires free competitive elections, 
the results of which determines who governs" (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 3). The 
emphasis given to fair and competitive elections is based on Joseph 
Schumpeter's statement on the creation of free and competitive electoral 
institutions and on Robert Dahl's concept of `polyarchy'. However, polyarchy 
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considers electoral institutions as necessary but not sufficient to the highest 
feasible attainment of the democratic process (Dahl, 1989: 222). 
This perspective has been criticised for separating and then linking the 
economic and political spheres. This has reduced democratic procedures and 
social life to the notions of individualism and to the reflection of the operating 
principles of the market and exchange value (Cole & Lambie, 2005). As a result, 
this contradiction has helped to maintain social inequalities under capitalism 
(Boron, 1995; Robinson, 1996). Robinson acknowledges this contradiction to 
the influence of Max Weber on Talcott Parsons' argument, who defines 
democracy as a separation of the political sphere from the economic sphere 
(1996: 49-51). But despite this separation, the liberal perspective still links the 
two spheres through the institutionalisation of markets as a necessary arena to 
consolidate a democracy (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 14). Markets are 
institutionalised insofar as they follow legal and regulatory frameworks enforced 
by the state apparatus. They are important for providing a material base for 
pluralism and the autonomy of civil and political societies (idem). 
Free competitive elections are required as a way to enable the transition to 
democracy (Linz & Stepan, 1996). But electoral contestation has to be 
institutionalised for its consolidation, in the form of legal guarantees anchored in 
the rule of law and maintained by an impartial state apparatus. In addition, 
freedom of association and communication is necessary for democratic 
consolidation, thus giving an important role to civil society (Linz & Stepan, 
1996: 14). In other words, to achieve consolidation the axis for a democratic 
transition relies on competitive elections. And the necessary satellites that turn 
around the axis are the conditions of civil society's freedom, constitutional rules 
to allocate power democratically, accountability, and sufficient autonomy for a 
market economy to maintain a material base. 
Even though this perspective has emphasised the creation of fair and free 
electoral institutions, it has also recognised that it is a `minimalist' way of 
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understanding democracy. The empirical analysis of many countries developing 
electoral institutions, where significant portions of the population are mainly 
excluded from contesting for power or defending their interests, has underlined 
the need to focus on other arenas (satellites) that would help to improve or 
consolidate a liberal democracy (Diamond, 1999; Linz & Stepan, 1996). The 
characteristics of this perspective are further illustrated with reference to the 
Mexican case. 
2.2.1. Mexico's democratic transition and consolidation. According to the 
liberal democracy perspective, Mexico's transition to democracy was initiated 
with the progressive defeat of the authoritarian regime in the late 1970s. The 
primary strategy (the axis) to achieve this transition was through the rise of 
competitive politics in 1979 up until the 2000 elections that helped to earn 
Mexico its democratic status (Levy & Bruhn, 2001: 112). Despite these 
achievements a democratic regime has not been guaranteed as many 
limitations have been identified regarding the satellite conditions stated above. 
These limitations have led some Mexicanists to term the country's regime as a 
`semidemocracy'. Firstly, it still shows several elements that characterised the 
old authoritarian regime (i. e. limits to freedom of organisation and sequels of 
presidentialism3 - Levy & Bruhn, 2001: ch. 1). Secondly, new social and political 
changes, at national and local levels, have shown a potential to jeopardise the 
consolidation of democracy by turning back to repressive regimes (Cornelius et 
al., 1999). 
Competitive elections as the axis for democratisation. Mexico started to develop 
competitive elections through the 1977 reform of the Law of Political 
Organisations and Electoral Procedures (LOPPE). This reform gave more 
3 Presidentialism is understood as an "... individual leader ... 
[that] captures the majority 
vote... and then proceeds to govern arbitrarily without restraint from party structures, 
parliamentary processes of legal or bureaucratic norms... " at a national or subnational level 
(Whitehead, 1993: 317.18). 
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space to electoral competition by allowing small political parties to register and 
by opening 100 additional seats in Congress, allocated to minority parties 
through proportional representation. The 1986 reform increased the number of 
these seats to 200 in the Chamber of Deputies and this system of 
representation also included state and municipal congresses (Levy & Bruhn, 
2001; Rodriguez & Ward, 1999). The 1990 law reform doubled the size of the 
Senate through proportional representation. In this same year the Federal Code 
of Institutions and Electoral Procedures (COFIPE) guaranteed the autonomy of 
the Federal Electoral Institute from the administration in office. The COFIPE 
underwent sweeping reforms during the period of 1990-96. Among the various 
points reformed, inclusive and equal citizenship (as electorate) was recognised 
as an important element within federal and local electoral processes (COFIPE, 
1996). Citizen participation has been recognised by plebiscite and referendum 
devices which tend to focus on specific political arenas; however, this varies 
across the localities (Alvarez & Castro, 1999). Additionally, as a way to 
guarantee contested elections across the country, state-level electoral institutes 
have been created in order to regulate state and municipal elections. 
Evidence on this transition to democracy has been observed by scholars 
(Cornelius et al, 1999: 6; Levy & Bruhn, 2001: 101; Middlebrook, 2004) through 
the PRI losing the absolute majority in Congress in 1997; by the National Action 
Party (PAN)4 winning the national elections in 2000; by the Revolutionary 
Democratic Party (PRD)5 winning Mexico City's mayoral election in 1997, and 
when political control was ceded to opposition party governments governing 
between 55 and 60 percent of the total population in 1999. However, this 
competition has been mostly contested by these three political parties which 
tend to favour free market principles, especially the PAN and the PRI. This 
4 The PAN represents a conservative political position on the right and it is the oldest opposition 
party to the PRI. 
5 The PRD represents the left political position. It was created after the 1988 elections but its 
predecessor was the National Democratic Front. 
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limited competition shows an example of how free elections are not a sufficient 
condition of inclusiveness and thus other conditions have to be considered. 
Other (satellite) conditions for democratisation. The first condition or principle to 
consolidate a democracy refers to civil society freedom of association and 
expression. A way to legitimise the political system and political power is 
through the independence of the development and dissemination of ideas and 
information from the powerful to secure their authority (Beetham, 1991: 105; 
Gramsci, 1971). Within the consolidation process, Mexico has overcome 
several of the co-opting strategies that limited information during the 
authoritarian system by allowing, for example, its presidents and ministers be 
criticised by the media. 
However, limitations on freedom of expression can be identified by the 
monopolisation of the media by a few wealthy groups, who generally support 
the government in office at national or state levels (Levy & Bruhn, 2001: 116- 
119). Regarding the quality of information, limitations have been identified by 
the lack of clarity on issues like legal public policy, drug trafficking and corrupt 
activities by politicians or officials in office. In relation to freedom of association, 
it can be said that it has been improved markedly by the emergence of political 
competition and of a more participative civil society through the creation of 
NGOs and civic organisations committed to social development (Santin, 2004). 6 
But just like the authoritarian regime that did not permit legally organised threats 
to its rule, due to its corporatist system, new opposition governments like local 
PAN administrations seem intolerant to social organisations that do not fit with 
its individual-citizen participation methods (this is further developed in Chapter 
8). ' The result of all these limitations tends towards a `legitimacy deficit' caused 
by a lack of confidence on the part of the constituents in the governing group in 
charge of maintaining and promoting the political system. 
6 The number of NGOs increased by 191.33% from 1995 to 2000. 
7 See also Arzaluz, 2002; Ramirez-Salz, 1998; Ziccardi, 1998. 
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The second condition for democratisation is constitutionalism to guarantee the 
rule of law. Here a hierarchy of norms is established to make action upon and 
by other arenas legitimate and predictable (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 14). 
Nevertheless, this predictability is threatened for example when corruption is 
tied to the political leadership selection process. During the authoritarian regime 
(1930-1990), the appointment of leaders was very common to maintain the 
regime's stability. By the early 2000s, corruption was diminished by a 
competitive leader-selection process within political parties. Open and free 
markets have rendered this type of process more accountable insofar as 
transnational consultants (i. e. Standard and Poors Annual Report - S&P, 2001) 
evaluate a locality's level of political competitiveness and transparency. This 
evaluation has worked as an indicator for investment -a relevant indicator if 
local governments want to develop and promote economic growth. 
However, the strong focus in calling for international scrutiny has undermined 
the development of the local institutions - such as the judiciary or other 
governmental bodies' capacity-building (Levy & Bruhn, 2001: 137-38). At state 
and municipal levels, contested elections have helped in several cases to 
diminish corrupt activities by the checks and balances associated with a 
continuous alternation of political parties in office, especially between the PAN 
and the PRI. 8 It can be said thus, that the checks and balances promoted by 
competitive elections as well as by the international community have enhanced 
transparent procedures, but still local levels of enhancement are required. 
A third condition for democratic consolidation is accountability. Fair elections 
provide a means for vertical accountability', but horizontal accountability also 
8 When a PAN administration has been followed by a PRI government, corruption has still been 
found. The main difference in comparison to authoritarian times relies in that the accused have 
been punished and more complete information of the facts has been publicised (Ramirez-Säiz, 
1998). 
9 Vertical accountability "permits citizens to voice their demands to public officials... and to 
denounce these same officials from wrong acts that they may commit" (O'Donnell, 1998: 113). 
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needs to be attained through liberalism and republicanism (0' Donnell, 1998). It 
is the existence of the last two conditions that will promote a more democratic 
system in countries like Mexico. Liberalism as a promoter of freedom diminishes 
`encroachment', which occurs when one public agency trespasses upon the 
lawful authority of another, violating its autonomy or freedom. Republicanism as 
a promoter of the public good and of highest values "prohibits encroachment 
and strongly condemns corruption" (1998: 121). In order words, vertical 
accountability of the rulers to the ruled is important, but also horizontal 
accountability among officeholders in order to constrain executive power and to 
protect constitutionalism and deliberative processes (Diamond, 1999: 10). 
In Mexico, with the development of competitive elections, elite networks have 
had to adjust to the new system that has tended to be more plural. First, this 
has encouraged the creation of professionalized preventive agencies like 
general accounting offices and rational-legal bureaucratic norms (i. e. sufficient 
taxable surpluses). However, this system has been achieved by federal, state 
and municipal agencies that have sufficient capacity to meet such 
responsibilities, leaving the poorer (rural) municipalities behind (Garcia, 1999). 
Second, competitive elections have created a generation of `technocrats' 
supporting neoliberal policies, but who have had a distant connection with the 
people; at the same time, old techniques of control and co-option have 
continued to be used. 1° 
Progress regarding accountability has also been achieved as the degree of 
presidentialism has decreased. This means that deliberate appointment in 
political posts has diminished and that the president has stopped being the 
monopolist of political power. But the continuation of traditional centralism and 
fiefdom leaders allied to the old regime across the country, has encouraged 
divisive regional/local differences that could threaten national consolidation of 
democracy (Cornelius, 1999). It seems that "the democratizing system has 
10 The creation of PRONASOL by President Salinas, in the early 1990s, became a strategy to 
unite technocratic ideals with the protectionist and patronage mechanisms of authoritarianism. 
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struggled to limit presidency without fatally weakening it" (Levy & Bruhn, 2001: 
133). By maintaining a strong presidency (which is not only reflected in the 
President but also in governors at state and municipal levels), effectiveness is 
achieved by following local development objectives. This, in combination with a 
weak horizontal accountability ensures only a partial progress toward 
democracy. It is partial insofar as executive decisions could be held to be above 
the rule of law, ignoring the limits stated by republicanism. Additionally, a weak 
judiciary, despite a more active legislature in elaborating checks and balances 
to the executive, threatens republican principles even further (Rodriguez & 
Ward, 1999). 
Finally, human rights abuses against dissident students, popular groups, 
peasants or professional journalists are not a new topic in Mexico as they have 
occurred throughout the authoritarian regime. What is surprising is that these 
abuses are persistent despite the actual demands for vertical accountability by 
Mexican civil society (Levy & Bruhn, 2001: 139). This persistence threatens 
liberal rights. As a result, it challenges democratisation insofar as the freedom 
that this political order is supposed to offer is undermined by coercive acts. This 
characteristic reflects how a political regime (whatever its type) tends to use 
consensual and coercive mechanisms simultaneously. 
The last of the conditions facilitating a democratic consolidation regards the 
institutionalisation of markets. Institutionalised markets assure the socio-political 
acceptance of a free-market system and the roll back of the state economy 
(Linz & Stepan, 1996). Power in policymaking has been shared between 
governmental bodies and market organisations in order to favour the 
environment for capital development. This, as a result, enhances property rights 
and the autonomy of civil society in order to make actors (the media, social and 
private organisations) more active and responsible in public affairs; both 
important for pursuing vertical and horizontal accountability (O'Donnell, 1998). 
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The inclusion of market systems within democratic conceptions stresses the 
contradiction of the liberal perspective. The consolidation of market systems as 
a condition to provide a material base in a democratic political order stresses 
the importance of private property. On the one hand, this perspective 
legitimises "social and economic inequalities and privileges which rest in the 
monopolization by minorities of society's material resources" (Robinson, 1996: 
52). But on the other hand, this perspective's democratic principles emphasise 
the importance of human equality and popular sovereignty. This contradiction 
has been overshadowed by the separation of the political sphere from the 
economic sphere, which has aimed for a political arrangement that legitimises 
inequalities within and between nations. These inequalities are enhanced by 
global production processes that favour capital and labour flexibilisation (Boron, 
1995, chl; Robinson, 1996). 
As neoliberal policies have been carried out during the last twenty five years, it 
has been observed that "privileged Mexicans are more likely to enjoy access to 
freed media, organise effectively in autonomous interest groups and in 
elections, and become part of the decision-making leadership" (Levy & Bruhn, 
2001: 141). These privileged groups include the middle and upper classes 
across the country, coined as the `strong Mexico'. It has also been observed 
that strikes and demonstrations organised by popular or peasant groups have 
had political impact but have faced greater coercion than the protests organised 
by more privileged groups. As a response, government has used repressive 
mechanisms to keep the mass groups in line, but it does not go as far as the 
law would allow in controlling, for example, business or the Catholic Church 
(Levy & Bruhn, 2001: 142-44). 
Besides the political inequalities that social classes encounter, there also 
remain serious socioeconomic inequalities, especially regarding income 
distribution. In 2000, more than the 50% of the population was considered as 
poor. The richest 10% of the population received 42% of the national income, 
while the poorest 40% received just over 11 % of income (Wise et al., 2003: 3). 
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These facts underscore the `equity trade-off of liberal democracy in which 
"deprived majorities will at some future point win justice and equality through the 
freedoms afforded by liberal democracy" (Robinson, 1996: 64). Additionally, a 
reason justifying the repression and co-opting of marginalised groups - which 
have been considered as legacies of the authoritarian regime - is the existence 
of coercive mechanisms that underpin the social order in any type of regime. 
Physical repression has been a last resort within a democracy. The last resort 
premise relies on the domination trade-off which first tries to convince through 
legitimate means rather than repression. Even though the existence of poverty 
may not be considered as physical repression, the material repression that 
capitalist societies generate cannot be denied. 
Neoliberal reforms in Latin America have been considered effective tools for 
democratic consolidation. In the absence of such reforms, `populist' 
democracies (following the masses interests) might generate unstable, 
ineffective and incoherent regimes (Whitehead, 1993: 321). Consequently, to 
suppress popular demands, many features of a full liberal democracy (i. e. high 
participation, authentic political choice, extensive citizenship rights) are violated 
or limited by the neoliberal regime. These contradictions weaken the influence 
of the power structure's legitimacy, as the ideas and norms that support this 
legitimacy encounter a low credibility by society (Beetham, 1991). " 
These contradictions of liberal democracy have prompted some academics to 
focus on `popular democracy'. This approach considers citizen participation as a 
political sphere that is not separated from the economic sphere. Citizen and 
social participation are considered as an instrument for empowering 
11 This low credibility can be observed in the unchanged 53% of Mexicans who preferred 
democracy as a political regime in 1996 and 2003. In 2002 it reached 63%, its highest point 
since 1996. However, the highest percentage does not coincide with the biggest changes 
favouring contested elections during the period of 1996-2000, which in theory should have 
made more people prefer democracy (data from the World Bank cited in The Economist, 
1/11/2003). 
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marginalised groups. Liberal democracy has considered civil participation as a 
means to contribute to development, but it has fallen down in incorporating 
participation in the planning and execution stages of policymaking. This 
incorporation has been studied further by scholars who consider participation as 
part of project planning and evaluation (Schonwalder, 1997; Taylor, 2003). 
The criticisms raised by the supporters of popular democracy have prompted 
liberal supporters to argue that the consolidation of democracy is a `perfectible' 
and `open-ended' process (Dahl, 1989; Diamond, 1999). It needs to consider, in 
addition to the satellite conditions, a more inclusive and rigorous participation as 
well as a continuous growth of citizens' knowledge, resources and competence. 
With all these conditions taken into account, the mass public and the legitimacy 
of elected officials may increase. Beyond this, increasing competence in terms 
of citizenship and participation in the political process will spill over into other 
arenas of social life such as: an increased civic engagement and community 
networks, and the generation of trust, reciprocity and cooperation (Diamond, 
1999: 18-19). Many of these latter conditions have been encompassed under 
the study of `governance', which this thesis considers as a process within 
democratisation (see Chapter 4). 
Despite the differences in the use of democratic principles in liberal democracy 
and popular democracy, politicians have introduced a combination of 
representative and participatory methods within the policy process generating, 
as a result, a conflated conception of democracy. As a response to the latter, a 
more radical perspective on democracy has been developed, which argues that 
democracy is a political strategy to support the development of global capital. 
2.3. Democratisation within a global context 
Under this perspective, Mexico's democratic `transition' and `consolidation' can 
be understood in relation to a global context. Here the economic and political 
spheres are not separated and thus the state (not in its traditional form) can 
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facilitate new economic and social relations that go beyond national institutions 
and territoriality (Brenner, 2004; Robinson, 2004). 
For Robinson, democracy is considered as an instrument that helps to maintain 
the social structure of capital accumulation. This social structure: 
refers to a set of mutually reinforced social, economic and political institutions 
and cultural and ideological norms which fuse with, and facilitate, a successful 
pattern of capital accumulation over historic periods of time (Robinson, 1996: 
32) 
It is this intertwinement of the socioeconomic and political spheres, within the 
social structure of capitalism, which highlights the main difference with the 
perspective of liberal democracy. For Robinson a new social structure has been 
emerging since the 1970s, accelerated by the globalisation of finance and 
technology. This social structure has created a single field of global capitalism 
which has been integrating various polities, cultures and institutions of different 
national societies into a transnational society. 
There are different perspectives in understanding the phenomenon of 
transnationalisation. For Leslie Sklair it is a phenomenon where processes and 
institutions cross borders but do not necessarily derive their power and authority 
from the state (2001: 2). For Robinson, the single field of global capitalism has 
led national societies to adapt to a new global order where the promotion of 
democracy has been promoted by an incipient `transnational state' (2003: 13- 
14). 
It is through the existence of a `transnational capitalist class' (TCC) that a 
primary supporter in maintaining capital globalisation is found (Robinson & 
Harris, 2000; Sklair, 2001). This class is dispersed throughout every country in 
the world. However, the dispersed foci encounter the interests of those national 
capitalist groups which favour regulatory and protectionist mechanisms, 
whereas the transnational faction looks for an expanded global economy based 
on worldwide market liberalisation (Robinson, 2004, p. 41). For Robinson this 
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class is formed by the shareholders of transnational corporations and financial 
institutions distributed worldwide; whereas for Sklair the TCC also includes 
bureaucrats, politicians, professionals, merchants and media that support the 
development of transnational corporations (2001, ch. 2). 
Robinson's (2003) analysis of the TCC is appropriate for this thesis as it has 
suggested arguments based on the case of Central America, which are similar 
for the study of Mexico. For him, it is in the interest of the TCC to support the 
development of neoliberal and democratic policies. The TCC, according to 
Robinson, is becoming a `faction of the world bourgeoisie' and it is in the 
process of attaining a global rule. As a faction it has confronted other factions 
with national capitalist interests. In Latin America, the old oligarchic landowning 
and business elites subject to ISI policies had to mould their interests to export 
markets. This moulding period has been contested by the old elite factions; 
however, a tendency of adapting and joining new groups who are oriented to 
transnational capital is increasingly observed (Robinson, 2003). This matter is 
exemplified for the Mexican case in Section 2.3.1. 
The TCC aims to find institutional means to promote, develop and maintain 
economic projects favouring global capitalism through neoliberal and 
democratic policies. Following this argument, Robinson takes Dahl's term of 
`polyarchy' a step further. He argues that polyarchy refers to a system in which 
a dominant group actually rules, and participation of decision making by the 
majority is confined to choosing among competing elites (who built transnational 
networks), in tightly controlled electoral processes (1996; 2003: 53). Thus, 
polyarchy is defined as `democracy promotion' throughout the world. The 
purpose of promoting democracy is not to suppress but to penetrate and open- 
up civil society (i. e. private organisations such as political parties, trade unions, 
or the media) and from therein integrate the subordinate classes (i. e. 
marginalised groups) and national groups, through consensual means, into a 
hegemonic transnational order (1996: 29). 
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For the TCC to dictate the character of global production, Robinson recalls the 
Marxist understanding of the state that, combined with the transnationalisation 
argument, proposes a transformation of the state. The state's transformation 
aims to "facilitate the conditions for the new type of relations developing under 
globalisation" (2004: 98). The TCC as the dominant class seeks to exercise its 
rule through political institutions. This exercise tends to control capitalist 
relations of production as well as the reproduction of political and cultural 
institutions (favouring the rule of the dominant class). The attainment of this 
exercise seems to rely on transnational institutions which have the potential to 
constitute a `transnational state'. Robinson considers that the transnational state 
may be a `multilayered' and `multicentred' apparatus which will be comprised of 
a network of nation-states together with supranational economic and political 
forums (i. e. World Bank, IMF, United Nations, OECD). 
Under this global perspective, Brenner's (2004, ch. 3) concept of the 
reconfiguration of the state can also be incorporated. He argues that 
globalisation effects have created new `state spatial strategies' that are oriented 
toward the reproduction, modification and transformation of the inherited 
frameworks of state institutions to regulate social and economic relations on 
various geographical scales. This argument underlines the significance of state 
transformation not only towards the creation of supranational bodies but also 
towards the creation of subnational state apparatuses that support global 
capitalist needs. Global economic and socio-political systems have changed the 
traditional conception of nation-states which are subject to national territoriality. 
Instead the importance of territoriality is considered as a continuously evolving 
space (Brenner, 2004; Cox, 1983; Payne, 2001, Robinson 2004). 
The global perspective has introduced into the academic debate the concept of 
transnationalisation and its implications upon the reconfiguration of the social 
class structure, the state and territoriality. Within this debate democracy can be 
considered as a political order that helps to maintain global capitalism. 
However, the pre-existing structures of the nation-state apparatus are still 
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relevant from this perspective, as they are shapers of the transnational 
environment. For example, Robinson (2003: 46) argues that national-states 
have followed new strategies to support the changes generated by global 
capitalism, by achieving macroeconomic stability (reforming fiscal and monetary 
exchange policies) and by providing infrastructure necessary for global capital 
activity (liberalisation of trade and finances, the deregulation of economic 
policies, and the privatisation of the public sphere in arenas such as public 
services, communication networks and the supply of services needed by 
transnational corporations). This can be illustrated for the case of Mexico in the 
1980s, where changes in the authoritarian regime were started to become 
apparent: 
The Mexican single-party system, coupled with weak democratic institutions, 
strong corporatism and a powerful centralized presidency, insulated 
technocratic policy makers form political pressures [against the free markets 
rationale] and enabled them to carry through reforms more quickly than would 
be tolerated in most full-fledged democracies (Fourcade-Gourinchas & Babb, 
2002: 561). 
Based on the Mexican experience, the next section presents in more detail the 
premises of this second perspective on democratisation. 
2.3.1. Mexico's democratisation in global perspective. The global 
perspective on democratisation is helpful in describing the changes in social 
relations present in Mexico during its transition to democracy and through its 
current democratic consolidation. It is not the purpose of this section to describe 
in detail all the types of social relations, it will mainly focus on those key 
changes that both the dominant groups and the subordinate groups have 
encountered during this transition. 
The authoritarian regime emanated from a revolutionary stage in 1929, where 
the ideas of national sovereignty and social justice were the premises that 
originally supported the PRI. But despite the mass ascendancy of the PRI, 
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throughout the period of power, it manifested the opposite. The contradictions to 
its premises were observed through its cordial relationship with entrepreneurs, 
the low mobilisation of social groups as a mode to restore political order, and 
the favouring of national capital accumulation (O'Donnell, 1979; Smith, 1979). 
The authoritarian state responded to two types of pressure. The first one came 
from `above' and favoured national capitalist interests. An `alliance for profits' 
existed between the state and entrepreneurs, resulting in a wide scope for 
consultation between them (Reyna, 1977). Elite entrepreneurs did not react to 
the scope of political decisions, instead they responded to the will of the 
president. Even though they did not play an active role in policymaking, 
entrepreneurs were the most privileged and influential sector as no other social 
groups challenged them (Purcell & Kaufman, 1977). The only body able to do 
this was the authoritarian state when it followed policies detrimental to the 
business sector. These detrimental policies acted as a response to the second 
pressure that came from `below' representing workers, peasants, and other 
popular groups. This pressure was generally repressed, but the morality and 
solidarity enshrined in the premises of the PRI and in the constitution led the 
state to respond to some of these groups' demands (i. e. the implementation 
distribution programmes such as the sharing of profits). However, the detriment 
of capital that these decisions generated, in the end, implied less radical 
expectations in favour of the business sector (Purcell & Kaufman, 1977). These 
two pressures led the authoritarian state to become an actor with highly- 
developed abilities of negotiation and deliberate conciliation between opposite 
interests (elites vs. masses). The mechanisms to do this were the corporatist 
structures that allowed `taking turns' as a way of avoiding conflict between 
potential competitors (Purcell & Kaufman, 1977: 207). In summary, the 
authoritarian state generated two different social strategies to deal with these 
two pressures: a government initiative in promoting business-public 
relationships and co-opted mechanisms for other social groups to relate with the 
state. 
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Additionally, dual economic policies allowed the regime become a populist 
government by addressing material needs demanded by the masses, as well as 
supporting national capital through ISI policies. But the economic crisis of 1982 
generated a political crisis where the authoritarian state no longer had the 
political and financial resources that were used to maintain stability between the 
two pressures. 12 This limitation of resources was a condition established by the 
US foreign policy in order to re-negotiate the debt and loans between Mexico 
and international financial institutions. The weakening of one-party rule allowed 
a diversity of interests to react against the old structures of authoritarianism. 
Some groups favoured neoliberal structural reforms to attain democracy; 
whereas others supported popular democracy ideals insofar as neoliberal 
policies began accentuating political and socioeconomic inequalities. 
The establishment of the new transnational elite. The 1980s international 
intervention in the promotion of neoliberal policies was followed by a threat to 
nationalism. This implied serious problems of identity as the sovereignty of the 
country was considered vital to maintain its self-determination. This was not 
only stated in the constitution through the doctrine of natural resources as a part 
of the national patrimony, but also in the bases on which economic policies 
were formulated. These economic policies underlined that "... foreign capital 
[was] not to control or even partially own any basic industries and that whenever 
possible, domestic production should substitute for imports or foreign own 
production" (Purcell & Kaufman, 1977: 199). 13 
12 The limitations of the authoritarian regime acted against high wages, the provision of 
infrastructure to cover basic needs, subsidies, and protectionist tariffs for foreign goods. 
13 The defence of national production was also reflected in the nationalisation of the Mexican oil 
in 1938 and in the 1982 bank nationalisation. However, the implementation of neoliberal policies 
prompted the re-privatisation of the bank industry in 1993; and the privatisation of the energy 
sector has been stalled due to the issue on national identity that the oil industry represents to 
Mexico. 
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However, the conditions stated by international stakeholders who adjusted the 
old economic structures clearly supported export-oriented policies that 
contradicted Mexico's ISI strategies developed after the 1950s. Additionally, the 
cuts in public expenditure and the fiscal reforms that prevented subsidies and 
extensive resource allocation to society diminished substantially the 
protectionist character of central government (based on Woo-Cummings, 1999). 
As a result, the decade of the 1990s showed, on the one hand, that decreased 
protectionism affected not only welfare policies for popular groups, but also the 
levels of competitiveness of those medium and small entrepreneurial and 
commercial sectors (within the middle class) who had previously benefited from 
a strong national market (Shadlen, 2001). 
On the other hand, the structural adjustment policies also affected the elite 
groups but the impact was more focused on their change of strategies and 
social relations in order to overcome neoliberal reforms. This was identified 
within groups of politicians and entrepreneurs. Regarding the former, the state 
bureaucracy started to encounter changes, insofar as its members were 
identified as the first generation of `technocrats' (Heredia, 1992; Morton, 2003; 
O'Donnell, 1993). They started to `normalise' the economy in terms of free and 
open markets and in favour of the roll back of the state economy. It was this 
normalisation that initiated the path for the transnationalisation of the productive 
structure in the country, intensified in the 1990s by the deregulation of prices 
and interest rates, and the privatisation (national and foreign) of parastatal 
industries. The transnationalisation of the economy changed the structures of 
the old oligarchy, by allowing foreign entrepreneurs to form relationships with 
some groups of the old elite, especially in areas where foreigners had 
competitive advantage, such as in finances (Camp, 1989). 
This new elite provided access not only to foreign direct investors but also to 
financial investors who in the medium term contributed to the globalisation of 
the financial system (Heredia, 1992, Salas-Porras, 2002). As changes in the 
oligarchic structures were developed, national entrepreneurs played a more 
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active role in trying to negotiate their position in the policymaking process. Their 
increased role was prompted by two factors: the emergence of TCC's interests 
in the country's political and economic stability in order to measure investment 
risks, and by national entrepreneurs who felt that their interests were threatened 
by international competitors. In other words a conflict of interests between 
dominant groups started to be generated within the crisis of the authoritarian 
regime. 
An example of how the authoritarian regime was no longer able to cope with the 
effects of global capital accumulation can be observed in the 1982 
nationalisation of the banking sector. This action was considered as a way to 
facilitate public debt management. For elite entrepreneurs this action was 
considered a blasphemy against private property and individual rights. So in 
order to `limit the government's discretionary authority..., its corruption, and its 
tendency to become populist" (Kleinberg, 1999: 74), these dominant groups 
aimed "... to lift the state controls over them and to create a... consultative 
mechanism where business [was] regularly informed on economic policy and 
encouraged to enter politics" (72). These aims were promoted by elite 
associations such as the Mexican Council of Businessmen and the Mexican 
Bank Association (which have been concerned with the government's 
achievement of stable macroeconomic conditions and the internationalisation of 
markets) (Luna, 2004). 
A strategy to counterbalance the government's authoritarian decisions was the 
use of existing organisational structures offered by the opposition political party, 
the PAN. The liberal ideas that entrepreneurs followed coincided with the 
ideology of this party, as it favoured property rights over the state and 
considered the vote as the most accurate form of individual political 
participation. The integration of these entrepreneurs increased the party's 
resources which helped to promote its influence on a national scale. Its 
opposition to the PRI appealed to other social groups that were also against it, 
but that did not necessarily coincide with the liberal ideas promoted by the PAN. 
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However, its innovative mobilisation drew these groups' attention. Their 
integration made of the PAN a national interclass party for some period of time 
(beyond the interests of the upper-middle class and the Catholic Church). 
Regionally, the interclass integration of the PAN promoted local entrepreneurs 
to participate in state level politics which were supported, at the same time, by 
popular groups. Initially, the states of the north started to push for transparent 
elections, achieving for the first time, by the end of the 1980s, state and 
municipal governments (Mizrahi, 1994; Rodriguez & Ward, 1994). 
The importance that the top entrepreneurial sector represented for central 
government made the following federal administrations (under the transition 
process, 1982-2000) look for strategies that attracted the private sector, making 
of it an ally instead of an enemy. Structural adjustment policies, such as 
privatisation and deregulation of markets, convinced entrepreneurs to support 
the reformed state. Additionally, debt relief schemes and the expansion of 
financial markets during the 1983-87 period; the re-privatisation of the bank in 
1993; and the active role of elite entrepreneurs during the NAFTA negotiations, 
in the first half of the 1990s, facilitated a rapprochement between public- 
business relationships on a national scale (Heredia, 1992: 16; Kleinberg, 1999). 
Hence, the PAN's potential to win the 1988 national elections was weakened 
mainly by the ability of the PRI-regime to regain the elite entrepreneurial 
sector's confidence; and by the ability of the PRD and the PRI to attract popular 
support as they represented more genuine interests or implemented co-opted 
policies such as the PRI with PRONASOL (Loaeza, 1994; Dresser, 1996; 
Zermeno, 1990). 14 
The success of the PAN was extended to other regions of the country, 
especially in urban areas within the Bajio, where the alliance of regional 
14 The PRD was identified with a political mobilisation known as Neo-Cardenismo following the 
name of its leader Cuauhtemoc Cardenas and his father Läzaro Cardenas. This mobilisation 
encompassed different groups that ranged from middle-class to popular interests, especially 
across Mexico City (Bruhn, 2000). 
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entrepreneurs and the PAN had endured throughout the last thirteen years. This 
alliance did not only incorporate local business but also popular groups that 
fought against corruption and the monopoly of central government decision 
making. The integration of these various groups and classes into one 
coordinated force created social mobilisations in the states of Guanajuato and 
in San Luis Potosi represented by Navismo, and the formation of Alianza Civica 
that could be considered a continuation of Navismo at a national level 
(Reygadas, 1998). These mobilisations emphasised electoral democracy, 
making the vote the most important form of individual participation. As the 
elected representatives of these states developed their policies, tendencies for 
democratisation were identified by promoting accountability (i. e. clean and 
competitive elections, effective management, and professionalisation of the 
bureaucracy - Garcia, 1999). However, the urban character of these 
mobilisations generated an uneven development when compared to poor rural 
municipalities with a weak financial and administrative structure. 
The last years of the PRI-rule in the 1990s were characterised by the 
implementation of neoliberal policies that coincided with the PAN's interests. 
Thus these two political parties have represented competitive dominant groups 
encompassed by neoliberal interests (Levy & Bruhn, 2001). Liberal 
individualism was promoted in national discourses, as well as citizenship in 
which civil society was also held responsible for the national project, especially 
through electoral reforms and targeted poverty programmes (O'Toole, 2003; 
Rodriguez & Ward, 1999). But apparently this social inclusion was permitted 
insofar as it legitimated neoliberal interests. 
Furthermore, the neoliberal policies implemented by the PAN and PRI, at a 
regional level, showed legacies of authoritarianism insofar as autonomous 
social organisations were not recognised by local authorities. Only those that 
participated through the channels sponsored by the state were validated 
(Haber, 1990; Morales & Contreras, 2000; Valencia, 1995). These local 
governments `neutralised' and `moderated' the demands of social mobilisations 
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in order to maintain the new capitalist regime, but introduced at the same time a 
more plural representation (Loaeza, 1994). This illustrates how dominant 
interest concentrated in government and elite groups sought to impose policies 
from above, but were constrained by the participative rights promoted by 
popular social mobilisations. 15 
Popular (subordinate group) mobilisations. Mexico's incorporation into an open 
economy affected directly the national sovereignty and social justice that the 
authoritarian state promoted throughout the post-revolutionary era. Neoliberal 
policies negatively affected the levels of real wages and public expenditure 
oriented towards education, health services, housing, and food subsidies - all of 
them benefiting (and protecting) popular groups. 16 The flexibilisation of the 
economy weakened unions, shifting union mobilisations out of the labour arena. 
Instead, these mobilisations started to become concentrated in urban areas in 
the various cities in the country that made demands based on material needs. 
During the 1980s important urban social groups demonstrated in Mexico City 
(Hellman, 1994), in various central and northern localities (Arzaluz, 1995; 
Haber, 1990; Pansters, 1996) and in the south such as the case of Juchitän 
(Rubin, 1997). Many of these social mobilisations not only demanded material 
needs, but also attacked those in power for their excluded participation. Also, 
these mobilisations were critical of the monopolisation of power by the state, 
reflected through its corporatist and co-optative mechanisms, especially with the 
sectors representing workers, peasants and urban popular groups (Evans, 
1999; Foweraker & Craig, 1990). In other words, these subordinate groups that 
15 This point is also discussed by Robinson, 2003; Roberts, 2005. 
16 Real wages declined by about two thirds between 1980 and 1994. Other data calculated that 
almost 60% of the Mexican population lived below the poverty line, while 30% of Mexican 
households lived below the poverty line. Income distribution did not vary much between 1950 
and 1992 in the lowest and highest decile groups of society. Those who benefited the most 
were the middle deciles, who encountered a negative shock in the mid 1990s economic crisis 
(Various sources cited in Levy & Bruhn, 2001: 157 &176). 
36 
represented a majority formed part of the democratic social movement that 
originated during the transition period 
The concurrence of social dissatisfaction and the strength gained by opposition 
parties offered structural opportunities for many of these social organisations to 
become part of the political arena. Some joined the Neo-Cardenista political 
movement, whereas others joined the PAN. This implied for the parties an 
extension of their agenda by demanding material needs as social and political 
rights which promoted democratic participation. This participation argued for 
`fair dealing with authorities', challenging the `clientelistic' relations which had 
prevailed during the authoritarian stage (Foweraker, 1995). " 
Some scholars (Loaeza, 1991) have categorised the integration of social 
movement organisations into political parties as a continuation of a co-opted 
system, since social organisations have depended on the interests of political 
leaders. This has characterised social organisations as bodies with low or 
moderate power of mobilisation, as they have been bounded by the structures 
of electoral institutions. Additionally, it has been argued (Zermeno, 1990: 170) 
that social movement organisations want to `decorporatise' themselves by 
`corporatising' under different rules. Furthermore, this re-corporatisation 
supposes a `bureaupolitics' in which social leaders are absorbed by the higher 
bureaucratic circles of politics. This illustrates Robinson's argument regarding 
the important role of political parties as a means to integrate civil society into the 
neoliberal discourse. 
Joe Foweraker (1993) states that social movements depend to some degree on 
political leadership to define and encourage their formation, specifically social 
movements in Mexico that seek institutional recognition in order to gain material 
17 Clientelistic support consisted of electoral support in exchange of favours benefiting these 
social groups and their leaders. 
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improvement. 18 Social organisations are limited but not determined by the 
formal institutional structures of the political system (i. e. legal framework). This 
means that social organisations are able to shape institutional relationships, 
bringing to bear a major influence, when they help to build the profile of 
opposition parties during democratic transition (Foweraker, 1995). For the latter 
to happen, social movements have defended their `organisational autonomy' in 
order to negotiate with their counterparts. In other words, social (popular) 
movements in Mexico institutionalise themselves when they achieve: 
... incremental negotiation and renegotiation of the links between popular 
movements and the dominant institutions of national political life, and it is 
precisely in seeking and shaping their linkage with the political system that 
popular movements have contributed to changes in its institutional configuration 
(Foweraker, 1993: 153) 
This statement offers an optimistic view as long as it recognises the ability of 
social movements to influence the institutional political configuration (despite 
the costs implied in becoming part of a political party). 19 The perspective 
illustrates the shift that Latin American social movements encountered in the 
1980s. They sought for a political representation in order to move away from a 
`nationalist-populist' regime. This latter regime referred to the populace as the 
essence, to the nation as the community threatened by external dominance, 
and to the state as the unit of change, but also of expression and national 
defence (Touraine, 1987: 142). However, this regime was undermined insofar 
as globalisation started to blur the importance of territoriality and to diminish the 
18The alliance with political parties distinguishes social movements as a blend of class interests. 
This blend has characterised mobilisations in Latin America as popular rather than social. Class 
categories were not maintained as strong nationalism was emphasised instead. This 
nationalism was a method of defence against external (foreign) intervention during authoritarian 
or dictatorship periods in the region, which at the same time followed values of independence 
from colonial rule (Foweraker, 1995; Touraine, 1987). 
19 'Cost' refers mainly to the trade-off that social mobilisations encounter in moving away from 
the principles of popular democracy in exchange for integrating themselves into the hegemonic 
regime, for example. 
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protectionist character of the state; giving entrance instead to the ideals of 
electoral democracy. 20 
It has been recognised that these mobilisations have influenced the local level 
as they were able to attain the interests that the community claimed in terms of 
services, regulation reforms, electoral transparency, and promotion of 
citizenship in local political agendas. However, this influence impacted upon the 
implementation stage of policymaking rather than the design or formulation 
stage, which followed elite interests in favour of neoliberalism and (a limited) 
pluralism (Dresser, 1996; Foweraker, 1995; 2001). Social movements called the 
regime's structures into question, and in the Mexican case, they were able to 
democratise political relations. The success of social movements depended on 
the ability to negotiate the complexities of the institutional terrains (legal and 
organisational relations), in linking the movement with the governmental domain 
(Foweraker, 1993). 
From the optimistic point of view, the uncertainty of the democratic transition 
rendered the accommodation of social-movement organisations within existing 
institutions as the most feasible alternative. But the incorporation of these 
organisations into political parties identified inconsistencies insofar as the 
movement's objectives moved away from popular democratic principles. Some 
authors (Olle, 1990; Diani, 2001) rather than considering this as a reason for 
avoiding their institutionalisation, argue that an opportunity is presented through 
an `institutional learning process'. This process with time will overcome 
deficiencies encountered between social organisations and political parties. 
Furthermore, the success of social movements can be enhanced when at the 
end of the wave of collective action, there is a greater integration of leaders and 
20 Examples on how Mexican social movements tended to support representative politics can be 
observed in various regional mobilisations. Navismo in the state of San Luis Potosi or the 
Barzön Movement in the north and the centre of the country during the 1980s and the 1990s 
offer some details (see Appendix 1.1 for more information). 
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activists within political and entrepreneurial elite circles (Diani, 2001). 21 This 
leads to a formation of new social networks that can facilitate the incorporation 
of the demands of social movement into the political agenda, despite the 
uncertainty and inconsistency that this incorporation may imply in the beginning 
Moreover, the institutionalisation of social movements has also been identified 
through their collaboration with state sponsored participatory councils and their 
alliance with NGOs (Foweraker, 2001; Schonwalder, 1997; Ziccardi, 1998). The 
former are considered as a source of resources, whereas the latter are 
considered as a strength to enhance social organisations' capacity- building and 
as a means for linking strategies and lobbying. Both, the relationships of social 
organisations with political parties and their alliance and participation with 
NGO's and state-sponsored programmes are considered as key factors to 
influence the implementation policies and to extend their influence in policy 
decisions, at the same time that co-option is diminished. 
However, for radical scholars these arguments tend to support the legitimisation 
of neoliberalism (Robinson, 1996). This is shown by the incorporation of social 
and political rights into normative, regulative and rhetorical levels of the political 
system in Mexico, both nationally and locally. Thus, it seems that democratic 
consolidation requires legally constituted organisations to be able to participate 
in the political system. It is also argued (Zermeno, 1997) that the 
transnationalisation of Mexico's economy, since the 1980s, has dismantled 
collective identities - created during authoritarianism such as unions, social and 
political organisations, grassroots organisations - that were found to be 
obstructing the global capital order. 
As a result, this type of scholars and practitioners argue that a more genuine 
contraposition to global capitalism has emerged through anti-capitalist 
21 The entrepreneurial elite is as important as the political elite due to the strong relationship 
between both within the Mexican context, especially as two of them comply in favour of 
capitalism. 
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movements where social forces operating through nationally-based movements 
are slowly transposing the transnational space through their mobilisation and 
their capacity to place demands on the system (Robinson, 1998/99: 127; 
Kingsnorth, 2004). 22 This contraposition is justifiable insofar as neoliberalism 
keeps accentuating economic and political inequalities by permitting: 
... the presence, at the same time, of disorder, disidentity, and anomie on the 
one hand, and transition to democracy and desire for integration on the other. 
But in societies hit by population growth, stagnation and globalisation the 
predominance of the latter is merely wishful thinking, if not the naked ideology 
of domination (Zermeno, 1997: 190). 
From this discussion between the optimistic and radical positions it is quite clear 
that it is debatable what social mobilisations need to do to achieve more 
genuine results from the process of democratisation. An important point 
underlined by the radical position concerns how social movements' attainments 
can be absorbed by capitalist dominating interests, if the latter tend to dominate 
electoral institutions. The new social relationships originating from the changes 
in economic and political structures tend to incorporate in their discourse 
inclusive and basic civil rights that the mobilisations of the 1980s claimed. 
However, this discourse may be considered a legal and normative `disguise' as 
in practice many forms of exclusion, elitism and neo-capitalist interests continue 
to dominate the economic and political structures. Using Larry Diamond's 
words, democracy is not an `unmitigated blessing' due to its myriad 
interpretations and threats (1999: 2). This ambiguity can turn out to be perverse 
if it satisfies a minority's interests. In the same way, governance as process 
nested in the process of democratisation can be interpreted as perverse insofar 
as it encourages civil networks and responsibilities oriented in favour of a 
minority's interests. 
22 The Zapatista Movement is an example on how social movements have begun to 
transnationalise in Mexico by reaching national and international support (Kingsnorth, 2004: 




First, this chapter discussed how neoliberalism, understood as a set of 
principles based on the ideology of free markets, was implemented in Mexico as 
an economic strategy that helped to overcome the country's 1982 debt crisis. 
Neoliberalism facilitated Mexico's integration into a world economy that has 
been shaped by the globalisation of capital. Neoliberalism in Mexico implied not 
only changes in the country's economic reconfiguration, but also changes in the 
political and societal spheres (including the state's reconfiguration). 
Second, the chapter looked at how the reconfiguration of the state fits into a 
transformationalist theoretical view, which argues that the state and its 
relationship with civil society has broken with state-centrism. Instead, the 
analysis includes the national-state as a unit of study insofar as processes and 
institutions apart from the traditional concept of the nation-state were also taking 
place. The phenomenon of globalisation had tended to create a social space 
with polymorphic levels and scales, involving at the same time, a state 
reconfiguration characterised by its pro-activeness. 
Third, neoliberalism in Mexico combined with civil society's aspiration to 
democracy, which responded to the repression of the authoritarian regime. The 
development of neoliberal and democratic policies enhanced Mexico's electoral 
institutions but, within its democratisation process, popular aspirations have 
been marginalised by dominant groups that have been able to mould economic 
and political strategies in favour of global capitalism. Based upon the 
democratisation path that Mexico has undertaken two theoretical perspectives 
were identified: liberal democracy and democracy in a global context. 
Drawing of both perspectives, I sought to construct a broader theoretical 
framework that is able to contextualise Mexico's contemporary politics. Even 
though each perspective differs strongly in their epistemological position 
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(separation/unity of economic and political spheres, fixed/changing nation-state 
territoriality), they complemented each other in my analysis. The conditions for 
democratisation (axis and satellites) of the first perspective have been useful to 
understand the internal organisational and managerial change that the state 
apparatus has encountered under democracy. These changes refer to open 
information, accountability and the promotion of pluralism. 
The second perspective has been useful in contextualising democracy on a 
global scale. Under this perspective attention has been paid to changes in 
social relations and the reconfiguration of statehood beyond traditional territory. 
The restructuring policies that Mexico has followed in response to 
transnationalisation, and for which national-states have worked proactively, 
have been significant to contextualise Mexico's position in its transition to 
democracy. The next chapter discusses Mexico's decentralisation strategies, 
which exemplify the pro-activeness of the state in this context. 
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Chapter 3- Mexico's municipal decentralisation 
Introduction 
Decentralisation policies have been a phenomenon that has accompanied the 
democratisation process in Mexico, although interpretations of the effects of 
decentralisation vary (Courchene et al., 2000; Cornelius, et al. 1999; Levy & 
Bruhn, 2001). The transition from authoritarianism to a more pluralistic regime 
and its conjunctional implications - like the economic and political crises, 
structural adjustment reforms, the increasing socioeconomic and political 
inequalities- have raised the importance of decentralisation as a `positive trend' 
to achieve administrative simplification as well as more political equality. As a 
result, states and municipalities have acquired a more relevant role in the 
policymaking process in order to start implementing the consolidation tasks. 
The development of decentralisation policies in Mexico has partly been 
promoted by two factors: the declarations of transnational planning 
organisations in favour of political and fiscal decentralisation (OECD, 1998; 
Giugale & Webb, 2000) and the planning and implementation of these policies 
by federal government (Cabrero, 1996; Ziccardi, 1998). The international and 
national promotion of decentralisation, in parallel to democratisation, has 
increased the relevance of concepts such as: competitive elections, 
accountability, shared responsibility, equal development, and participation. In 
this setting, decentralisation and democratisation are advantageous for 
achieving effective policymaking (OECD, 1998). 
This chapter argues that the intertwining of the concepts of democratisation and 
decentralisation has been a strategy to promote Mexico's global 
competitiveness at the urban level. The first section of this chapter discusses 
how decentralisation policies have been interpreted in Mexico. The second 
section describes briefly the evolution of decentralisation since 1982 (a key year 
for democratic transition) and how it has increased municipal responsibilities in 
Mexican urban policymaking. The final section focuses on theories of 
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urbanisation and how they illuminate the democratising and decentralising 
strategies of Mexican cities. 
3.1. Decentralisation policies in Mexico 
"... [D]ecentralisation means both reversing the concentration of administration 
at a single centre and conferring powers of local government" (Smith, 1985: 1). 
In the study of politics decentralisation refers to the territorial distribution of 
power. It involves different kinds of hierarchy that combine different institutions 
and functions with the effect of delegating powers to lower-level governments 
(1985: 2). 
Territorial distribution can refer to the subdivision of a unitary state or to 
federalism which divides political power in a constitutional way. The case of 
Mexico is based on federalism - where its constituents (states) have their own 
internal local government (municipalities) - which employs a system of 
administrative and political coordination and collaboration. The combination of 
institutions and functions within the process of decentralisation has promoted 
administrative decentralisation as a particular policy for decentralising functions. 
This case happens when authority is passed to a body that is appointed rather 
than elected, and that is managerial, administrative or expert, rather than 
political (Pollitt, et al., 1998: 6). 
Decentralisation has also occurred through political decentralisation. This type 
of decentralisation can be achieved in two ways: by central government 
decentralising authority over some particular tasks to elected local government; 
and by increasing the authority of appointed bodies, elected from a sectoral field 
rather than from a universal constituency. In the latter case candidates may be 
ordinary citizens rather than professional politicians (Pollitt, et al., 1998: 6). 
Administrative decentralisation and political decentralisation (including its two 
variations) have been enhanced in Mexico through the promotion of neoliberal 
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policies, competitive elections and accountability. The high level of 
indebtedness of the Mexican government in the early 1980s prompted 
international organisations to ask for fiscal discipline to control government 
expenditure. Consequently, the incapacity of national government to maintain 
the level of expenditure that states and municipalities demanded, in addition to 
its inability to meet social claims (i. e. housing, health, education), highlighted 
decentralisation as an alternative solution. 
The rise of competitive elections during the 1980s created a greater political 
pluralism that tended to enhance pressures toward political decentralisation. In 
this more plural environment local political forces questioned the great power 
that federal government acquired from the end of the 1940s to 1980 through the 
states' agreement to confer their taxation authority on the federal government. 
These agreements favoured the centralising strategies that the one-party rule 
system used to achieve political stability across the country. A greater interest in 
lobbing against centralist taxation began from the end of the 1980s when many 
localities started to be governed by opposition parties and in 1997 when the PRI 
stopped having an absolute majority in Congress. The positive effects of this 
lobbing can be observed in the discussions generated within the national fiscal 
conventions during the 1990s that aimed for fiscal decentralisation and 
devolution (they included reforms in revenue-sharing and federal allocations to 
states and municipalities) (INDETEC, 2003). 
The extension of accountability during the 1990s was reflected in the 
administrative decentralisation to expert appointed bodies and in the political 
decentralisation to other governmental bodies (between different tiers of 
government). An example of the former was the decentralisation of research 
and statistical institutions such as the Institute of National Statistics, Geography 
and Information (INEGI). The latter case can be exemplified through the 
creation of the Committees of State and Municipal Planning and Development 
(COPLADEs and COPLADEMs) where the financial operation of federal 
allocations to states and municipalities has been carried out. These committees 
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aim to diminish `encroachment' and rent-seeking; 23 however, limitations can be 
identified when some of these transfers do not have clear assignment and 
distribution rules (i. e. health and education allocations). 
Also, accountability has been promoted by the tendency to `devolve' authority to 
new legally established organisations. 24 This tendency is observed at the 
municipal level through the creation of Institutes of Municipal Planning in which 
their decision-making and technical committees involve the participation of 
experts on urban planning issues. These experts can have a bureaucratic 
background or be citizens who work as a counterweight to local government. 
However, the lack of organisational capacity of many of these new municipal 
organisations can halt informational and accountable strategies (see Chapters 7 
& 8). 
Finally, accountability has helped to clarify the process of fiscal coordination 
between federal government and subnational governments through the 
continuous reforms of the Fiscal Coordination Law. An example of the latter was 
the enforcement of a clearer total amount of revenue-sharing from federal to 
state and municipal levels (achieved in 1997 by opposition parties that lobbied 
in the Chamber of Deputies). However, some problems prevail as the amount 
that each state and municipality would receive is unknown due to the annual 
variation of the federal revenue-budget and because the criteria on which state 
governments distribute federal resources to municipalities has been discretional 
(Cabrero & Martinez, 2000). 
Within political decentralisation, the subcategory of fiscal decentralisation is 
particularly important. Fiscal decentralisation is understood as the set of 
revenues that increase subnational revenues "either through the levels of 
23 Encroachment occurs when one state agency trespasses upon the lawful authority of 
another, violating its autonomy or freedom (O'Donnell, 1998: 121). 
24 'Devolving' refers to devolution either as a transfer of authority between existing organisations 
or the creation of a new organisation to receive the decentralised powers (Pollift, et al., 1998: 8). 
47 
automatic transfers from the central government, the creation of new 
subnational taxes, or the delegation of taxing authority" (Faletti in Llerenas, 
2005: ch. 2, p. 6). Mexican fiscal decentralisation focuses on issues regarding 
intergovernmental revenues, expenditures, credit and debt, all of which are 
linked by the national system of fiscal coordination. Fiscal decentralisation has 
been: 
... the result of the need to address the increasing levels of public debt held by 
some states and the need to improve efficiency and rationalize service delivery 
in key sectors, such as social welfare, education, health, and transportation 
(Courchene et al, 2000: 128) 
The impetus for fiscal decentralisation boosted during the Zedillo presidential 
administration (1994-2000), which followed World Bank recommendations 
(Giugale & Webb, 2000). This type of decentralisation was linked to the 
conditions to consolidate a neoliberal democracy as it promoted the roll back of 
state expenditure. This led the shift to a less interventionist role of national 
government, at least in the implementation of policies of health, education and 
urban infrastructure. 
The Mexican Constitution mentions the division of responsibilities between 
levels of government; however, it does not specify how these responsibilities 
are assigned to education, health, social assistance and urbanisation matters. 25 
During the authoritarian regime, intergovernmental relations undermined 
municipal responsibilities due to the municipalities' dependency on central 
government and because of hierarchical patterns which allowed the president to 
bypass local autonomy. 
25 Even though the Constitution and federal policies do not mention urbanisation as a specific 
matter many of the responsibilities shared between levels of government refer to urbanisation 
i. e. waste management, land use permits, infrastructure. 
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As fiscal decentralisation started to be developed, there was increased 
awareness about the greater responsibilities of municipal governments. These 
new responsibilities involved three elements for its attainment: a specific 
regulation and normative design, a clear intergovernmental fiscal system, and a 
transparent implementation (Cabrero & Martinez, 2000: 139). To a certain 
extent, regulation and normative design have been achieved through the 1997 
reform of the Fiscal Coordination Law (however, this is limited to federal 
allocations only). Furthermore, the implementation of several public services 
has been carried out through federal transfers regulated by this law. Thus the 
main problem has lain in the fact that these finances are not generated or 
completely administered by the localities (ibid). 
Some scholars (Arellano & Rivera, 1999; Cabrero & Mejia, 1998: 80; Ward & 
Rodriguez, 1999) recognise that there is not a linear relationship between fiscal 
decentralisation and major levels of economic and social development, but 
national and local politicians seem to be convinced that this issue is the key to 
success (Guerrero & Guillen, 2000). Their argument is that, even though there 
is not a clear relationship between fiscal decentralisation and development, 
modernising the local fiscal structure leads local governors to acquire more 
power of negotiation in the formulation of fiscal decentralising reforms 
(Cornelius, 1996; Ward & Rodriguez, 1999: 693). The modernisation of fiscal 
structures gives a political advantage to local politicians in moving forward the 
decentralisation process. This allows the policy design stage to include levels of 
government that go beyond central government (i. e. in the negotiations for local 
credits with development banks - INDETEC, 2003). 
However, regional economic and political disparities - developed since colonial 
times- threaten or weaken these decentralisation policies. Regional disparities 
can be identified in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and in 
levels of illiteracy between states. Specifically, the northern states and some 
central states (like the Federal District and Jalisco) present the highest levels of 
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GDP per capita and the lowest percentages of illiteracy. 26 These disparities 
have been generated through differences in capital accumulation that have 
favoured northern states due to their strategic (near) location to the United 
States and central localities that supported Mexico City's development. The 
disparities are also attributed to the levels of savings that state-level treasuries 
have been able to manage, as well as to their access to administrative and 
productive technologies. But two main factors can accentuate further these 
disparities. First, through the NAFTA signed in 1994, a propensity of income 
level divergence between states has been expected, as it has tended to benefit 
the localities in the north (Courchene et al., 2000). Second, the inequalities 
between states are also of concern especially in those municipalities that seat 
state governments which tend to receive more resources than, for example, 
rural municipalities with low population levels. This point underlines the fact that 
equalisation policies are not just a responsibility of federal government but also 
of state governments, which are responsible for distributing federal revenue 
shares between their municipalities (Cabrero & Martinez, 2000). 
The wide variety that municipalities present in terms of income, literacy, 
ethnicity, climate, and territorial extension is further aggravated by per capita 
income and political inequalities. 27 The existence of disparities have prompted 
scholars to argue that not only is fiscal decentralisation useful in consolidating 
democracy but also the participation and transparent decision making process 
of other levels of government and agents of society (Arellano & Rivera, 1999; 
Cabrero & Mejia, 1998: 80; Ward & Rodriguez, 1999); especially when 
26 In 1993 northern states including the Federal District received between 4,480 to 10,200 
dollars, and in 1995, these states presented a rate of illiteracy of 2.9% to 5.7%; whereas the 
poorest states (located in the south-east) received between 1,700 to 2,700 dollars and 
presented in 1995 a rate of illiteracy of 16.3% to 26.1 % (INEGI cited in Courchene et al. ) 
27 The top ten states with highest income inequalities are south-eastern states (Hernandez, 
2000). Per capita political inequalities refer to the privileged Mexicans who are more likely to 
enjoy media freedom, organise more effectively in autonomous interest groups and 
become part 
of the decision making leadership (Levy & Bruhn, 2001: 141). 
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socioeconomic and political variables are considered (Levy & Bruhn, 2001: 
141). 
However, participation and transparency have been undermined by national 
and subnational contexts. Firstly, it has been argued that the closeness of local 
government to the people can bring a better response to social demands as 
well as a better anticipation of the changes required (Sharp cited in Smith, 
1985: 28). This advantage has underscored the locality as a better provider of 
services and a promoter of liberty, equality and welfare, as well as being a 
training ground for citizen participation (just as recommended by OECD, 1998). 
But, it has been argued that local governments, especially in urban areas, tend 
to follow policies favouring capital accumulation, under-developing active and 
inclusive participation (Evans, 2002). In Mexico this is observed through federal 
programmes (such as Habitat) that target the urban poor by promoting 
infrastructure and education, health and urban services. This targeting helps to 
accomplish the basic standards that make cities liveable and competitive 
enough to attract investment. 
Secondly, Mexico's initial attempts to decentralise its administrative system was 
not for the sake of democracy, but in order for the PRI to maintain order and 
control in a period when economic and political instability started to emerge 
(early 1980s) (Mizrahi, 2004). In this period decentralisation was considered as 
a purely administrative strategy to increase the levels of efficiency and efficacy 
in the provision of public services. Afterwards, insofar as opposition parties 
started to control various local governments, ideas of federalism began to 
dominate the agenda. Similarly, in the 1990s when the World Bank and the IMF 
started to include on their agendas issues on 'good governance', anticorruption 
and equity, ideas of a more inclusive and active civil participation started to 
accompany policies of decentralisation (Williamson, 2004). 
Thirdly, the possibility of hostile factions (opponents to the dominant group in 
power) capturing the local state apparatus, can threaten national political 
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stability as parochialism and separatist ideals may emerge (Dunleavy cited in 
Smith, 1985: 40). In Mexico, some authors (Cornelius, et al., 1999) contend that 
the subnational arena will be the first source of inertia as well as of resistance to 
democratisation. The lack of a strong centralised power leading to a coherent 
national project may leave government in the hands of a local elite with no 
interest in governing democratically, following instead a more dictatorial regime 
(Snyder, 1999; Turner, 2002). These subnational divisions have increased 
insofar as national authoritarianism has decreased. These subdivisions can 
raise political instabilities that promote undemocratic but stable regimes. 
In summary, it depends upon the context of the locality (state or municipality) 
whether decentralisation is best understood as a response to urban 
development, managerial effectiveness or the increased pluralism that 
democracy promotes. This interpretation of decentralisation has been shaped, 
in each case, by the actions taken by local administrations in office, by the 
guidelines of national and international recommendations, or by a mix of both. 
These aspects will be further discussed and exemplified in Section 3.3.2 (and 
developed further in Chapter 9). 
3.2. The re-emergence of the municipality 
During the authoritarian period municipal responsibilities and policymaking were 
commonly bypassed by federal and state governments. Through the less 
interventionist role of federal government in the delivery of public services, the 
municipality has regained a more active role in the policymaking process. 
Before describing how this re-emergence has taken place, the municipality's 
administrative structure is explained. 
3.2.1. The municipal government structure. In Mexico each state (32 in total) 
is subdivided into municipalities - in 2005 a total of 2435 municipalities existed 
across the country. Each municipality is formed by two bodies: the executive 
represented by the municipal president (mayor) and the municipal congress 
52 
(cabildo), which works as a legislative body. However, the congress does not 
have the power of elaborating laws; it can only regulate the municipality's 
responsibilities. Both are representative elected bodies with a three year term of 
administration. Presidents cannot be re-elected for the period immediately 
following, while members of the congress can and do aim for the presidency. 
The municipal president is elected by a relative majority rule, however, some 
congress members are elected by a slate system (this depends on each state 
electoral law). 
The laws or decrees that the municipality follows are bounded by national and 
state constitutions; they are only reformed or modified by federal or state 
congresses. The dependency of the municipality on other governmental 
legislation aims for a consistent national development. In particular, the national 
Constitution and the organic Federal and State Laws are the main axis that 
maintain this consistency. Although these laws vary according to the state's 
characteristics a similar pattern can be observed between them. Examples of 
federal laws that help maintain a coordinated system between tiers of 
government are: 
" Law of Public Administration 
" Law of Public Works 
" Law of General Planning 
" Law of General Human Settlements 
" Law of National Planning 
" Fiscal Coordination Law 
" The Budgetary (Revenue and Expenditure) Laws (modified yearly) 
Due to the relevance of fiscal decentralisation in Mexico it is worth describing 
how the municipal-fiscal structure works. Municipal finances can be divided into 
two parts. The first part refers to revenue and expenditure and the second 
refers to those additional resources that come from federal government, termed 
`federal allocations' (aportaciones). 
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On the one hand, municipal revenue is formed of taxes (land use permits and 
estate-property tax), income generated from public services, permits, ownership 
of natural resources (forests, water sources), donations, debt, and federal 
revenue-sharing (participaciones). This revenue sharing is not transferred 
directly from federal agencies to the municipal bodies, but state governments 
work as intermediaries for distributing them. Even though municipalities have 
the opportunity to generate their own income, this is very limited as most of the 
income comes from buoyant taxes (consumption and production taxes) 
administered and distributed by federal and state governments. As a result, 
great financial dependency has been created on federal revenue-shares 
(Cabrero, 1998: 134). For municipalities to increase their fiscal autonomy, 
modernisation of management systems and the update of prices and tariffs (i. e. 
estate register and estate-property tariffs) have been implemented. However, 
this increase has been generated by those urban municipalities which have the 
necessary operative infrastructure and skills (Cabrero, 1996: 40). These 
municipalities have also been the main beneficiaries of federal revenue-shares 
as the distribution formula has had a bias in relation to the number of 
inhabitants (Cabrero, 1998: 135). However, this bias has tended to be 
compensated through federal allocations, favouring poor (rural) municipalities. 
On the other hand, municipal expenditure is divided into current expenses 
(administrative issues), investment (public works and development), and 
transfers (subsidies, donations). Within the expenditure structure some level of 
decentralisation has been observed as municipal governments tend to increase 
their spending (Cabrero & Martinez, 2000: 143). This increase in municipal 
expenditure could be considered a positive indication of autonomy. However, 
the distribution of expenditure at the municipal level has tended to favour 
administrative matters rather than investment in infrastructure (Cabrero 
& 
Martinez, 2000: 145). This increase in administrative costs can imply in some 
cases either a bureaucratisation of municipal governments or the need 
for 
municipalities to modernise their procedures and train their human resources. 
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Whatever the case, other sources of finance are required to achieve more 
investment levels. These sources can be credits or maybe partnerships with 
other sectors of society; nevertheless a preference for federal transfers has 
prevailed (ibid). 
Subnational (state and municipal) spending has tended to be more 
decentralised since the early 1990s; however, this expenditure has depended 
greatly on federal government through revenue-sharing and federal allocations. 
Allocations, which are classified here as the second part of municipal finances, 
play an important role in fiscal decentralisation as they have tended to increase 
subnational levels of expenditure and most of all of investment (Courchene, et 
al., 2000; Cabrero & Martinez, 2000). Allocations are investment expenditure 
programmes derived from federal budgetary lines commonly known as 
`branches'. From the various branches, number 33 allocates resources directly 
to municipalities through two funds: FAISM and FAFM. 28 
These funds have enhanced municipal responsibilities and policymaking, but 
they are earmarked for specific projects. FAISM relates to water purification, 
drainage, municipal urbanisation, rural electrification, basic infrastructure for 
education and health, housing improvements, sewerage systems, rural roads 
and infrastructure that enhance rural production. FAFM must be used 
exclusively for meeting financial and public security needs. In both funds, tight 
reins are placed on institutional overheads or on indirect costs such as 
consultancy fees. (Ward & Rodriguez, 1999: ch. 5). 
Even though these funds have tended to strengthen political decentralisation 
they show deficiencies in terms of accountability. The criteria for allocating the 
FAISM, for example, are weighed within a formula elaborated by the Federal 
Social Development Secretariat that is not clearly explained. But accountability 
in this matter has been improved by prescribing equal monthly instalments to 
28 FAISM stands for the Social Infrastructure Municipal Fund and FAFM stands for Municipal 
Enhancement Fund. 
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each municipality by the end of a calendar year (Ward & Rodriguez, 1999: 
ch. 5). Accountability is also undermined through the unclear criteria that states 
use to distribute federal revenue-shares between their municipalities. By law, at 
least, 22% of these shares has to be distributed to municipal governments. 
These types of deficiencies obstruct an equal municipal decentralisation; 
however, it has to be said that internationally Mexico's achievements have been 
recognised through the speed and depth of its policies (Courchene et al., 2000). 
3.2.2. The evolution of municipal decentralisation. In the 1947 national tax 
convention, state governments agreed to depend on federal revenue-sharing. 
This allowed federal government to administer industry, trade, luxury goods, 
and income taxes. In exchange subnational governments helped federal 
government to collect them without getting involved in the political and 
administrative costs that this responsibility implied. This agreement 
strengthened the power of the authoritarian regime. It is important to underline 
that this evolution developed in tandem with electoral reforms. The following 
paragraphs explore the link between them. Appendix 2 summarises electoral 
reforms and decentralisation policies in chronological order. 
The Lopez-Portillo presidential period (1976-82). Decentralisation policies 
began in this period through the first National System of Fiscal Coordination, 
created in 1980. This was a first attempt at fiscal decentralisation by tying 
federal revenue-sharing to distribution formulas based on the states' population, 
the amount of revenue collected in the past, and indicators of tax collection 
performance. However, these criteria, through time, benefited urbanised 
localities with more capacity for tax collection and with more population. In 
addition, this system created the COPLADEs as a coordinating structure 
between federal and subnational governments. Even though the organisation of 
these committees has changed over the past decades, they are still the 
structure that prevails for intergovernmental coordination. 
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Paradoxically, despite the fact that decentralisation strategies were underway, 
in 1980 the last agreement for centralising the tax system was signed (this time 
regarding consumer tax). This action shows how the decentralisation policies 
that the one-party rule regime started did not aim for a true federalism, but were 
just a mechanism of control within a context that had started to anticipate 
economic and political crises (Mizrahi, 2004). 
The de la Madrid presidential period (1982-88). In this period an administrative 
decentralisation was enhanced as a result of the 1982 public debt crises. This 
decentralisation did not aim to strengthen municipal autonomy but sought 
efficiency in administrative tasks and service delivery (stated in the 1983 
constitutional reform of article 115). 29 In particular, the legal permission that 
municipalities attained to collect and fix property tariffs and land-use taxes 
complemented the industrial deconcentration that started in the 1960s from 
Mexico City to other medium-sized cities, such as Queretaro or Leön. 
While the decentralisation policies were initiated by central government, their 
implementation by subnational governments has been slow. Initially, local 
governments lacked the infrastructure and skills to become responsible for what 
the Constitution indicated. For some, it has taken twenty years to attain the 
required levels of capacity (for many others these levels are not yet attained). It 
was not until the early 1990s that urbanised municipalities started to become 
more innovative and participative with regard to fiscal and administrative 
modernisation. 30 
Local governments have developed a paternalistic nature within their 
governance structure. This has mainly been illustrated by the management of 
resources and planning design through state government, instead of being 
29 For example provision of drinking water, drainage, sewerage, and street lighting; cemeteries, 
the maintenance of slaughterhouses and public markets; solid waste management; land use 
permits; public security. 
30 Various cases in Cabrero 2001; 2002 - especially metropolitan municipalities. 
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directly administered or formulated by municipal governments. This 
dependence has not allowed accountability between subnational 
intergovernmental relations (Guerrero & Guillen, 2000). As a result, 
municipalities have become the weakest tier in the governmental system since 
the degree of centralism from federal to state governments has been replicated 
from state to municipal governments (Ward & Rodriguez, 1999). 
By the end of this administration, subnational governments started to be 
controlled by opposition parties (i. e. northern states like Baja California and 
Chihuahua, and between the 1990s and the 2000s, central states such as 
Guanajuato, Queretaro and San Luis Potosi) that argued for more competitive 
electoral institutions (Valencia, 1995; Pansters, 1997, Ramirez-Saiz & 
Regalado, 2000). These claims also aimed to strengthen the municipal level by 
promoting more transparency, an aggressive local fiscal policy, and a 
streamlined administration (Ward & Rodriguez, 1999: 684). Fiscal 
decentralisation achieved an important place on the agenda as in many cases it 
was detected that the level of government immediately above put limits on the 
lower tier regarding the distribution of revenue-shares. This commonly 
happened when subnational levels were administered by different political 
parties (ibid) 
The Salinas presidential period (1988-94). The proliferation of the opposition in 
various state and municipal governments started to threaten the centralist and 
presidential power that the PRI possessed. During the Salinas administration 
the initiatives that promoted decentralisation diverged from the objectives 
established by the 1983 reform. The new policies undermined state and 
municipal administrative structures (i. e. COPLADEs) and established instead 
direct relationships between central government (or president) and the local 
communities (Cabrero, 1998). A solidarity programme (called PRONASOL) 
promoted an alternative system of political decentralisation in targeted poor 
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localities. 31 The weak support that the PRI had with many marginalised groups 
across the country prompted President Salinas to develop PRONASOL as a 
partisan tool to attract votes in favour of the PRI (Haber, 1990; Dresser, 1996; 
O'Toole, 2003). 
The funds that this programme transferred to the localities, to compensate for 
regional differences, were not allocated to the modernised municipalities (the 
urban type), but were not allocated either to the poorest for partisan reasons 
(Cabrero, 1998). So, the principles of attaining a more equal development 
across local governments in terms of infrastructure, skills, capacity-building and 
major levels of decentralisation were unsatisfied. In short, inequalities among 
regions were accentuated and a centralised system prevailed (ibid). 
An innovation of PRONASOL was the introduction of community participation in 
the implementation of projects regarding the improvement of infrastructure and 
basic public services. It is debatable whether this type of participation followed 
the co-opted mechanism of the old authoritarian regime; however, PRONASOL 
adapted some of the demands which emanated from various grassroots 
movements (Bernard, 1999; Haber, 1990; Hellman, 1994). PRONASOL left a 
legacy of a certain degree of participation that the following administrations 
could not ignore, especially when the environment of economic and political 
dissatisfaction persisted. 
The Zedillo presidential period (1994-2000). In this administration 
decentralisation policies gained a more genuine position through the concept of 
`new federalism'. This implied "decentralisation of powers [executive, legislative, 
and judicial] and responsibilities to the states, and a willingness to `let go' on the 
31 With PRONASOL, a certain level of political decentralisation was promoted as responsibilities 
were transferred to Solidaridad Committees integrated by the communities and 
federal 
government. The decentralisation regarded to rural and urban infrastructure such as roads, 




part of the President" (Ward & Rodriguez, 1999: 675). Decentralisation policies 
accompanying federalism strengthened states rather than municipalities. This 
can be observed as state governments benefited directly from increased levels 
of revenue-sharing and local income (i. e. taxing automobiles, hotel occupancy 
and payrolls); and from the system of intermediaries administering federal 
resources (enforced by the 1997 Fiscal Coordination Law). These 
decentralisation strategies began to shift Mexican intergovernmental 
relationships towards a model where authority is autonomous between state 
and national governments, but very coordinated and inclusive between state 
and municipal levels (Ward & Rodriguez, 1999). 
Such a model has been reflected in the role of the state tier in distributing 
federal transfers to the municipalities. This distribution became more of a 
stability strategy in cases where the political plurality increased between state 
and municipal governments. 32 The political tensions generated by this plurality 
enhanced the need for fiscal accountability between the three levels of 
government, recommending at the same time an increased municipal 
participatory role (OECD, 1998). 
As these new policies started to be implemented in various localities across the 
country, state governors started to attain more political strength. However, 
counterweights from other state-level republican powers emerged, especially 
from the legislature. This was a result of the electoral reforms that have 
accompanied decentralisation policies since 1986. In particular, the guarantee 
of a proportional segment of representation in the federal and state congresses 
enhanced political diversity within the legislature. The `letting go' of 
presidentialism during this period, in addition, to more plural state-level 
legislatures were factors that counterbalanced the new governors' power. This 
led to negotiations between state congresses and the state-level executives, 
instead of complying only with the president. As a result, checks and balances 
32 Especially states governed by the PRI and municipalities governed by the opposition, as 
in 
the case of San Luis Potosi (Cabrero & Gil, 1999). 
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and accountability began to come into play at subnational and national 
governments (Ward & Rodriguez, 1999). These counterweights between 
powers and intergovernmental levels were more commonly found in 
modernised states and municipalities rather than in marginalized and less 
developed localities. 33 This accentuated further the inequalities between 
municipalities (Guerrero & Guillen, 2000). 
The Fox presidential period (2000-06). As Mexico has internalised the global 
aims of an integrated, open, and flexible economy, there has been increasing 
acceptance of an environment in which actors develop their own assets and 
resources. This is translated in the need for localities to create territories that 
can be productive and that enhance competitiveness (OECD, 1998). This 
environment has been pursued through the ideas of `new federalism' which 
encourage an incremental share of intergovernmental responsibilities and 
decision-making. However, international criticisms have been made of the over- 
regulation that leads federal government to take final decisions, as in issues 
regarding budgetary information and management. 
The OECD and World Bank support the idea that further fiscal decentralisation 
is needed for municipalities to obtain adequate amounts of funds and enough 
flexibility to use them. These funds are significant to make local authorities more 
accountable, responsive to local needs, and able to create leverage to promote 
local development (creating markets and jobs) (OECD, 1998: 26; Cabrero & 
Martinez, 2000). 
Decentralisation policies are considered by the OECD to be the best path to 
turn municipalities into competitive and autonomous territories. Nevertheless, if 
local markets are to be created, all the issues of effective management and 
clear and coordinated responsibilities, in and outside the municipal government, 
33 Different studies on municipalities in the north and centre of the country show that the 
localities with effective counterweights are within the modernised and urbanised regions 
(Ward 
& Rodriguez, 1999; Ziccardi, 1998). 
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have to be well established to attract private investment. Furthermore, the issue 
of accountability becomes vital to create a trustworthy environment in which the 
private sector (local and non-local) can invest. Due to the inabilities and 
restrictions that municipalities have had in generating direct revenues, the 
collaboration with other sectors of society has become appealing, without 
limiting this alternative to privatisation policies only. 
Since the 1990s, the OECD and the United Nations' recommendations have 
favoured multi-actor responsibility to attain economic development (UNMP, 
2005). But to be coherent in attaining real local needs, these recommendations 
have supported the participation of other citizens, as well as the private sector 
through partnerships. 34 Central government intervention has been accepted in a 
proactive way. First, insofar as it works to diminish regional differences by 
promoting individual welfare and tools to enhance municipal government 
capacity-building; 35 second, by establishing macro-level frameworks of 
administrative and fiscal coordination; and third, by providing accessible and 
open information through intergovernmental networks to help localities to be 
more competitive (OECD, 1998). 
In order to continue with the `new federalism' strategy, the Fox administration 
has followed closely the recommendations stated by international stakeholders. 
This is observed in official documents such as the National Development Plan 
(PND, 2000-06) and in the Programme for an Authentic Federalism (PAF, 2002- 
06). This federalism mainly supports intergovernmental governance and it is 
supplemented by citizen participation through channels established by the 
national-state (PAF, 2002-06: 37-9). 
34 This participation is underlined through state-sponsor channels such as the COPLADEs 
(OECD, 1998: 116). 
35 This point is considered as a double-edge-sword as the provision of certain infrastructure like 
electricity or communication and transport systems is highly controlled by central government, 
and national and international elites that can easily undermine local interests. 
62 
Also, a new emphasis has been given to the National System of Fiscal Co- 
ordination through which an international competitive and collaborative system 
has been proposed. It aims to improve intergovernmental relationships apart 
from fiscal coordination. The agenda has focused on the promotion of 
investment, savings, and employment at the local level to obtain financial 
autonomy (PAF, 2002-06: 140). The role of central government as coordinator 
and provider of information within intergovernmental networks has been 
pursued as well. This role is reflected in the reforms of national organisations in 
charge of coordinating intergovernmental information systems, such as the 
Federalism and Municipal Development Institute (INAFED) and the Institute of 
Technical Development for Public Treasuries (INDETEC). 
The role of the private sector has been considered an alternative way of 
achieving local autonomy and development (Cabrero & Martinez, 2000: 174). 36 
Its participation is openly invited in areas that provide resources and skills such 
as in the infrastructure for schools, health centres, public services, 
communication and transport; urban planning and development - the latter two 
including housing, regeneration; and tourism (see Appendix 3 for some 
examples). It is emphasised that consultation with the community is required in 
order to plan adequately. This consultation has included civil society in the 
formulation of some local programmes or projects. However, the reasons for its 
inclusion are not as clearly identified as those for the private sector (resources 
and skills). 
In summary, insofar as decentralisation policies have evolved, their implications 
have become more complex as new actors and concepts have been included in 
the process. Moreover, the ideas of sharing responsibilities, participation, 
36 The role of the private sector within policies of decentralisation was first considered in the 
Salinas administration through the '100 Cities' Programme. It specified the need to consult the 
civil society for its development, especially the private sector (SEDESOL, 1992; OECD, 1998). 
In the early 2000s, this has been extended into the national Habitat Programme, which aims to 
overcome urban poverty by establishing adequate infrastructure, services and land regulation. 
63 
transparency and accountability converge with the themes involved in the 
process of democratisation, which has generated a more pluralist environment 
in the electoral arena but remains limited with respect to political and 
participative spheres where other social groups interact (see Chapters 7& 8). 
Decentralisation policies have had an effect on localities of all types, but the 
concern of this thesis is with decentralisation in urban areas. 
3.3. The process of urbanisation in Mexico 
The process of urbanisation is closely related to Mexico's political and 
administrative decentralisations. To understand the link between urbanisation 
and decentralisation, it is important first to present the relationship between 
urbanisation and capital accumulation. 
3.3.1. The concept of urban space. The importance of the urban space is 
based on David Harvey's (1989a: 22) argument that "capital accumulation and 
the production of urbanisation go hand in hand". This mutual dependency 
embraces conflicting forces and channels them into many possibilities for both 
creative and destructive social transformations. 
The urban space is understood here as a process that goes beyond territoriality. 
This includes changes in the economic forms of production as well as in the 
social relations that result from these changes. Space is not just a matter of 
lines in a map delimiting a city, it also relates to the `cartography of power' 
(Massey, 1994,2005). The development of the urban space, in combination 
with the passage of time, is what Harvey calls `urbanisation' (1989a: 54). 
From the classical Marxist perspective, the conflicting forces within capitalism 
involve the struggle between the powers of capital and labour. Conflict between 
these powers (i. e. determination of wage or employment equilibrium) has limited 
the accumulation process, but the possibility to move or extend across space 
has created an escape valve to overcome these pressures. The aim of capital 
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accumulation has led to the exploitation of particular geographical locations 
when they present advantages. The evolution of capital production and the 
changes in social relations have had important implications for shaping and 
forming the urban space (Harvey, 1989a: ch. 1). The globalisation of capital has 
made of the urban space a less specified territory. Instead it has become a 
dynamic and `open space' insofar as social relations are becoming increasingly 
interconnected on a global scale, which may move beyond urban geographical 
boundaries (Brenner, 2004; Massey, 2005). 
Neil Brenner argues that globalisation has exposed the limitations of the 
traditional nation-state for the study of urban and regional economies: 
[urban and regional economies] are the 'motors of global economy'... insofar as 
they harbour the socioeconomic assets, innovative capacities, technological 
infrastructure, specialized skills, institutional networks, and sociocultural milieux 
upon which the leading sectors of transnational capital depend. This resurgence 
of urban and regional economies cannot be adequately appreciated on the 
basis of state-centric models that encage economic activity into self-enclosed, 
national scaled territorial units (2004: 6). 
This conception of urban space has been commonly associated with the 
emergence of `global cities' such as London, New York, Tokyo or Sao Paolo 
(Sassen, 1999). These cities are the centres of the servicing and financing of 
international trade, investment and headquarters operations. These cities are 
crucial for the valorisation of leading sectors of transnational capital. However, 
this thesis argues that the effects of globalisation also affect medium-size cities 
that aim to integrate themselves into the global urban system. 
The fact that capital accumulation has been able to shape the urban space is 
generally observed throughout the strong correlations between urbanisation and 
gross domestic product levels (Guarda, 1989). However, this correlation is not 
always straightforward. In Mexico, even though the gross domestic product did 
not grow at increasing rates (especially in the period of 1980-90), the levels of 
urbanisation did (see Table 3.1). This shows that urbanisation has also been 
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considered a political strategy for the country to integrate with the increasingly 
global economy. 
Table 3.1. Mexico's gross domestic product growth rate and urbanisation levels 
(1960-95) 














1960-70 7.3 1960 41.2 119 37.6 
1970-80 6.8 1970 49.4 166 52.0 
1980-90 -0.4 1980 56.2 229 58.1 
1990-95 1.5 1990 60.8 309 61.3 
1995 64.3 348 67.8 
2000 75* 
Based on Garza, 1999; Guarda, 1989: 14 
* INEGI, 2000 
Further studies show that during the decade of 1980-90 the urbanisation rate 
was the lowest if compared to other decades throughout the same century 
(Garza, 1999: 153). 37 In this period the share of large cities of over 1 million 
inhabitants decreased in terms of the total urban population from 51.3% to 45%; 
while the share of small cities (15 to 50 thousand inhabitants) increased from 
10.4% to 10.8%. Furthermore, the number of medium-sized cities, between 500 
thousand to 1 million inhabitants, increased from 4 to 12 (ibid). 
During 1990-95, small cities decreased in share to 10.2% despite their increase 
in number. Medium-sized cities increased to up to 18 in number, reaching up to 
24 if considering those of over 1 million inhabitants. In total, the first two largest 
types of cities accounted for almost 68% of the urban population. In sum, these 
data reflect the fact that economic crises - in 1982 and 1994 - did have a 
negative effect upon the urbanisation levels of the largest cities but favoured the 
proliferation of the medium type. 
37 For example the rate of urbanisation in 1950-60 was of 2.9%; higher than the rate in 1980-90 
which was of 0.8%. 
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These changes in urbanisation would tend to lead to the conclusion that rather 
than a process of urban decentralisation from the big metropolises, the period 
1970-1990 saw a change in the scope of urban concentration (from big to 
medium cities). The increasing urban network in the country underlines the 
relevance of political decisions that strengthened the process of urbanisation 
(Aguilar, 1999; Garza, 1999). In other words, urban policies (shaped by agents' 
interests) also promoted urbanisation beyond economic needs. 
The process of urbanisation involves the emergence of polycentric urban 
regions which Gustavo Garza describes as "sets of relatively neighbouring cities 
[that] form urban subsystems owning the great functional integration of their 
industrial establishments and populations" (1999,154). In Mexico three types of 
regions tending to polycentric areas have been identified. In the northeast, 
Monterrey seems to work as the core of a conglomeration. In the centre-east, 
Mexico City is the core and has already overlapped with Toluca's boundaries. 
Other cities considered in this area are: Cuernavaca, Puebla, Cuautla, Pachuca 
and Queretaro. The third polycentric area tends to be around Guadalajara in the 
centre-west of the country. The city of Leön tends to become part of this 
conglomeration. The analysis (Garza, 1999) of these regions refers to the 
period up until 1995, at which point the effects of NAFTA had not yet 
determined the relevance of other cities or regions. The effects of this free trade 
zone on the Mexican urban system is generating new city conglomerations 
along the NAFTA corridor (uniting Mexican central cities with American central 
and southern Canadian ones - see Map 3.1). Along this corridor cities within the 










Capital flows accentuated through free trade and globalised markets since the 
end of the 1970s have led to increased world competition between cities and 
regions (Harvey, 1989a: ch. 1; Jessop, 2002: ch. 5; Sklair, 2005). They no longer 
had to compete on the basis of their industrial mix but in terms of the attractions 
they could offer to corporate investment (labour and commodity markets, 
geographical location, social assets). Global capitalism has led cities to 
compete on additional issues such as architecture, cul tural innovation, 
information gathering, and control of government decision making. 
Interurban competition has emphasised the tension between the social and 
spatial division of production, consumption and control. Interurban competition 
has been an important determinant for the evolution of capitalism, and 
fundamental to its uneven geographical development (Harvey, 1989a: 55). On 
this basis, it is easier to understand the prevalence of Mexico's regional 
disparities, not only regarding the shape and form of the urban space but also in 
terms of the levels of local income and literacy. Interurban competition tends to 
produce cities with socio-economic differentiations so that the surpluses of 
capital and labour can have enough flexibility to achieve increasing rates of 
accumulation (Robinson, 2003: 28). 
3.3.2. The `entrepreneurial city' and urban politics in Mexico. Urban politics 
and state behaviour are two faces of the same coin. It means that the changes 
encountered by the state are somehow reflected in the structural changes that 
influence a city's development. In order to develop the argument, this thesis 
draws upon the concept of the 'entrepreneurial city', as de veloped by Bob 
Jessop (1997a; 2002). 
An entrepreneurial city is characterised by its "concern to create new 
combinations of economic and/or extra-economic factors which will further 
urban competitiveness" (Jessop, 1997a: 31). This concept is useful as it 
provides a link between the structural changes encountered at the level of the 
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state and by the urban scale, especially when both are shaped by the 
production of global capital. 
The approach for understanding the relationship between the state and urban 
space is also illuminated by Brenner (2004) through his concept of `state 
spatiality', derived partly from Jessop's argument of state reforms. State 
spatiality is a process that is: 
... actively produced and transformed through socio-political struggles at various 
geographical scales [supranational, national, subnational]. The geography of 
statehood must therefore be viewed as a presupposition, arena, and outcome 
of evolving social relations (2004: 80, fig 3.2) 
Brenner contends that, within the process of state spatiality, two dimensions 
can be found: `state spatial projects' and 'state spatial strategies'. The first 
dimension refers to political strategies oriented toward the reproduction, 
modification, or transformation of patterns of state territorial and scalar 
organisation. This dimension can be interpreted as the spatial organisation of 
the state itself, which depends on the state's internal scalar division among 
different tiers of administration or government. State spatial projects, for 
example, can be coordinated by fiscal policies or regulatory activities (2004: 
92). The second dimension refers to state capacities to establish a `structured 
coherence' for example as to promote capitalist growth within national, regional 
and local economies. State spatial strategies are articulated through policy 
instruments, infrastructure investment, spatial planning programmes, or urban 
polices (2004: 93). Brenner argues that state spatial projects and strategies are 
shaped by the traditional structures of the nation-state; but it is also important to 
note that globalisation has led to the rescaling of state structures and the 
increasing importance of supranational and subnational scales. The reliance 
upon a traditional state apparatus describes part of the inheritor role that 
characterises the state pro-activeness mentioned in Section 2.1. 
The concepts of entrepreneurial city and state spatiality have been developed 
as analytical models to understand urban development in the Western 
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developed countries (the US and Europe). However, state reconfiguration and 
urban development in Mexico have been influenced by Western ideologies 
(especially by the United States, Levy & Bruhn, 2001). Mexico's membership of 
various international forums has made it subject to policy recommendations 
originated by developed Western countries. This relationship opens a window to 
focus on the similarities between urban development patterns. 
The development of a capitalist economy in Mexico, especially from the mid 20th 
century, partly explains the country's high level of urbanisation. Thus, the 
country's transition to democracy has underscored the interest in becoming part 
of the changes that the global production of capital has tended to follow. Thus, 
the state reconfiguration that has been experienced by Western developed 
countries, responding partly to a global economy, has also been experienced in 
Mexico, similarities are particularly evident when the shift away from the 
`welfare state' in Europe and the implementation of neoliberalism in Latin 
America are compared (Fourcade-Gourinchas & Babb, 2002; Jessop, 2002). 
State reconfiguration resulted in part from the deregulation of international 
finance and the liberalisation of markets since the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
The liberalisation of trade and production was accompanied by the liberalisation 
of interest rates and a series of experiments (encountered by developed and 
developing countries) that tested the boundaries for the deregulation of 
markets, privatisation, and fiscal and monetary strategies (Williamson, 2004). 
Both the shift away from the `welfare state' in Western countries and the 
implementation of neoliberalism in Latin America involved a reduced role for 
government in the provision of public services and social security. New 
strategies to provide for social demands have been oriented towards the 
combination of market and state structures, which have enhanced the activism 
of the private sector into public matters. Public expenditure disciplines have 
prompted national governments to build appropriate institutions 
(i. e. 
decentralisation policies and organisations coordinating these policies). 
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Consequently, local and regional governments have tended to seek for a 
stronger autonomy supported by resources from non-state sectors, at national 
and international scales, but within an institutional framework (laws and policies) 
promoted by national government. 
The diminished interventionism of the state has allowed the involvement of 
many agents within policymaking, leading towards new structures of 
coordination and collaboration. These agents range from international 
organisations associated with national and local groups (able to adapt 
themselves to these new structures) to social mobilisations that have supported 
democratic principles and, for cases like Mexico, the old paternalistic and 
interventionist role of the state (further discussed in Chapters 7-9). The 
intertwining of actors at the local, national, and international scales has 
enhanced cooperation between networks of city governments in the same 
country or even in different ones. In Mexico, the 1999 reform of the 115 
constitutional article established the coordination between municipalities in 
order to promote further support and resources. This coordination has involved 
the participation of non-governmental organisations advising governments how 
to build networks between municipalities and non-public or non-for-profit 
organisations (Santin, 2004). 
State restructuring has been characterised by Jessop (1997a) as involving three 
trends: the 'denationalisation of statehood', the 'internationalisation of the 
national-state', and the 'destatisation of the political regime'. The 
denationalisation of statehood is understood as the core executive losing or 
conceding capacities to societal actors or to peripheral governmental bodies. 
This concession has been identified through strategies of privatisation, 
decentralisation or agencification (i. e. partnerships). Some authors have 
identified these institutional changes as an 'internal hollowing out of the state' 
(Saward, 1997). However, this thesis argues that the three trends are better 
seen as a reconfiguration of the state. 
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The second trend, the internationalisation of the national state, refers to the 
increasing involvement of international agents with national politics (either as 
part of transnational corporations established in specific localities or as a 
member of a political or economic international organisation). This trend is 
understood as the core executive conceding capacities to supra-state entities or 
the adaptation of the core to policies dictated at an international level. This trend 
can be associated with the `external hollowing out of the state' (Saward, 1997). 
The third trend concerns the destatisation of the political regime. This involves 
"redrawing public-private divide, reallocating tasks, and rearticulating the 
relationship between organizations... across this divide on whatever territorial 
scale(s) the state in question acts" (Jessop, 2002: 199). This trend underlines a 
growing recognition of interdependence between the public, private and social 
sectors, as well as the convenience (and perhaps need) for their mutual 
learning, reflexivity, and negotiated coordination. These characteristics have 
blurred the limits between sectors, consequently shifting the state organisation 
from government to `governance' (Rhodes, 1996). 
The link between the evolution of urban politics and state reconfiguration can be 
observed within decentralisation policies that aim to enhance a locality's 
economic, political and administrative autonomy (this is exemplified in Section 
3.3.3). With these types of policies local governments are prompted to negotiate 
political and economic matters with different agents and organisations, creating 
a phenomenon of `urban entrepreneurship'. The group of networks developed 
from different directions (supra or intergovernmental as well as sectoral) has 
inevitably shifted the boundaries between sectors, especially when there is a 
clear contribution to make in material, technical or political terms. 
Jessop (2002: 188) argues that city (or regional) governments seek to transform 
themselves into entrepreneurial political apparatuses in order to cope with the 
risks (political, social and economic) that national-state trends have exposed 
them to. This entrepreneurial character is about creating innovative strategies. 
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These strategies aim to build local competitive advantages by restructuring the 
urban space in the context of global conditions. In an 'entrepreneurial city' the 
strategic relationship of local government and the business sector is significant 
to promote its development (with the support of national government which at 
the same time can be supported by international forums). However, these 
factors are not sufficient to make a city entrepreneurial, what is also needed are 
"institutional and organisational features that can sustain a flow of innovations", 
required to compete (Jessop, 2002: 189, my emphasis). 8 3 
A specific restructuring policy can be the introduction of new spaces and places 
for living, working, producing, servicing, consuming, etc. (Harvey, 1989a, ch. 1; 
Jessop, 2002, ch. 5). This new spaces and places will open new markets in new 
areas with advantages for producing goods/services and urban activities. City 
regeneration has been the most common example reflecting urban innovation in 
terms of giving a new image to the city ('re-image') and in creating forms of 
socio-political organisation that promote and maintain this new image. The 
conservation of historic centres is an approach that has become attractive for 
countries such as Mexico. The redefinition of the urban space promotes a city's 
position (within a world city scale) according to its cultural heritage and in some 
cases to its geographical location that promotes a city as a commercial 
gateway. 
The tendency to turn local governments into the best providers of local services 
as well as the bearers of local advantages has been supported by national 
governments and international organisations. 39 This support has been observed 
in the three trends of the state which underline a new role for the national-state 
by sharing responsibilities with other levels of government and sectors. The 
38 The term `entrepreneurial city' in this study is interchangeable with that of 'urban 
entrepreneurialism' or 'urban entrepreneurship'. 
39 Examples of this are the Interamerican Development Bank financing regeneration projects in 
different historical centres in Latin America (Bromley & Jones, 1999) and the World Bank 
financing municipal service delivery (Guarda, 1989) 
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national-state tries to "retain control over the articulation of different spatial 
scales" (Jessop, 2002: 201). The tendency of the national-state is to work more 
as a facilitator of functional linkages or networks and material 
interdependencies (i. e. Mexico's federal government in promoting decentralised 
urban policies). Through this new role it tries to compensate for planning and 
market failure, tending to leave the responsibility for policy decisions to 
transnational institutions and the responsibility for implementation to subnational 
governments. 40 This role forms part of the pro-activeness of the state. 
The diminished role of central government intervention is observed in Mexico 
through the promotion of fiscal decentralisation and its relationship with urban 
development. However, the historic dependency of subnational governments on 
federal transfers has underlined the strong role of national government in 
determining local policies. The importance of federal financing has undermined 
the incentives to pool resources from other non-public sources. Bearing in mind 
the federal government's strong role in addition to the state's restructuring 
under globalisation, this research argues that national guidelines have 
promoted new institutional structures and social relationships that are similar to 
international patterns and follow some of the elements of the entrepreneurial 
city. 41 
3.3.3. The `entrepreneurial city' and its limitations as a phenomenon. 
Although there are limitations that can be found in Jessop's approach to the 
40 This argument coincides with that of William Robinson's (2003) - in which the national state's 
role has shifted from the formulation of national policies to the administration of policies 
formulated by a transnational state system. 
41 See Davis1994 to understand how Mexico's policy process can be studied from a policy 
networks approach due to the power relationships between politicians and businessmen in 
Mexico City. See Conde, 1996 and Martinez, 2001 for some examples of the privatisation on 
public services in the metropolitan area of Mexico City. These references provide a background 
about the more publicly known and increased relationships between business and local 
government (supported by the federal government) as one characteristic to achieve a local 
entrepreneurial environment. 
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concept of the entrepreneurial city, it is relevant for this thesis because it relates 
to the restructuring of the state, which is important considering Mexico's 
process of democratisation and implementation of neoliberal reforms. 
Specifically, Jessop's approach provides a theoretical tool to make a 
comparative analysis across different cities that have been affected by the 
changes in modes of production, high rates of unemployment, fiscal austerity 
and market rationality, either in the American or European contexts (Harvey, 
1989b; Brenner, 2004) as well as in the Latin American one. 
For different authors the entrepreneurial city means a process in which mainly 
cities compete with each other to attract investment in a world of economic 
instability and volatility. However, approaches to the concept differ when cities 
are analysed within different historical, social and political contexts. Some 
authors (Cheshire & Gordon, 1996) argue that factors such as group interests, 
type of leadership and constraints imposed by external regulators (i. e. national 
and supranational guidelines) will determine the mobilisation of resources and 
forms of organisation in distinctive ways. Patrick Le Gales (2002: 208) points to 
the tradition and influence of European civil associations and social movements 
arguing that there is a high probability for these groups to resist the logic of 
urban entrepreneurialism promoted by a local elite. 
Furthermore, Harvey (1989b: 8) argues that, although urban entrepreneurialism 
seeks to produce benefits for populations within a particular jurisdiction, in the 
end the outcomes rest generally on the creation of public-private partnerships 
that focus on investment and economic development in the speculative 
construction of a place (i. e. regeneration of docklands, construction of a 
shopping mall), rather than ameliorating the negative conditions (i. e. 
unemployment, unequal income distribution) existing in a particular territory. He 
states that any consideration of urban entrepreneurialism should be aware of 
the "increasing disparities in wealth and income" and any "increase in urban 
impoverishment" (1989b: 12). Income disparities and impoverishment result 
from: local development being led by property, business and market oriented 
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projects; the promotion of local subsidies to capital instead of being directed to 
the underprivileged; and the promotion of labour policies (i. e. subcontracting) 
that contribute to the expansion of the informal sector. All of these negative 
effects are disguised by the attraction to build new places that contribute to the 
imagery of cities suited for competitive purposes, which may also help to create 
a sense of social solidarity and civic pride (1989b: 14). 
Harvey (2000) explores his argument in the context of the American city of 
Baltimore. He notes how in the 1990s the city government, in partnership with 
the business sector, achieved the displacement of low-income families from the 
inner city and from inner city suburbs. Valuable land was given away to 
developers; stadiums, conventions centres and railways networks were created 
as a source of jobs and generation of income, but in exchange libraries were 
closed, public services curtailed, investment in city schools was minimal and 
unemployment rates more than doubled (2000: 141). One of the reasons behind 
these unwanted results of socio-spatial segmentation and marginalisation is, 
according to Harvey, the social processes that were mobilised to construct a 
desired city (2000: 173). These social processes can be identified in the 
institutional arrangements and rules followed by the state apparatus (including 
the local tier - 2000: 178). State projects have helped to pursue consumerism, 
which has produced wealth and empowerment for the few and repression and 
degradation for the rest. 
Taking account the various approaches to the entrepreneurial city, Jessop 
(1997a) has classified a city's competitiveness into strong and weak modes. 
Strong competitiveness comprises "economic, social and political innovations 
that intend to enhance productivity and other conditions of structural 
competitiveness" (1997a: 31). These other conditions (or extra economic 
factors) can be interpreted as being more socially concerned with income 
distribution problems and tackling social exclusion. Weak competitiveness 
generally includes modifications in "formal regulatory, facilitative or supportive 
measures aimed at capturing mobile investment... as well as simple image- 
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building measures with the same purpose (boosterism)" (ibid). In contrast with 
strong competitiveness, the weak mode can be interpreted as instrumental, with 
no direct concern for social well being. 
This classification encompasses many alternatives 
[b]esides property-led or more general market-led initiatives dominated by 
business interests,.. [such as] more neo-corporatist, neo-statist, or even 
community-based in governance structure - albeit still more or less closely 
dependent for success on market forces (Jessop, 1997a, 31). 
The dependence on markets underlines the main weakness of urban 
entrepreneurialism as a phenomenon: individual cities are being brought closer 
into line with the discipline and logic of capitalist development (Harvey, 1989b: 
10). If this discipline is considered, then it can be argued that no matter how 
strong the objectives of competitiveness are, the outcomes may result into weak 
competitiveness. For example, political projects may promote jobs that cannot 
dispense with the informal sector, the promotion of tourism and cultural projects 
may contribute to an ephemeral identity of a place, and the creation of public- 
private partnerships may be considered as a pure and reliable form of 
democratic participation. These examples have proven to attract and maintain 
mobile capital investment, but have generated deeper differences in social 
income distribution, as in the case of Baltimore. 
In considering Jessop's approach to the `entrepreneurial city', as well as other 
authors' arguments about the limitations of the phenomenon (e. g. the disparities 
in income and welfare distribution, social exclusion), this thesis argues that 
differences in participation within the operation of specific forms of organisation 
can also be observed when promoting urban entrepreneurialism in the Mexican 
context. This argument does not focus on the economic factors of the 
phenomenon (e. g. income distribution) but in the social and political 
organisational forms that help maintain urban entrepreneurialism in a middle- 
sized city (see Chapters 7-9). 
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3.3.4. Urban decentralisation in Mexico. The transition of the national-state 
into a facilitator between multiple scales can be observed in the evolution of 
Mexican urban politics. Between the 1940s and 1950s some attempts to 
deconcentrate Mexico City's industrial agglomeration were carried out through 
laws on manufacturing and credits. However, the strategies were not very 
effective as they only affected areas surrounding the capital city. In 1976 the 
first important law regarding land-use planning was passed, the Law of Human 
Settlements. This law was important to set urban policy rules and regulations, 
but their implementation encountered serious delays. In 1978 the first National 
Development Plan was announced. The Plan's proposals were to be followed 
by state and municipal governments. However, the lack of sufficient resources 
and the simplistic proposals to reverse Mexico City levels of industrial 
concentration made for a very inadequate policy (Garza, 1999). 
In the 1980s, the neoliberal political restructuring shifted national policies to 
focus on fiscal and monetary matters in order to control debt and inflation rates. 
Consequently, the national government paid little attention to urban policies, 
preparing instead a set of plans and programmes that only paid lip service to 
the discourse of an integral and national urban development. The National Plan 
of Urban Development (PNDU) of 1988-1994 stands as a good example. 
According to the Law of Planning of 1983, the national plan of development was 
to be published six months from the start of a new presidential administration. 
Carlos Salinas instead published, on his first day in office, the PRONASOL 
programme, while the urban development plan was published a year after (in 
1989). A significant budget was designated for PRONASOL's development, as 
it was President Salinas' political weapon to cope with the changes generated 
by neoliberal policies and the levels of social dissatisfaction. Even though the 
main aim of this programme was the development of services to provide basic 
needs through community participation in targeted poor areas, it had a relevant 
impact in terms of national urban infrastructure (i. e. building of roads, increased 
coverage of public services). 
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The PNDU's delayed publication showed at the outset its low priority, 
consequently it was not surprising that its budget was much lower than the one 
allocated to PRONASOL (Garza, 1999). Furthermore, the PNDU was 
considered by experts as a document with serious technical and methodological 
limitations as it gave an inadequate diagnosis and poor forecast of Mexico's 
urban system (1999: 164). Finally, the PNDU did not only lose its significance 
due to its own inadequacies, but also due to the creation in 1992 of the 100 
Cities Programme (P-100 Cities). 
P-100 Cities emerged as the political tool of the first front-runner for the PRI 
presidential candidacy. The programme was based on a decentralisation 
strategy that targeted 116 middle and large cities across the country. It 
promoted local governments to regulate urban development through the 
technical assistance of the Federal Social Development Secretariat. The P-100 
Cities tried to develop the new responsibilities that municipalities has attained 
since the 1983 reform of Article 115 and which, by that time, were lagging 
behind in terms of implementation. Some of the strategies were: the 
modernising of the local governments' real estate register to increase the 
taxation base; the improvement of conditions of communication between the 
targeted cities; and the allocation of territorial reserves that would absorb future 
population growth. The P-100 Cities continued in the following administration 
periods, increasing its coverage to 300 cities and updating various urban 
development schemes, historic centres and infrastructure projects (Garza, 
1999). 
The increased importance of local governments in the promotion of 
development through PRONASOL and P-100 Cities programmes marked a new 
phase for national government responsibilities. With the promotion of these 
programmes the federal government has test-driven `passing the buck' to other 
levels of government by requiring localities to solve their own problems. This 
characteristic underscores the point about national government trying to 
become a coordinator rather than an executor of policies. 
80 
In Mexico, federal government has `abdicated' the direct planning and 
implementation of urban politics since neoliberalism started to lead the way for 
economic and social policies (Garza, 1999). What in the mid 1970s seemed to 
culminate in a national urban planning - through the publication of several laws - 
ended up in the early 1990s as mere rhetoric. Since the mid 1990s, national 
development plans have tended to emphasise the creation of federal 
mechanisms to coordinate and inform subnational bodies on how to achieve 
major autonomy and responsibilities (i. e. on issues regarding fiscal tasks, 
management and administrative training workshops). 
Consequently, local subnational governments have started to build their own 
projects to attain more autonomy. Two main projects have been developed. 
First, the creation of state government development plans which need to be 
followed by municipal governments through their own local development plans 
(some other state laws and regulations may complement the former, such as 
budgetary state laws); and second, the creation of urban institutes or municipal 
secretariats which are becoming increasingly responsible for formulating and 
implementing urban policies. 42 It is unclear to what extent these institutes are 
involved in obtaining their own resources (due to the municipal dependency on 
federal transfers). However, it has been observed that they have decentralised 
many responsibilities by creating councils and committees in which local 
stakeholders, apart from the public sector, have been involved in the 
policymaking. Federal government, in exchange, has supported these forms of 
decentralised decision-making by allocating, in some cases, resources to 
specific municipal projects regarding, for example, environment and tourism 
developments. However, in the urban planning process the degree of 
involvement of local non-governmental stakeholders has been coordinated and 
negotiated by municipal and state governments (as in the case studies 
discussed in Chapters 7-9). 
42 Such as the creation of the Institutes of Development Planning (IMPLANs) during the 
administration of panista municipalities. 
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Mexico's urban policies and decentralisation programmes of the 1990s, 
exemplify state spatial projects, in Brenner's sense, that coordinate national, 
state and municipal institutions. They also express state spatial strategies that 
have tended to accentuate the differences between rural and urban localities. 
However, these differences appear to be characteristic of a transnational epoch 
where capital seeks different comparative advantages between geographical 
territories. To maintain these differences state institutions explicitly or implicitly 
promote these geographical variations across space (Brenner, 2004: 93). 
Conclusions 
The chapter has discussed the development of urban decentralisation policies 
in Mexico since the 1980s. The chapter showed how administrative and political 
decentralisations were enhanced by neoliberal policies that complemented 
ideas on competitive elections and accountability. In particular, fiscal 
decentralisation was relevant due to its association with the rationalisation of 
the provision of public services, the participation of non-public stakeholders in 
local policymaking, and the diminished interventionism of federal government in 
the implementation of urban planning. The effects of decentralisation policies 
upon the relationship between governmental and non-governmental 
organisations became more noticeable from the early 1990s, when the pro- 
activeness of federal government was expressed in the roles of facilitator and 
coordinator among subnational institutions and the recommendations stated by 
international organisations. 
Secondly, the chapter discussed how the changes associated with state 
reconfiguration could be studied through urban politics in the context of 
globalisation of capital accumulation and the process of urbanisation. These two 
phenomena are linked in the concept of the entrepreneurial city, which 
underlines how city governments have transformed their political apparatus to 
cope with risk. The transformation of the political apparatus included institutional 
82 
and organisational forms that sustained a flow of innovations required by the 
city to compete within global conditions. It was argued that state restructuring 
on the urban scale could be analysed through three trends: denationalisation of 
statehood, the internationalisation of the nation-state, and the destatisation of 
the political regime. 
Finally, the chapter explored the link between state reconfiguration and urban 
politics through the analysis of political and fiscal decentralisation. These two 
types of decentralisation reflected a less interventionist national government in 
the implementation of urban planning. Consequently, local governments created 
new organisations where local stakeholders other than the public sector were 
started to be involved in the urban policymaking process. The remainder of the 
thesis explores further the three trends characterising the entrepreneurial city. 
However, a meso level framework of analysis is first presented in order to 
bridge the gap between state reconfiguration and the effects of such 
reconfiguration at the local level. 
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Chapter 4- Urban governance: linking levels of analysis 
Introduction 
The previous two chapters discussed the processes of democratisation, 
decentralisation and urbanisation in Mexico over the last twenty years. This 
chapter develops a meso level conceptual framework that can enable links to 
be drawn between macro level and micro level processes at the urban level. 
In Chapter 3 the term `entrepreneurial city' was used to define the strategies of 
local governments, through the `re-imaging' of a place and the creation of 
innovative strategies (political and economic). The concept also implied macro 
state structural changes, categorised into three trends: denationalisation of 
statehood, internationalisation of the national state, and destatisation of the 
political regime. This chapter argues that these trends have an impact at the 
urban level, especially when they are identified with `governance' as a process 
for policymaking. Governance, in this sense, involves collaboration between the 
public and the private sectors, in a multiscalar or multilayered order between 
international, national and local organisations. 
The first section of this chapter discusses how the dialectics between structure 
and agency can be grasped at the urban level. The second section discusses 
the rationale that the thesis has followed in using governance as an analytical 
(general) tool for linking macro and the micro level processes. The third section 
discusses what is understood by governance as a (particular) process, focusing 
on two approaches that can be applied in the study of the locality. The last four 
sections consider how studies of urban regimes, partnerships, participation and 
institutionalism can complement governance approaches by emphasising the 
importance of agency in urban politics. 
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4.1. The city as a unit of analysis 
The last chapter argued that the urban space was shaped by changes in the 
mode of capital production as well as by the social relations that are associated 
with these changes. According to David Harvey (1989a, 1989b), the city is able 
to influence the nature of the economic and social processes that gave origin to 
it. This interpretation renders the city a spatio-temporal product where a 
dialectical relationship between economic and social processes exists. On the 
one hand, the city as a complement of capital accumulation (especially after the 
1970s) is influenced by speculative investment and mobility of capital. But, on 
the other hand, forces such as social relations (i. e. organisational structures, 
social mobilisations) are considered a particularism within a political process 
that helps to define the values of the city. In other words: 
Capitalism has to urbanize in order to reproduce itself... But urbanization means 
a certain mode of human organization in space and time that can somehow 
embrace... [individual and collective] conflicting forces, not necessarily so as to 
harmonize them, but to channel them into so many possibilities of both creative 
and destructive social transformation (Harvey, 1989a: 54). 
The dialectical relationship between economic and social processes can be 
theoretically illustrated by regulation theory and its approach to urban politics. 
An example is the book edited by Mikey Lauria (1997), where regulationists 
propose a number of different ways of linking regulation with urban politics. 
Regulationist work has been concerned with "the regulation of the process of 
capital accumulation within a capitalist mode of production" and the role of 
institutions, social forms, and cultural norms within this mode of production 
(Goodwin & Painter, 1997: 15-16). 
However, the regulation approach encounters two main limitations. One of the 
limitations is that this theory cannot in itself provide a full explanation of the 
changing character of the state, culture or social relations, as they are by 
definition part of the explanatory tools, not the objects of the explanation 
(Goodwin & Painter 1997: 17). The other limitation is that the level of influence of 
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social processes upon the accumulation process cannot be generalised 
because the course of capital accumulation depends on temporal and spatial 
variations. 
The emphasis that regulation theory tends to put on stable national settlements 
over uneven local stability, and on structure over agency, has prompted 
scholars to focus on complementary approaches, particularly in relation to 
`governance' and urban regimes (Goodwin & Painter, 1997; Jessop, 1997b). 
Both of these approaches underscore the importance of the locality in a wider 
context and the significance of agency for the creation of new social relations 
and organisational structures. 
4.2. Linking macro and micro level analyses 
The link between levels of analyses is important because of the potential for 
agency to shape structure, especially in periods when historical structures or 
forces are encountering a transition or transformation (Mahoney & Snyder, 1999 
- further discussed in Section 5.6). Some examples of structures, considered as 
macro level processes, are ideology, social class, economic forces, and state 
reconfiguration. This thesis focuses on the last type of structure. 
Governance is used in two senses: general and particular. Governance, used in 
its general sense, allows for the recognition of agency and structure. Thus 
governance provides an understanding on how state reconfiguration is being 
carried out. `Governance', when used in its particular sense, refers to a specific 
arrangement of governing (Rhodes, 1996), recognising the role of government 
as well as non-public organisations in policymaking. `Governance' can be 
complemented by other theoretical tools that provide a micro level 
understanding of agency within an urban context such as urban regimes and 
partnerships, but which at the same time are highly related to theories of 
participation and institutionalism. For this type of analysis three empirical tiers 
are relevant: supranational, national and subnational institutions (including 
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organisations, regulatory frameworks, and stakeholders). Empirical research 
could focus on a specific tier only; however, this thesis proposes that each 
empirical level is not exclusive from the other. Relationships among the three 
empirical levels can be observed through the coordinating and adjustment 
strategies followed by different non-governmental and governmental agencies. 
Figure 4.1 depicts the theoretical framework upon which this thesis is based. It 
proposes three levels of empirical research (supranational, national and 
subnational) and sets out the relationship between the macro, meso and micro 
levels of theoretical analysis. The processes of democratisation and state 
reconfiguration are classified within the macro level. The creation of democratic 
institutions, the implementation of decentralisation strategies and the promotion 
of `governance' are classified within the meso level. Meso level processes also 
include the implementation of neoliberal policies and the legacies of both the 
authoritarian regime and social movements (as it is argued that these past 
processes are reflected in current ways of organisation). The theoretical 
concepts classified within the micro level are: urban regimes underscoring the 
relevance of informal arrangements; governance as partnerships; participation 
theories reflected in actual participatory systems; and `new institutionalism' 
highlighting formal rules and informal conventions as part of the policymaking 
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4.3. Governance theory 
The term governance can be confusing as it has been used in a myriad of ways 
(analytical or procedural) and in different national contexts (Pierre & Peters, 
2000; Kjaer, 2003). First, this section presents what is understood by 
governance in a general sense as well as in its particular form of collaborative 
arrangement. Second, two interpretations of `governance' are discussed. A third 
section examines the concepts of `multi level governance' and `good 
governance'. 
Governance, in its general sense, can be considered as an analytical tool 
concerned with creating the conditions for ordered rule and collective action 
(Pierre & Stoker, 2000: 32-33). Governance enables social and economic 
coordination between organisations and actors. In this sense, the thesis has 
used governance due its analytical linkage between macro level and micro level 
processes. The linkage can be reflected in how social and economic 
relationships develop within the context of state reconfiguration (see Section 
4.2). 
There have been various approaches in differentiating modes of governance; 
however these attempts can be condensed into three ideal types: hierarchy, 
market and networks (Frances et al., 1991; Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998: 318- 
19). Each mode presents different characteristics relating to a normative basis, 
means of communication, methods of conflict resolution, flexibility of decisions, 
amount of commitment between the parties involved, climate in which 
relationships develop, and the level of dependence between actors' choices or 
preferences. These characteristics have an effect upon economic, political and 
social structures, but due to the interests of this thesis, only a brief description 
underling the coordination within governmental arrangements is discussed. 
The hierarchy mode of governance refers to the state governing society by 
imposition of the law and other forms of regulation. In this mode a vertical 
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relationship exists between government and society and between governmental 
actors themselves. It has been related to the role performed by government 
during the welfare and protectionist state, where its intervention was supreme in 
providing public services and shaping the nation's economy, via bureaucratic 
routines (Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998: 518). 
The market mode of governance has attained importance insofar as a hybrid 
system between the state and the market has been developed. This has been 
observed since the end of the 1970s when the flexibilisation of capital and 
labour started to develop and state interventionism started to decrease, 
especially in determining the behaviour of markets. This mode refers to political 
and economic actors coordinating themselves to resolve common problems 
without distorting the competitive nature of the market (Frances et al., 1991). 
Coordination is generated insofar as actors see advantages to themselves 
(Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998: 518). This mode of governance has been 
associated with the rise of New Public Management where the marketisation of 
state institutions has been implemented with the aim of providing effective and 
efficient public services (Pollitt, 2003). 
The network mode of governance has been considered a `contemporary' 
structure comprising a variety of actors and organisations. Within networks; the 
interdependence between actors is highlighted in order to achieve and 
maximise political outcomes based on trust and reciprocity. These networks are 
also characterised for being `self-regulatory' (Rhodes, 1996). This mode of 
governance has emerged in response to reduced constraints on decision 
making by central government and increased organisational and political 
fragmentation. This mode includes a multiplicity of actors that go beyond the 
government and market structures, including civil society as well. The study of 
networks has been helpful for understanding the arrangements within state and 
non-state actors, for example, the formulation and delivery of public services by 
government, the private sector and civil society (Newman, 2001). 
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Modes of governance can be used separately to understand governing 
processes, but mixed modes can also exist. Consequently, it should not be 
surprising that different modes of governance prevail within certain 
organisational structures (i. e. hierarchy and networks modes coexisting in 
partnerships); what seems to vary are the political and social relationships that 
can emerge within a common organisational structure according to the mode of 
governance (Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998). 
The variation of political and social relationships implies that the process of 
coordination matters; this leads to the understanding of `governance' in its 
particular sense. The particular sense of `governance' refers to a specific 
arrangement of coordination where organisations of the public and non-public 
sectors collaborate to attain goals otherwise not attainable (Stoker, 1998). 
Governance, in this sense, can be implemented through the creation of public- 
private partnerships. These partnerships are an active process where public, 
private and voluntary stakeholders work in a coordinated fashion to attain a 
common good either in formal or informal ways (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002, 
ch. 1). It is through partnerships that networks, characterised by trust and 
reciprocity, have been commonly observed. 
Governance, expressed through partnerships, creates an opportunity for the 
direct participation of non-state actors in policy decisions through the 
participation of individuals representing sectors (private or voluntary). Thus, 
governance may imply the inclusion of certain individuals that could have been 
marginalised in previous circumstances where multi sector partnerships did not 
exist. The potential of inclusion of private and civil representatives into 
policymaking has created a normative stance for governance. This stance has 
been identified with the `good governance' term, used by several international 
organisations that provide aid for promoting democratic consolidation and 
eradication of poverty (Kjaer, 2003). However, this aid is subject to normative 
conditions established by donor countries, which promote democratic principles 
such as community or civil participation, accountability and transparency. The 
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inclusion of different stakeholders that governance implies is not inevitable, 
especially if existing structures and invested interests may infiltrate against the 
efforts promoting participation and accountability. 
Even though the implementation of governance in its participatory forms (multi- 
sector collaboration and public-private partnerships) has the potential to 
promote inclusion and participation; the thesis argues that inclusion and 
participation may not happen if social and political processes depart from 
genuine democratic principles. The potential misleading nature of the 
governance concept, in addition to its many interpretations (general and 
particular) may be considered as a theoretical weakness. However, the 
analytical power of governance and the tendency towards particular governance 
arrangements in a context of urban entrepreneurialism, make this concept 
relevant. Bearing this in mind, the rest of the thesis moves forward by 
discussing governance in its particular form within the Mexican context. 
Governance is used for interpreting the empirical level of the argument of the 
thesis, through the analysis of public-private partnerships and their relationship 
with other modes of political participation (Sections 4.5 and 4.6). But first, 
subsections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 discuss how governance (in its particular form) has 
been developed from two different perspectives: the coordinating and the 
national-state-centric approaches (Pierre & Stoker, 2001). 
4.3.1. The coordinating approach. This approach refers to `self-governing, 
interorganisational networks' (Rhodes, 1996). Networks refer to the 
relationships between interdependent actors and organisations involved in the 
policy process. This concept also implies that the boundaries between market, 
state, and civil society are blurred. Thus, the capacity of government is 
challenged by the complexity of segregated and decentralised policy 
processes, 43 and the involvement of a multitude of organisations belonging to 
43 The limits to government capacity have been the subject of in-depth studies against the 
background of the governmental landscape experienced by Britain between 1979 and 1997. 
`Governance' became an explicit policy frame after 1997 (Stoker, 2004). Furthermore, the 
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different scales (international, national, local) and sectors (public, private) 
(Kooiman, 2003). 
Within the new process of governance, government is only one of many actors 
that influence decisions; hence there are limits upon its power to exert its will on 
other actors (Kirckert cited in Rhodes, 1996, p. 659). This emphasises the 
autonomy that organisations have within governance, which does not imply 
freedom, but rather an intraorganisational control (self-organising). Although 
government does not have a privileged position it can `indirectly and imperfectly' 
guide these networks (Rhodes, 1996). 
This new role has rendered government liable to create new organisational 
strategies in order to take decisions - either in a conscious or reactive fashion. 
These strategies respond to the move away from the welfare-state policies 
encountered in the US and Europe by the late 1970s. The strategies can be 
classified in three categories: composing and coordinating the networks; 
collibrating and steering; and integrating and regulating (Stoker, 1996, p. 14- 
15). The first category of actions refers to the process of identifying key 
stakeholders that could provide and exchange resources for the formulation and 
implementation of a policy or programme. It also refers to the development of 
effective linkages between relevant parties to ensure the preservation of 
networks. The second category refers to the steering and influencing of 
relationships in order to achieve desired outcomes. The third category is 
concerned with the avoidance of unwanted side effects and the establishments 
of mechanisms for effective coordination. 
Networks have the potential to provide an opportunity for citizens to regain 
control of government by participating in them. Networks can transcend 
hierarchical institutions, pooling more diverse resources, capabilities and 
incorporation of the notion of 'governance' within the 'Third Way' configuration has acquired 
adherents from other parts of the world insofar as the concept has prevailed in the discourse of 
international organisations (Kjaer, 2004). 
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perspectives (i. e. from private and community groups). As a result, 
interdependency and trust between participants can be developed. However, 
one of the downsides of networks is the threat they pose to democratic 
accountability (Rhodes, 1996, p. 666). Networks can create a private 
government that maintains the interests of a privileged group. This can happen 
when privileged groups become part of a network seeking to ensure that the 
rules of the game will favour their interests. Networks imply an enhanced 
pluralism insofar as a great variety of actors are able to participate in the 
network. But this has not necessarily meant that government has reduced its 
intervention. In many cases, it rather seems that government has learned to co- 
exist with a larger number of organisations, from a wider range of sectors. This 
argument can be interpreted as governance implying more than government in 
policymaking (Kjaer, 2003). This observation leads to the other perspective of 
governance. 
4.3.2 The national-state-centric approach. According to this perspective 
government is considered as a: 
key actor in governance by virtue of the vast resources... which it still controls 
and also by the legitimacy it enjoys as the sole actor in society which can 
properly define the collective interest (Pierre & Stoker, 2000: 33). 
This approach gives a stronger emphasis to central (national) government's role 
as the main actor for controlling, steering and encouraging subsequent changes 
that respond to a globalised economy. 44 Governance as a coordinating 
approach has been useful to study the diminished interventionism of central 
government in policy decisions (i. e. decentralisation). However, it has 
oversimplified this analysis; for instance some studies in Britain argue that 
central government still has an important role in policymaking (Davies 2002; 
John 2001; Marinetto, 2003). The criticisms underlined in these studies have 
44 Here the term state-centric does not refer to the nation-state's structure but to the national 
government's reconfiguration that helps to carry out state projects and strategies at different 
scales (i. e. international, regional or local). 
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been helpful in considering the role of central government as an additional 
theoretical element within governance; relating specifically to central 
government's bypassing of local authorities' political structures to guarantee 
that national and international recommendations are followed. 
Jon Pierre and Guy Peters (2000: 163) link this approach to the way states 
"manage their transition" in response to globalisation. This transition is reflected 
in the domestic political and economic accommodation to the global economy 
which involves in itself social changes (i. e. social relations, organisational 
changes). This perspective of governance - influenced by the multiplicity of 
actors stated by the coordinating approach - argues that the changes that the 
state encounters tend to become a collective interest in an era of economic 
globalisation and subnational institutional dynamics. The multiplicity of actors 
has prompted national-states to adapt to changes that they have not directly 
initiated, as other actors from different levels are involved in shaping the 
direction of change (Pierre & Peters, 2000). This is further explored through the 
concept of multi-level governance (Section 4.2.3). 
Changes in social relations and organisational structures have helped to 
redefine the nature and extent of the national-state's power. This power has 
begun to derive less from constitutional powers and capabilities (such as 
authoritarian decisions or manipulation). Instead the state's capacity is 
established to coordinate and set priorities of various public and non-public 
projects and between supranational and subnational levels (Pierre and Peters, 
2000: 198). The reconfigured role (or pro-activeness) of the national-state 
reflected at the subnational level can, on various occasions, be over-reactive. 
This over-reaction is observed: (1) insofar as it bypasses subnational structures 
when they reflect some type of weakness in their coordinating capacity; (2) 
insofar as constitutional and legal control is used over subnational governments 
(despite its tendency to decrease); and (3) insofar as it offers immediate 
compensation to economic and social shocks incurred from state reforms at the 
local level (i. e. emergence of informal sector, migration problems, extreme 
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poverty) (Pierre & Peters, 2000). The over-reaction can be interpreted as a way 
of maintaining coordination between supranational and subnational levels. 
An example of the first way national government can over-react has been 
analysed in the Single Regeneration Budget in Britain which started in 1994. 
Here central government prompted and sponsored local authorities to create 
public-private partnerships as an organisational form to reactivate urban 
development (Davies, 2001; Harding et al., 2000). This intervention allowed 
central government to bypass local authorities' interests. An example of the 
second way national government can over-react has been analysed in the 
central government's control of public finances, at the local level, on issues 
related to expenditure and investment projects in countries such as the UK and 
Denmark (Harding, 1997; John, 2001). It is worth noting that these two 
examples are also reflected in the Mexican case due to the authoritarian 
centrality of power and decision. Under the Mexican context, the third way that 
national government can over-react is illustrated by the PRONASOL 
programme, which aimed to compensate marginalised communities after the 
implementation of neoliberal reforms. 
Pierre and Peters (2000: 101) argue that the trends that the national-state has 
followed in parallel to global capitalism tend to replace invasive strategies of 
central government with more subtle techniques of `steering'. Thus, this 
approach understands governance as a strategy where the central 
government's core role is tending to coordinate the design and implementation 
of policies that have not been directly and solely initiated by it. With this role the 
central state ensures alignment with dominant interests (at international and 
local levels) by tending to share its political and administrative force. In other 
words: 
In the `reasserting control' scenario, we should expect to see states design and 
select policy instruments so as to ensure a maximum compliance with minimum 
coercion (Pierre &Peters, 2000: 105, my emphasis). 
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This coordinating role has an effect on public and private activity and on the 
interaction between globalisation and localisation. These effects are explored 
through the concept of multi level governance. 
4.3.3. Multi level governance. This concept discusses governance as a 
negotiated exchange between systems of governance (i. e. within a mode) at 
different institutional levels (Pierre & Stoker, 2000: 30). These levels vary from 
the international, passing through the national, to the regional and local scales. 
In particular, the intermediary role of the national state between the international 
and subnational levels is what maintains the balance between all scales (Pierre 
& Peters, 2000). 45 
The interaction of multiple institutional levels can influence the direction of a 
policy strategy. That is why it was argued above that the national-state has 
adapted to changes that were not directly and solely established by it. For 
example, on the one hand, national policy strategies can be defined by political 
or economic forums and the member countries involved in those forums (i. e. 
World Bank, IMF). Also policy strategies can be defined by the interests of 
transnational corporations and financial organisations. These are reflected in 
transnational meetings such as the ones organised by the World Trade 
Organisation (Brenner, 2004; Robinson 2004; Sklair, 2005). 
On the other hand, national policies can be influenced by the subnational level 
through its institutional arrangements or social relationships. This can be 
palpable in the case of `global cities' where the denationalisation of the national 
territory is presented (through the establishment of transnational leading finance 
and service firms in the city). But a type of national identity is also underscored 
through anti-migration or racist local groups that want to maintain a country's 
traditional social relations (Sassen, 1999). National policies can also be 
influenced by urban governments that are not necessarily global, but that 
45 One of the problems of multi-level analysis is that it refers to intergovernmental relationships 
when its definition can refer to broader applications (Pierre & Stoker, 2000: 31). 
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compete for a place in the globalised economy. This influence can be derived 
from their aim to become distinctive through the promotion of their heritage or 
advantageous location as trade hubs which, at the same time, create new local 
interests and relationships. The changes that both types of cities encounter put 
pressure on national policies in order to safeguard their nature. 
The national-state role is significant for transmitting reforms through political 
and administration strategies and policies. This is why some authors see 
national-state pro-activeness as adapting what transnational institutions 
establish but also for what subnational institutions demand (Brenner, 2004; 
Pierre & Peters, 2000; Robinson, 2003). The national-state's intermediary role 
in coordinating the interaction of the global and the local scales is a governance 
strategy of institutional change to achieve effective economic performance, 
which is shaped by the globalisation of capital (Jessop, 1997a: 35). 
Governance at the international and local levels. The link between international 
and local understandings of `governance' can be illustrated through the concept 
of `good governance'. Although it varies from the theoretical perspectives 
discussed above, it is helpful in order to render fully the conception of 
`governance' within an empirical context. 
For some international organisations such as the World Bank and the OECD 
`good governance' was coined in an effort to guarantee an effective use of the 
aid provided by financial institutions, especially directed towards developing 
countries. This term was subject to various interpretations; however, its core 
features referred to the managing of public affairs in a transparent, accountable 
and participatory manner to reduce corruption and strengthen the rule of 
law 
(Kjaer, 2004; Santiso, 2001). 
For the World Bank the prevalence of the rule of law involves national-states in 
developing appropriate regulations and supervision to enhance market 
environments. Moreover, the 1990s incorporation of 
democratic principles into 
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international organisations' aims, regarding equality and participation, enhanced 
the participation of civil society as a counterweight to corruption or rent-seeking 
in developing countries (Williamson, 2004). Consequently, the national-state as 
an intermediary has guided the development of participatory institutions for 
subnational governments to follow. These guidelines, for example, have created 
hybrid organisational structures that incorporate government and civil society or 
public and private sectors, such as partnerships. This statement is exemplified 
for the Mexican case in Chapter 9. 
The creation of hybrid organisations, which are shaped by economic changes of 
capital accumulation and state reforms at the local level, is what has been 
named `local governance'. In particular, its normative version - `good local 
governance' - has been the basis to promote local governance within a 
democratic context. Good local governance has been defined according to 
three aspects (Stoker, 1994: 5): 
" Openness so that people are recognised as having the right and opportunity 
to act in the public political life; 
" Capacity for deliberation about the key issues confronting community, both 
on the part of civic leaders and `ordinary' citizens; and 
" Capacity to act that enables institutions and actors from public, private and 
voluntary sectors to blend their resources and efforts to achieve common 
purposes 
However, governance failures are inevitable insofar as government institutions 
become inconsistent with the objects they are governing (Jessop, 2002: 231). 
Thus governance failures can be observed when any of the three points listed 
above is restricted. These restrictions can happen due to a lack of 
organisational capacity or interest in including different sectors of society or 
`ordinary' citizens into political matters. To understand in more detail how these 
restrictions develop, conceptual approaches other than `governance' are 
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required. The remainder of this chapter discusses the contributions of urban 
regimes, partnerships, participation, and new institutionalism. 
4.4. Urban regimes 
The `model' of an urban regime has been developed by American scholars 
(Elkin, 1987; Stone, 1989). Regimes are defined as: 
informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function 
together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions (Stone, 
1989: 6). 46 
The agents involved within these informal relationships have access to 
resources that allow them to play an active role in local policy decisions. The 
informal arrangements are tacit agreements or understandings between the 
parties involved over long periods of time. The informal arrangements can 
generate a positive effect upon the articulation among the agents' relationships. 
The positive side is based upon trust between the parties involved and who aim 
to develop the same interests. However, informal arrangements can have a 
negative effect when the relationships created are exclusive to parties involved, 
emphasising the lack of accountability to other groups of society about the 
decisions taken by the stakeholders involved in the urban regime or network. 
The parties involved are, in Clarence Stone's term, a `governing coalition'. The 
main task of this coalition is to gather the necessary resources (material and 
non-material) to define the direction of a chosen policy strategy. The governing 
coalition generates a 'power to', rather than a `power over', in the mobilisation of 
resources and efforts to achieve the chosen policy (Stone, 1989). To achieve 
`power to' there has to exist a purpose that could be extended throughout an 
urban community and its unavoidable interdependency. This task has to be 
46 Public bodies refer to governmental organisations while private interests refer to non- 
governmental organisations, civil, business or religious groups 
(Stone, 1989: 4). 
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carried out by a strong leadership able to attract and coordinate the necessary 
resources to achieve the established aims 
The governing coalition has to be able to mobilise resources based on its 
principal political agenda, thus it is common for local authorities and business 
groups to participate in the coalition, by relying on a leadership with capacity to 
coordinate efforts. Both stakeholders' participation relies on the authorities' 
preoccupation in promoting the locality's economic development and on 
business' (i. e. real estate, developers, private universities or consultants) 
possession of the financial resources and organisational capacity to collaborate 
with the local authorities (Stone, 1993). However, attempts to apply the regime 
model in the European context have concluded that the partners in a coalition 
are not restricted to business and government; other private and voluntary 
organisations are also involved (Mossberger & Stoker, 2001). 
The urban regime model is also characterised by its normative nature, which 
suggests an increasing inclusion of various social groups and citizens in urban 
policy decisions. This level of inclusion is partly due to the `power to' premise. 
However, the more partners are included, the more sophisticated is the 
coordination required due to the complexity of the model (Stone, 1993). Thus it 
has been common to observe, in empirical studies, that urban regimes tend to 
maintain and develop strategies that generate immediate results (i. e. economic 
growth) and that do not involve major changes in socio-economic structures. 
This has been analysed by Stone (2001) in the city of Atlanta where, after forty 
years of urban regeneration, those benefiting most were business groups and 
the black middle class, while urban poverty still prevailed and few signs of 
inclusion were visible. 
The interrelationship between public bodies and private interests in addition to 
horizontal relationships, underlined by the `power to', match with the premises 
of `governance' discussed in the previous section. The analysis of the close 
relationship between the public and the business sectors, and the informal 
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relationships sustained between stakeholders, have offered `governance' 
studies additional tools in understanding the process of urban policymaking. 
However, the model's focus on an American context has generated criticisms 
when used in different contexts (including Western Europe); where local politics 
are guided by central government and by the legacies of the `welfare state' 
(Davies, 2001; Harding et al., 2000). 
The urban regime model underlines how `governance' can manifest itself as an 
informal organisational form. But its initial study within the American context 
generated a misuse of the concept when applied to local analysis under 
different economic and political contexts. For example, the confusion between 
partnerships and urban regimes was one cause of concern (Davies, 2001). In 
Western Europe, the strong intervention of central government in promoting 
public-private collaboration (Davies, 2001; Harding et al., 2000), and its 
intervention in defining local investment and expenditure (Harding, 1997; John, 
2001: 43), have been two clear reasons to argue that the `power to' of urban 
regime is not applicable in countries such as France, Denmark or Britain. It is 
argued that the role of central government and the intervention of subnational 
governments in urban policy decisions have restricted business participation. 
This has led to the subordination of business groups' decisions to politics and 
thus a `power over' has dominated the scene. In these cases partnerships have 
been a policy directed by the centre instead of becoming a local initiative. 
Table 4.1 contrasts how governance works following the premises of the urban 
regime model and how governance works under public-private partnerships 
promoted by central government. 
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Table 4.1. Governance as urban regime vs. governance as partnerships 
Characteristics Governance as urban Governance as 
regime partnership 
Participants Close relationships Distant relationship, 
between local authorities interaction between local 
and business elite; other authorities and the 
sectors can be also business sector through a 
represented legal framework only 
Modes of collaboration Voluntary relationship; Hierarchical (imposed) 
formal arrangements exist relationship between local 
with certain tendency of agents and/or extra-local 
becoming formal bodies (i. e. central 
government) 
Sustainability (duration) Long periods of time (Generally) short periods 
of time (instrumental 
view) 
Autonomy Policy and project aims Policy and project aims 
are decided and are determined and 
sponsored by local sponsored by extra-local 
agents bodies 
Areas of influence Policy strategies and Specific projects that 
implementation in many pursue particular interests 
policy fields (urban 
regeneration, education, 
etc. ) 
Governing objectives Tend to generate Directed by the interests 
economic growth of extra-local bodies 
(central government, 
political parties) 
Synergy Collaboration between Collaboration between 
the private and public sectors does not generate 
sectors to achieve `power to'; there is no 
outcomes otherwise not value added as 'power 
possible; there is value over' prevails 
added in the relationship 
as this 'power to' prevails 
Based on Davies, 2001: 55 
As the table focuses upon the differences, it is worth bearing in mind the 
similarity between the two, embodied in the prevalence of informal 
arrangements. Mapping the differences has helped to clarify conceptual tools 
for the analysis of Mexican partnerships. However, the characteristics listed in 
the table do not necessarily tally neatly with the empirical evidence discussed in 
Chapter 7. 
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Before discussing partnerships, it is important to underline the nature of the 
significance of urban regimes in the Mexican case. This type of study has not 
been common in analysing Mexican urban development, as the role of national 
and local business groups was greatly subordinated to central-state decisions 
until the mid 1980s. 47 However, in the early 2000s there was the first study of 
urban regimes in the Metropolitan Area of Monterrey (one of the three biggest 
located in the north of the country) (Bassols, forthcoming). One of the factors 
that motivated this study was Mexico's urban and political changes that have 
responded to market driven policies and the initial decentralisation of the state. 
Particularly, Monterrey's nearness to the US border has made this area act in a 
more business-oriented way, trying to simulate its neighbour's local 
development policies. Consequently, the study has focused on the role of local 
business in setting the municipal agenda, and the entrepreneurial leadership48 
acquired in the process (ibid). 
In an analogous way, this thesis argues that the role of business can be 
observed in setting the policy agenda in other regions (i. e. Bajio Region). Even 
though business in Mexico was subordinated to government during 
authoritarian times, the informal arrangements between business-people and 
politicians have influenced the country and localities' urban agenda, as in the 
case of Queretaro and San Luis Potosi. 
4.5. Public-private partnerships 
Partnerships can be understood as `organisational forms' of governance, which 
involve organisations working in association with one another. By working 
47 This comment was emphasised throughout an informal discussion sustained with Prof. 
Enrique Cabrero at CIDE in January 2004. 
48 By 'entrepreneurial leadership' I mean the ability of a mayor to coordinate the bid of resources 
coming from different sectors, and his/her ability to convince strategic local stakeholders 
to take 
the risks that innovative management and investment forms involve. 
104 
together, a process of `joint collaboration and decision-making' is expected; 
however, "partners are by no means always equal" (Stoker, 1998, p. 41). 
Inequalities arise from the extent of knowledge, skills or financial resources that 
partners possess and which are needed for the partnership to work 
Partnerships have been particularly associated with networks, but they are also 
forms that can be associated with other modes of governance (hierarchical and 
market) (Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998). As discussed in Section 4.3.1, networks 
can generate a challenge to democratic accountability when privileged groups 
create barriers obstructing transparency and information. Thus within a network 
context, accountability becomes a principal challenge for governance, 
especially when organisations - such as partnerships - follow national and 
international coordinated objectives. 
Potentially partnerships are an expression of `collaborative advantage', through 
which actors pursue a collective benefit that could not have been obtained by 
governmental and non-governmental organisations acting separately (Huxham, 
1996: 14). These advantages can be identified in the pooling of resources or the 
avoidance of the duplication of effort. These types of activities require, for 
example, that local government agencies develop a strategic role to manage 
the partnership's funding streams, to report its performance as well as to 
promote the relations premised on solidarity, trust, and reciprocity between the 
partnership's members (Skelcher, 2004: 39). It is not only the role of federal 
government in guiding the overall objectives that is important, but also that of 
local governments in creating and maintaining the partnership (which is subject 
to its local context: geography, population, political culture, history of 
collaboration - Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002: 116). 
The problem that partnerships encounter relates mainly to the obstruction of 
accountability. This problem can be categorised into three levels: public, 
performance, and financial accountability (Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002: ch. 8). The 
public lack of accountability is identified when a dominant role on the part of one 
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of the partners prevails due to the differences in skills, knowledge and financial 
resources. These differences increase problems in the communication between 
partners, affecting the levels of trust and solidarity that in theory an open and 
inclusive partnership should pursue. This is aggravated when a partnership was 
created to achieve a public purpose. Also the lack of public accountability 
emerges as a consequence of elite domination, especially within the legacies of 
an authoritarian regime in which informal or tacit understandings prevail as part 
of a clientelistic culture. 
The presence of performance accountability has been analysed based on the 
aims of a partnership following a national strategy or a particular local project 
(i. e. neighbourhood); or based on a partnership delivering a specific service or 
implementing a more general policy (Skelcher, 2004: 34). The different aims 
that a partnership may have can explain the levels of discretion in defining 
programmes or targets, at local, national or international levels (Sullivan & 
Skelcher 2002: 157). Financial accountability refers to the report on the use of 
funds that a partnership requires to develop its objectives. However, the use of 
public funds is subject to the employment of financial procedures as a way to 
guarantee that the resources are properly managed. Generally, this is controlled 
through specific regulations; however, problems arise when these regulations 
are not taking place, enhancing discrete decisions and thus a lack of trust. 
The problem of accountability can be further exacerbated when partnerships 
(non-elected bodies) compete against elected representatives to influence the 
direction of the policymaking process (Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002). A problem 
arises when the process of local democratisation has enhanced transparent and 
clear elections (as a result of past mobilisations) rather than promoting a more 
participative and responsible citizenry. This underlines a way on which society 
expects elected politicians to meet its demands rather than organising itself 
together with politicians to accomplish them together (this is further discussed in 
Chapter 7). 
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Partnerships have been identified in a wide range of policy arenas (health, 
education, public safety). However, their creation as an organisational form to 
promote the regeneration or liveability of a marginalised urban area has been 
identified in many cities around the world (Evans, 2002). Based on Jessop's 
(2002) argument, partnerships in the urban policy arena can be regarded as an 
organisational form that can help maintain the innovative character through 
which cities seek to achieve entrepreneurship. 
It can be argued that the context in which public-private partnerships in Mexico 
has developed is not completely new. Organisational forms coined as 
paragovernmental agencies, fideicomisos publicos or patronatos are 
predecessors that can be found in the Mexican legal framework since the 1960s 
(i. e. the Federal Law of Public Administration, Law of Paragovernmental 
Agencies, and Law of Institutions for Private Assistance, among others laws 
published by state government legislatures). These organisational forms are 
equivalent to trusts or boards in which different levels of government as well as 
different sectors of society collaborate to promote development. Even though 
the context is not new, a more systematic and publicly known way of creating 
organisations in which public and private stakeholders collaborate can be 
observed. This observation has become more evident since neoliberal policies 
and the decentralisation process have been experienced in Mexico, as well as 
through the internationalisation of developmental policies, promoted by 
international organisations, followed by the Mexican government (OECD, 1998). 
Public-private relationships have been expressed through strategies of 
privatisation of local public services such as solid waste collection, transport, 
housing and general public works (Batley, 1996, Garcia, 2003). At the local 
level, organisations in charge of urban management have been legally created 
by lease, concessions and contracting-out strategies, as well as by 
intergovernmental agreements and the participation of paramunicipal agencies 
or intermunicipal associations. As privatisation has consolidated throughout the 
last decade, other forms of collaboration have emerged through co-investment 
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strategies where the major financial investor has been the private sector and 
the main legal facilitator and administrator have been public agencies belonging 
to many different governmental levels. Co-investment has been generally 
considered a version of concession or contracting-out strategies (Garcia, 
2003: 251). 
In addition, public-private relationships have been restructured in a more 
systematic way through the creation of partnerships, mentioned throughout 
national programmes of urban development since the 1990s (Habitat 2002-06; 
Jones & Pisa, 2000). This form of organisation has been identified in housing 
and in the shift land use from rural to urban, which has been required for 
planned urban growth (Batley, 1996; Jones & Pisa, 2000). Partnerships differ 
from privatising forms of organisation in that the different powers and capacities 
(that go beyond financial resources such as human knowledge or skills) of the 
public, private and community stakeholders are harnessed to a shared purpose, 
working in a parallel fashion rather than hierarchically (Batley, 1996: 736). The 
operation of public-private partnerships is not as regularised as fideicomisos 
püblicos or patronatos. This aspect has become a challenge for governments in 
order to offer better opportunities that increase the participation of public and 
private stakeholders and that guarantee outcomes that benefit a majority of 
partners and users (Garcia, 2003; Jones and Pisa, 2000). This thesis argues 
that partnerships, in Mexico, have been identified for regeneration purposes, 
especially for the restoration of historic centres and neighbourhood 
improvement schemes, where the role of municipal government tends to be 
more active and less dependent on federal government's decision making and 
management. 
It is possible that within partnerships the beneficiaries or users can be directly 
involved in the formulation or administration of the delivery of a public good. 
This is more likely to be observed in cases of neighbourhood management 
(Batley, 1996, Skelcher & Sullivan, 2002). In Mexico, the neighbourhood level 
partnership can be identified in what are called public-private associations 
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created through state and municipal citizen councils or committees. Thus it is 
common to find these associations as part of citizen or political participatory 
methods (see Chapters 7 and 8). 
4.6. Participation 
The potential qualities that partnerships provide as a form of organisation are 
associated with an increased involvement of previously excluded people or 
citizen groups in the process of policymaking (Lowndes & Sullivan, 2004). 
Although participation can be regarded as an ingredient of partnership working 
(Lowndes & Sullivan, 2003), it is a separate phenomenon. Participation plays a 
broader role within the concept of democracy (Weale, 1999, ch. 5). 
Political participation is understood in this thesis as a complement to 
representative democratic methods (i. e. elections). Political participation is 
concerned with the day-to-day patterns of citizen political activity rather than 
confined to voting only (Parry, et al., 1992: 3). Political participation takes on a 
multi-dimensional appearance insofar as it can be manifested by citizens 
contacting members of congress or local councillors, going to the town hall and 
to discuss a problem, attending a public meeting to protest about an issue, 
signing a petition, becoming part of a public consultation, getting involved in 
policy or service development, etc. (ibid). The multi-dimensional appearance, at 
the same time, involves different types of citizens that can express their 
interests in individual or collective forms, reflecting short-term or long-term 
interests, or through state sponsored forms or in more autonomous ways (Prior, 
et al., 1995, ch. 8). 
Participatory initiatives, either autonomous in character or sponsored by the 
state, can contribute to deepening the democratic process (Prior, et al., 1995). 
In particular, participatory initiatives when promoted autonomously by, for 
example social movements, have been referred to as `political opportunities 
structures' (Kitschelt, 1986). For the purpose of this thesis the participatory 
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initiatives promoted by the state concern mainly the creation of institutions 
where citizen participation plays a role in the delivery of public services 
(especially `infrastructure' services which differ from health and education). The 
role of citizens within the provision of public services can vary from keeping 
them informed on how the services are provided to consulting them about the 
quality of service provision, involving them in the management or 
implementation of a specific service, or in policy development. 
The initiatives or political opportunity structures created by social movements 
can be observed in their negotiating capacity with governmental organisations 
or with political parties (referred before as `social movement institutionalisation' 
- Section 2.3.1). In the case of Mexico, social movements of the 1960s to 
1980s achieved negotiations with the authoritarian state over the provision of 
services to meet basic needs demanded by popular groups (i. e. electricity, 
potable water, etc. ). However, the ineffectiveness of the authoritarian regime in 
providing those services prompted a change in the organisation of these 
movements towards the development of voluntary sector organisations (NGOs) 
during the 1990s. Other social movements maintained a strong opposition to 
the regime, arguing for a genuine representative democracy within a 
competitive electoral environment. By the mid 1990s, other activists from the 
movements of the 1980s created a new type of movement against neoliberal 
policies (i. e. Zapatistas - Olvera, 2003; Wise et al., 2003). The transformation 
that social movements attained within the last forty years has created a new 
space where human rights (including political rights) have started to be reflected 
in the political institutions (i. e. regulations and ombudsman) of a democratised 
state. The result has been partly due to both the negotiating skills that previous 
social movements had attained and the involvement of social movement 
members in the current political arena. These outcomes are further analysed in 
Chapter 8. 
However, Mexico's democratisation process has also been subject to 
authoritarian legacies such as the alliance between the political and economic 
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elites, and the state's corporatism and interventionism in determining 
participation initiatives, as well as its repressive strategies. The legacies have 
been observed at national and local levels of organisation where dominant 
elites have shaped the national agenda, the effects of participative initiatives 
and the type of vision given to an urban space (Cornelius, 1996; Jones, 2004; 
Olvera, 2003). It is argued, in Chapter 8, that the combination of top-down 
participative initiatives (citizen participation within public service policies) with 
the bottom-up political opportunities (social movements' institutionalisation) 
produces a fragmented system of participation, which the term governance, in 
its particular sense, is not able to identify by itself. 
4.7. New institutionalism 
New institutionalism provides useful tools for analysing the dominance of certain 
stakeholders and the problems of accountability and rivalry that emerge in 
partnership. This theoretical perspective is concerned with informal conventions 
as well as with formal rules and structures. 49 This perspective 
... pay[s] attention to the way in which institutions embody values and power 
relations, and [it] stud[ies] not just the impact of institutions upon behaviour, but 
the interaction between individuals and institutions (Lowndes, 2001: 1953). 
Socio-political institutions are not just socio-political organisations in the formal 
sense. Instead they are the `set of rules' that guide and constrain actors' 
behaviour. They are the "dos and don'ts that one learns on the ground that may 
not exist in a written document" and which "may actually be contrary to the dos 
and don'ts that are written in formal documents" (Ostrom, 1999: 38). This 
paradox can also be observed through the introduction of new rules, which exist 
49 Informal conventions are tacit understandings that define how things are done in a certain 
organisation. Formal rules and structures also define how things are done in an organisation, 
they are generally found in written documents. However, they can be ignored by informal or tacit 
arrangements that through time can become of a formal nature (Lowndes, 2001). 
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in name only, while old rules continue to maintain effective power to direct 
organisations and people's behaviour (Lowndes, 2005). 
Socio-political institutions are processes that are in constant change as 
organisations and actors' behaviour are able to shape these institutions. 
Institutions sustain socio-political values (Pierre, 1999), but also the agents' 
behaviour contributes to enhancing or changing these values. Thus institutions 
arise or change over time in three ways: as a result of an accident, evolution, or 
intentional intervention (Goodin, 1996: 24-25) 
Different (and in some cases contradictory) sets of rules can exist within a 
specific socio-political structure. Thus the combination of social relationships 
and organisations that may develop to maintain or challenge these rules can be 
thought of as a form of `institutional matrix' (Pierson, 2004). The multiplicity of 
actors and institutional levels within `governance' exemplifies such a matrix. 
Governance can be seen as an instituted process that is created by 
government's acts of steering which guide and constrain future governing 
behaviour (Lowndes, 2001: 1961). These acts of steering "embody, preserve, 
and impart differential power resources with respect to different individuals and 
groups" (Goodin, 1996: 20). 
Power, at a local level, is embedded in socio-political institutions which are 
shaped by the rules that emanate from higher tiers of government (i. e. supra- 
national and national levels); by `institutional templates' that circulate in the 
wider economy and society (i. e. media, education); and by locally specific 
cultures and conventions (i. e. `rules in use') (Lowndes, 2005). This 
embeddedness responds to historical or path-dependent patterns that have 
shaped the specific nation or locality (i. e. centralism or clientelism). But, the 
dynamics on which institutions are dependent can also trigger new changes 
that, accidentally or intentionally, reconfigure them (i. e. technological changes 
that impact capital production) (Pierson, 2004). The balance between change 
and continuity arises through the combination of old and new institutions, as 
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well as of formal and informal institutions. Partnerships are an example of an 
organisational form containing social relationships where old and new values 
and understandings overlap (Davies, 2004; Lowndes, 2001). 
Within partnerships and different forms of participation, social relationships are 
observed based on the differences between the people's interests and their 
capacity building (based on resources, skills, organisation) to achieve certain 
objectives. These differences reflect the prevalence of power relations that can 
halt the inclusion of other agents' participation in policymaking (Davies, 2004; 
Millward, 2005). This prevalence is reflected in Mexican regeneration 
partnerships and local participation systems. This thesis is concerned with 
participation of stakeholders and citizens in the historic centres. The type of 
participation depends on institutions of an old and new nature. The extent of 
inclusion can be studied through the introduction of governance as a new 
institution. Old institutions can be observed through the prevalence of the 
state's centralism and interventionism and the tacit arrangements between the 
state and various groups of civil society. The combination of old and new 




This chapter has considered the city as a space that can be shaped by urban 
socio-political relationships. These relationships have been analysed through 
studies of governance which consider the state apparatus (and its 
reconfiguration) as an important intermediary to mould urban politics. 
The chapter has presented the theoretical framework that linked macro, meso 
and micro level processes. The concept of governance has acted as a principal 
analytical tool to bridge the gap between the micro and macro levels. In 
particular, the national-state-centric approach to governance has highlighted 
changes at multiple institutional levels that have impacted in the urban arena. 
Governance, in this sense, has been linked to promotion of organisational 
forms, such as partnerships or other structures of political participation; all of 
which have the potential of enhancing accountability and inclusion. Through 
urban regimes and new institutionalism, the model has accorded importance to 
informal arrangements (including their negative effect), formal rules, and the 
combination of old and new institutions in the urban policymaking process. 
The theoretical framework identified links between the reforms of the Mexican 
state over the last twenty five years and the organisational forms in which 
government and other sectors of society participate in defining urban policies. 
The city has been the space in which the reforms of the state have been 
reflected at the local level. In particular, urban partnerships and other 
approaches to political participation have opened up new paths that illuminate 
the relationship between agency and structure. 
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Chapter 5- Methodology: a case study approach 
Introduction 
The chapter begins by stating the research aims, propositions and questions, 
developed within a case study approach. The intention is to build a link between 
the premises stated in the theoretical framework and the particularities of the 
case studies selected. This link refers to the conceptualisation of participation in 
urban governance, specifically within public-private partnerships in central 
Mexico. 
The chapter discusses the case study selection process and the focus upon the 
historic-centre regeneration partnerships in the cities of Queretaro and San Luis 
Potosi (SLP). The chapter goes on to explain the processes of data collection 
and analysis. Throughout these sections, reflexive points are developed 
concerning the advantages, limitations and validity of the research design. The 
final section discusses the epistemological position of the thesis. The position is 
a blend of `critical realism' with the `integrative approach' of structure and 
agency (Sayer, 1992; Mahoney & Snyder, 1999). It is argued that structures do 
not determine social phenomena but they constrain or facilitate their 
development. 
5.1. The research aims 
The research aims are based on the multiple level framework depicted in Figure 
4.1. The macro level analysis is seen as exercising `threshold effects' that 
triggered changes regarding meso level processes and forms (i. e. state 
reconfiguration promoting changes within the state's internal organisation). 
The 
meso level is also expressed through path-dependent structures that condition 
the form in which these changes occur at the micro level (i. e. legacies of 
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authoritarian state analysed by governance as partnerships and forms of 
political participation at the local level). This research has four aims. The first 
aim is of a general nature: 
" To contribute to the analysis of (the potential) role of participation in 
contemporary Mexican urban governance 
The following three aims are of a specific nature. These are: 
" To analyse local public-private50 partnerships as a part of the urban 
policymaking process; 
" To research attitudes and activities of social groups51 in relation to local 
public-private partnerships; 
" To analyse how local governments follow national urban policies and 
international organisations' recommendations on issues concerning urban 
regeneration 
5.2. Theoretical propositions 
This section states three research propositions, based upon the theoretical 
framework discussed in the previous chapters. Specifically, the research 
propositions are related to the three trends that characterise entrepreneurial 
cities. The destatisation of the political regime is considered as a macro level 
trend that expresses itself through the creation of institutional processes such 
as `governance'. As discussed in Chapter 4, this concept reflects the redrawing 
of boundaries between the public, private and voluntary sectors. Governance 
also refers to the re-articulation of the relationship between organisations at 
50 The term private is comprised in this study by the business sector, universities and 
professional groups; all of them integrated by local distinguished members of society 
characterised by their resources, knowledge, forms of organisation, trustworthiness and in some 
cases long standing nature. 
51 Social groups include non-governmental organisations, community or citizen associations, 
and popular groups that are not sponsored by the government apparatus. 
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different institutional levels. In particular, the national-state-centric approach to 
governance (see Section 4.3.2) depicts the Mexican case of state pro- 
activeness to promote urban entrepreneurialism. The introduction of neoliberal 
policies and of democratic institutions has open up a space for governance in 
the political discourse. The diminished intervention of government within the 
economy and the participation of civil society in policy decisions have both 
helped to blur the boundaries between the public and private sectors. A way to 
study the collaboration between sectors can be through partnerships. Thus the 
first proposition states that: 
Public-private partnerships are organisational forms that express a tendency 
towards `governance' at an urban scale. Partnerships contribute to the 
discourse of collaboration between the different levels of government and 
sectors. 
The denationalisation of statehood is considered as a second macro level trend 
that is reflected in the federal government's delegation of capacities to societal 
actors or to subnational levels of government. In Mexico, political and fiscal 
decentralisations have strengthened municipal autonomy, especially concerning 
municipal urban development. Even though these types of decentralisation 
have encouraged municipal autonomy, the dependence on federal government 
is still significant considering the volume of federal resources required to 
develop urban infrastructure. The budgetary branch number 33 has been a 
clear example. This branch is not only concerned with the municipal capacity- 
building to administer these resources, but is also concerned with municipal 
authorities sharing the policy making with civil society. The COPLADEs and 
their links to the municipal level are the standardised organisational form where 
civil society is involved. However, the need of the locality to comply with urban 
competitiveness has favoured the federal initiative on partnerships. Thus the 
second proposition states that: 
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Municipal government prefers public-private partnerships over other forms of 
participation as a means to promote the locality's urban entrepreneurship. At 
the same time, issues of democratic participation are considered insofar as the 
discourse of local partnerships allows an environment for higher levels of 
inclusion than under the authoritarian regime. 
The internationalisation of the national state is considered as a third macro level 
trend that is reflected in the federal government's delegating capacities to 
supranational organisations or in the federal government's adaptation to 
international recommendations. Through this adaptation direct linkages have 
been formed between international organisations and subnational levels of 
government (as a form to enhance local autonomy). However, the federal 
government's role has been important to link the two institutional scales. 
At the same time that local governments had to update their policies to the 
recommendations of national and international organisations, they had also to 
be attentive to local stakeholders' pressures (which vary across interests). The 
demands that these pressures generate have been integrated into 
organisational forms such as partnerships and participatory systems linked to 
the COLPADEs. New organisational forms have appeared to be more inclusive 
and accountable than during authoritarian times. But informal arrangements 
between local stakeholders seem to favour elitist interests. Thus a third 
proposition states that: 
Municipal governments play a brokerage role to maintain organisational forms 
of `governance' (promoted by national and international standards) within a 
context of specific local pressures. The brokerage role involves `paradoxical 
strategies' that give municipal government freedom to favour either a more 
democratic inclusion or dominance of local elite interests. 
5.2.1. The research questions. The following research questions were 
developed to guide the empirical investigation of the propositions state above: 
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Do social groups expand the concept of urban governance beyond the 
arrangements between local government and local private groups? 
1. Are conceptions of popular democracy (as a challenge to liberal 
democracy) incorporated into the political process (i. e. community, 
popular or citizen participation in decision making) 
How do decentralisation policies52 and new political rights53 promote (or hinder) 
partnerships between municipal government and the private sector? (i. e. city 
regeneration and tourism programmes) 
a. Do these partnerships exhibit a capacity for innovation? 54 
b. Are these arrangements formally constituted? 55 
What is the response of social groups to public-private partnerships? 
a. Do they look to participate in these partnerships? How does the 
involvement of social groups affect ( or challenge) partnerships? 
b. Is this participation state sponsored or autonomous (bottom-up)? 
c. Is this participation formally constituted? 
What is the nature56 of the partnership activities and the interactions between 
stakeholders (municipal authorities, members of the private sector and 
social groups)? 
52 They refer to fiscal and political strategies that enhanced municipal autonomy regarding 
public service delivery and urban infrastructure. 
53 The political rights are considered a parallel phenomenon to the changes tending toward a 
global economy. These rights refer to free and fair electoral institutions and the participation of 
marginalised groups within the policymaking process. 
54 Innovative focus means the creation of local institutional and organisational features to 
restructure the urban space in accordance to global capital needs. New institutions and 
organisations are supposed to sustain a city's flow of those innovations required to compete. 
55 By formally constituted I mean: publicly known and legally or socially recognised. 
56 By nature I mean: the origins of a relationship, if imposed by hierarchical levels of government 
or by a local initiative; the duration of the partnership, and the type of goals it aimed 
for. 
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5.3. The case study rationale 
As the aims of this research are to analyse participation in urban governance, 
particularly in relation to public-private partnerships, a case study strategy was 
selected as the most appropriate approach. This study is not focused on the 
effects of the interventions of social organisations in public-private partnerships. 
It is interested in `why' and `how' civil and social organisations play (or do not 
play) a role within public-private partnerships, within a context of liberal markets, 
democratisation, and fiscal decentralisation (regarding urban planning). 
The case study approach is defined by Robert Yin as 
an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident (1994: 13). 
The case study copes with a technically distinctive situation in which many 
variables of interest "rel[y] on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to 
converge in a triangulation fashion... " and "that benefi[t] from the prior 
development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis" 
(ibid). Thus, the case study is a `comprehensive' research strategy in which 
existing theory, research questions, propositions, data collection, and data 
analysis are closely interlinked. The inclusion of multiple variables, on the other 
hand, underlines one of the limitations of this approach, the vast amount of 
information required. This limitation is based on doubts concerning the 
adequacy of data collected within a project. Another limitation is the case 
study(ies')'s representativeness and thus the `credibility of generalisations' 
made concerning its findings (Denscombe, 1998: 40). 
This study does not aim to generalise statistical results over a specific 
population, but to provide the basis for an `analytical generalisation' of the 
theoretical propositions developed in this research (Yin, 1994: 30). By selecting 
two specific cases, the empirical work attempts to provide answers to the 
120 
research questions and evidence base through which to assess the 
propositions. These cases are not representative of local governance in Mexico 
as a whole, but there are several municipalities within Central Mexico that share 
similar characteristics. 
5.3.1 The case study selection and setting. The research follows an 
`embedded' and 'multiple-case' approach (Yin, 1994). The comparative analysis 
is based on two cities: Queretaro and San Luis Potosi, both located in the 
central region of the country, named EI Bajio (see Map 3.1). With a multiple- 
case model the advantages stem from establishing comparisons to examine 
similarities and differences in a combination of characteristics that cross-cut the 
cases. This contributes to the process of finding a pattern of diversity (Ragin, 
1994: 112). 
The selection of cases was based on the `opportunity to learn' about the 
phenomenon under study (Stake, 1998: 101); in this case about the role of 
collective participation in city-centre regeneration partnerships. City centre 
regeneration projects have become relevant in Mexico, particularly during the 
same period in which decentralisation and democratisation processes began, 
emphasising as a result the role of the locality. 
The criteria to select the cases were based on the theoretical premises of urban 
competitiveness and innovation, which this thesis interprets as: 
9 The reaction of local authorities concerning the city's development in the 
context of its geographical location within the NAFTA corridor. This criterion 
is related to a relatively good road communication system which modes of 
global production require. Particularly, road communications have been a 
key aspect as Mexico started to integrate with the open-market economy. 
The improvement of motorway number 57, also known as the `NAFTA 
corridor' is a clear case that shows the importance of having a cross-border 
road network. 
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" The type of investment relations to promote urban development. This 
criterion is concerned with economic and social relations that are generated 
in response to the urban changes that a locality requires in order to maintain 
its entrepreneurial character. These changes tend to create in the city new 
niches of investment by promoting its cultural heritage and its potential to 
become a trade hub, especially after road communications have been set as 
a priority for the country's contribution to global trade. 
" Previous collaboration between local authorities and private and social 
groups in promoting urban development. This third criterion refers to past 
types of collaboration between the private and public sectors. The relevance 
of identifying such helps to understand the locality's propensity for creating 
partnerships and thus for integrating the concept of `governance' into the 
political discourse. 
" History of collective action as a catalyst of local citizen participation. This 
criterion helps to understand how past, local social mobilisations' demands 
have been incorporated into the local participatory system prevailing at the 
time the fieldwork was carried out. This criterion takes into consideration the 
democratisation process in which the locality has been immersed during the 
country's regime transformation. 
According to these four criteria many other cities could have been selected, for 
example cities in the north of the country such as Tijuana or Chihuahua which 
have been affected by both the economic activities tending to free trade 
markets (due to their nearness to the US border) and by mobilisations 
supporting a transition to democracy (as the states which they represent were 
the first ones to rebel against the one-party rule regime) (Mizrahi, 1994; 
Rodriguez & Ward, 1994). Also cities near the Bajio Region could have been 
selected, for example Leön, Puebla or Aguascalientes. These have 
been cities 
that have experienced changes since Mexico started its industrial and political 
122 
decentralisation process. Aguascalientes and Puebla have been well known for 
attracting foreign direct investment, especially the auto-industry. The city of 
Leön is another case known for creating its own business elite (i. e. shoe- 
manufacturing) and also known for its local actors participating in Mexico's 
transition to democracy. Moreover, all these three cities have elaborated urban 
regeneration programmes, where the local public and private sectors have 
collaborated (Bernard, 1999; Cabrero & Vega, 1999; Jones & Varley, 1999; 
Morales & Contreras, 2000; Moreno, 1998; Shirk, 1999). 
Despite the fact that all these cities could have been studied under the criteria 
selected, various factors narrowed the study to the cases of Queretaro and San 
Luis Potosi. The factors were: the city size (in terms of population and extension 
which challenged the work of one researcher over a period of six months), the 
distance from the researcher's home in Mexico City (which implied higher 
fieldwork costs), and the political administration periods of many of these cities 
that finished during the time the fieldwork was planned to be carried out 
(suggesting problems with access to information). 
Queretaro and SLP can be considered as `typical' examples, having 
characteristics which may be found in many other medium-sized cities within 
the Bajio Region. Neither of them is a metropolis with relatively well developed 
urban and communication infrastructures. Neither of them has large numbers of 
firms providing goods and services established within its territoriality such as is 
the case with other metropolitan cities (i. e. Mexico City). However, their 
increasing competitiveness in terms of urban infrastructure and economic 
development are considered within the top five at a national level (Cabrero et 
al., 2003). Both cities are aiming to make industrial parks more competitive, as 
well as improving their urban and communication infrastructures. They have 
been aiming to become economically and administratively innovative 
municipalities by following strategies designed and implemented in other 
municipalities within and outside the country (i. e. Leön, Atlanta-US, San Luis 
Missouri-US; Yeosu-Korea) (Actas de Cabildo Qro & SLP ). 
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Queretaro and SLP offer interesting results as they are not 'critical' or `unique' 
cases, they are average medium-sized cities (tending to become metropolitan 
cities) that are modifying their economic and socio-political organisations and 
relationships. The differences in each case depend more on the historical local 
context which has been encompassed by the national context. These 
differences, as discussed in Chapters 7-9, are based on how partnerships have 
developed and on the type of social relationships within those partnerships. 
With these cases I did not attempt to represent the whole municipal universe in 
Mexico, but to represent the medium-sized city in a region encountering 
economic and political change (that tends to be similar across different regions 
in the world). Based on these four criteria, the next chapter depicts in more 
detail the local contexts of Queretaro and SLP. 
The research timeframe is from 1997-2003. This period was chosen for two 
practical reasons. The first was the administrative political period which 
encompassed two consecutive municipal administrations (three year duration 
each) and one state administration. This allowed the assessment of urban 
policy continuity, at the municipal level, as it was framed by the same state 
government. The second reason was that by focusing on past years, the data 
obtained from the fieldwork was more reliable than that concerning present 
strategies which may encounter ongoing change. However, attention was paid 
to key periods such as the transition to democracy and the introduction of 
neoliberal and decentralisation policies which had started since the 1980s. Also, 
2004, the year when the fieldwork was carried out, allowed the researcher to 
assess how the policies of the 1997-2003 period were starting to evolve within 
the new state and municipal administrations. 
The case studies focus upon public-private partnerships that promote the 
regeneration of the city centres in Queretaro and SLP. These partnerships are 
related to the provision of public services and urban infrastructure, as well as to 
the attraction of cultural and tourism investment. Special attention was paid to 
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the historic-centre area located within each city centre. The historic areas were 
considered an opportunity for transforming the city centre into a new niche of 
investment as well as for creating new forms of organisation that promoted each 
city's cultural heritage. The units of analysis for each case study are: the 
historic-centre regeneration partnerships, other forms of participation that are 
involved in the regeneration of the historic centre (neighbourhood committees 
and street vendor organisations) and the municipal (executive) government 
strategies for regenerating the city centre. Across these units of analysis three 
types of stakeholders were studied: municipal politicians and public officers and 
local private and social groups. 
5.4. Data collection 
Two stages were carried out before collecting the data: a preparation stage 
(fieldwork protocol) and a pilot project that helped to define the former. 
5.4.1. Pilot study. A pilot project was carried out between December 2003 and 
January 2004. The purpose of this exercise was to refine the case study 
questions (based on the research questions) and to test and modify the 
interview topic guide. Seven semi-structured interviews were held with the three 
types of stakeholders (Appendix 4 shows which persons were interviewed in the 
pilot project). The pilot project was carried out in Queretaro due to its proximity 
to the researcher's home. The results from the pilot project (tapes and notes) 
were also useful for reflecting upon several conceptual terms used in the 
theoretical framework. These terms referred to 
" International organisations' recommendations on issues about urban 
regeneration; 
" The existence of partnerships and the characteristics that were observable 
to asses their capacity-building; 
" The involvement of social organisations within urban policies; and 
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" The characteristics to identify if participation was autonomous or sponsored 
by municipal government 
During this stage I was also able to identify additional contextual variables that 
had an impact on how participation developed within urban governance. These 
were the influence of the Catholic Church within local policies, the influence of 
political parties over local social and private groups, and the increasing 
relevance of the municipal congress as a counterweight to the municipal 
president's decisions. Even though these are considered important factors, 
during the data analysis no emphasis was put on them as they were not central 
to the research objectives. Instead, they were considered as local contextual 
factors that helped me understand the regeneration policies and the type of 
participation involved within them. 
Finally, the pilot project was helpful in deciding to pursue a two case study 
analysis. This decision was considered appropriate based on the researcher's 
resources and time. 
5.4.2. Fieldwork protocol. The fieldwork was carried out between May and 
November 2004. The first half of the time was spent in Queretaro, while the 
second half in SLP. In the protocol, a fieldwork schedule was established which 
contained the initial contacts and informants that helped me to obtain further 
data and that introduced me later to other interviewees. The protocol also 
contained the procedures guiding the data collection. This guidance was the 
case study questions that cross-cut the two case studies' documentary 
analyses and interviews (see Appendix 5 for the case study questions). The aim 
of these questions was to begin categorising the collected data to facilitate the 
comparative analysis. The protocol also contained the topic guides that were 
used in the interviews (see Appendix 5) as well as themes upon which 
observation was focused. The case study approach relies on multiple sources 
of evidence; in this research, three methods were used: semi-structured 
interviews, documentary review and non-participatory observation. Table 5.1 
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shows how these methods helped to address the evidence to answer the 
research questions stated in Section 5.3.2. 
Table 5.1. Relationship between research questions and methods used 
Research question Method used What was obtained Do social groups expand Documents; Meaning given, by local 
the urban governance Interviews stakeholders, to 
beyond public-private participation and 
interests? collaboration 
How do decentralisation Documents; Factors that promote 
policies and political Interviews; decentralisation and 
rights promote Observation participation at the local 
partnerships? level; 
Reasons for partnerships 
to be innovative; 
Physical changes which 
had occurred in the city 
centre; 
How partnerships are 
publicly known and 
socially accepted 
What is the response of Documents; Inclusion of social groups 
social groups to public- Interviews; in public-private 
private partnerships Observation partnerships' decisions 
What is the nature of the Documents; Extent to which 
partnership? Interviews; partnerships are 
Observation externally imposed as 
opposed to locally 
accepted 
Interviews. The interviews were a source of information used to understand the 
role of participation in public-private partnerships. The sample of interviewees 
followed a snowballing technique that sought to interview an equivalent number 
of stakeholder types (politicians/public officers and members of private and 
social groups). The interviewees included municipal politicians and public 
officers who were involved in the regeneration project of Queretaro and SLP 
during 1997-2003. Many of these interviewees were occupying, during the 
fieldwork period, federal legislative positions or state government posts, 
however many others were occupying municipal posts. The other type of 
interviewees included members representing local chambers of commerce and 
industry during the period of fieldwork. I encountered difficulty in contacting 
representatives that led their business groups during the 1997-2003 period. 
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This was because in the majority of the organisations' representatives changed 
on an annual basis. Finally, the third type of interviewees belonged to social 
groups or community organisations such as neighbourhood committees 
(generally I interviewed the committees' presidents) and street vendor 
representatives (leaders or secretaries). To a lesser degree, I interviewed 
member-leaders representing civil organisations involved in the city 
regeneration projects (see Appendix 4 for further details). 
Fifty eight interviews were conducted in total, across the two case studies. 
However, only forty of them were audio-recorded and transcribed. 57 The rest of 
the interviews were not recorded, nevertheless a report was written down 
immediately after the meeting with the informant was over. The aim of recording 
the interviews was to analyse in detail the language used by the informants 
throughout the transcriptions. Interviews were not recorded due to several 
reasons. In one case the interviewee did not want to be recorded. On six 
occasions the informants decided to offer an interview when the researcher was 
not planning or expecting to conduct one. In the rest of this type of interviews, 
the researcher was obtaining information throughout meetings and sessions 
that were not appropriate for an interview setting (due to the conditions of the 
place or the dynamic of the meeting). The recorded interviews are referred to 
through Chapters 7-9 by a `QRO' and `SLP' code, while the non-recorded ones 
are referred to by a `QR' and `SLPR' code. 
The interviews followed a semi-structured format which enabled me to pursue 
themes covered by the research propositions, whilst leaving open the possibility 
of considering conflicting views that interviewees might mention and which were 
not considered previously (based on Fetterman, 1998: 44). The majority of the 
interviews lasted between 30 and 45 minutes (this includes both types of 
57 After permission was given, the interview was recorded on audio tapes while I took notes. It is 
worth mentioning that the recommendations stated in the Data 
Protection Act 1998 were 
considered, so in the end of each formal interview a letter was left 
for the informant stating that 
the information obtained was going to be used for academic purposes only. 
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interviews). Twelve formal interviews lasted more than 45 minutes and 3 less 
than 30 minutes. In carrying out some interviews, I encountered problems in 
establishing rapport with interviewees. This situation did not give me enough 
confidence to ask more thorough questions, especially in situations having 
regard to financial issues; for example, the sponsorship of a partnership's 
project or informal relationships held with other stakeholders. I believe that in 
several cases this lack of rapport was due to cultural reasons or to gender and 
class issues. 
In the case of SLP I found more difficulty in interviewing key stakeholders such 
as businessmen and local politicians than in Queretaro. This might have been 
because I built better access networks in the latter case (due in part to the pilot 
activities in that city). But the difficulty I had in SLP may have also been due to 
the closed nature of the local elite. 
Documentary review. This method was advantageous due to its precision and 
breadth of coverage (in time, events and settings). The breadth of coverage 
was important for the research as I did not have any personal experience or 
deep knowledge of the localities' history or culture. The documents were 
selected on the basis of their relation to municipal planning or regeneration 
topics. The main documents are listed below and Appendix 3 identifies the other 
documents consulted. 
" Organic Municipal Law as well as other regulations related to city 
regeneration projects; 
" Urban development plans; 
" Reports about programmes and projects regarding urban regeneration; 
" Minutes of councils/committees on urban planning and development; 
" Documents about projects organised by entrepreneurial associations and 
social organisations that have an impact on urban development; 
" Local and national newspapers; 
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" Academic papers regarding urban or municipal development and social 
relations in the municipality 
One of the downsides of this type of method is the researcher's bias in selecting 
the type of documents. However, I believe I overcame this aspect by consulting 
those documents that were the most accessible to the general public and that 
had played a significant role in defining the municipalities' urban development. 
The documents consulted were examined using the case study questions 
stated in Appendix 5. 
During the fieldwork, I found some limitations in obtaining information or access 
to relevant documents. An example was the reports or minutes of the 
COPLADEMs (or equivalent) final decisions on how the Branch 33 was going to 
be spent in both case studies. A second example was being denied access to 
San Luis Potosi's reports or documents concerning the street vendors' 
relocation within the city centre. Information on this topic was only obtained from 
what street vendors and former officials stated, in the absence of being able to 
consult a written official source. A third example was the existence of a more 
complete research by local academics into the relationship between local 
government and business groups in Queretaro than in SLP. Also, in the former 
case some entrepreneurial associations seemed more interested in publishing 
reports and books about the entrepreneurial history than in SLP. This difference 
helped me to understand more fully the business-public relationships in 
Queretaro. Finally, the time taken in getting information about urban 
development and regeneration policies and the relationships within them, did 
not allow me more time to consult local newspapers in a systematic way. Future 
research could use this type of source to provide an understanding of how the 
media (and thus the local society) was interpreting the policies of municipal 
regeneration. This could provide hints about possible informal relationships or 
arrangements between politicians and the members of private and social 
organisations (these were difficult to perceive through primary sources during 
the fieldwork). 
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Observation. The observation method was non-participatory (Spradley, 1980). 
The observation focused upon two levels: structure and agency. At the 
structural level, attention was paid as to how economic changes (influenced by 
transnational production processes and policies supporting the former) affected 
social relations and the urban space. Shifting social relations were interpreted in 
terms of the realignment of social classes within the regeneration partnership of 
each city centre. Effects upon urban space were seen in terms of the activities 
and projects implemented to regenerate the city centre. This included not only 
the image of the area, but the participation of different groups in maintaining the 
new image acquired. Also, I observed the rivalry between physical spaces, 
especially between new retail centres vis-ä-vis the traditional old city centres. 
At the agency level, attention was paid to how the partnership members were 
participating and their willingness to invite other social groups as the 
partnerships carried out their projects. I also observed what type of 
stakeholders participated in the other forms of participation involved in the city 
centres' regeneration. A special focus was given to the mechanisms followed to 
coordinate all these participatory forms by identifying a main coordinator. I had 
the opportunity to attend several meetings of the neighbourhood participatory 
systems in each case study. However, I could not attend other meetings such 
as the partnerships' meetings, because by the time the fieldwork was carried 
out the organisations' activities were hindered by political matters (as discussed 
in Chapter 7). A similar situation happened when I attempted to attend the 
meetings of the street- vendor associations with local authorities. In this case, 
both the members of the associations and the local authorities reflected fear of 
or lack of trust in inviting an external observer to the meetings. I believe that this 
type of difficulty could be overcome by spending longer periods of time building 
a stronger relationship with each of the parties involved. 
In summary, the documentary review helped me to identify aspects of 
the way 
in which ideas about partnership and participation were starting 
to acquire 
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shape within the official discourse (ideas and practices). By carrying out 
interviews, I was able to identify if what was stated in the documents was 
actually being carried out or if informal arrangements prevailed instead. I did not 
seek to judge the informants' statements but to use them in order to understand 
how the informants influenced the partnerships' operation and the relationships 
with other forms of citizen participation. The observation method provided 
material evidence regarding the changes generated within the city centres and 
the inclusiveness and openness of the organisations that provided information. 
5.5. Data analysis 
The data analysis consisted of three stages: the elaboration of notes and 
reports during the fieldwork period; the categorisation of data; and the 
contextualisation process that triangulated the information obtained from the 
data collection. Through this triangulation I was able, later on, to build a linkage 
with the theoretical propositions. 
Notes and reports. During the fieldwork notes and reports were produced. 
Notes were written down during the interviews (formal and informal), but also 
when official documents or organisation reports were consulted (especially 
those of which it was difficult to obtain a copy). 58 The points summarised 
throughout those notes referred to the issues raised in on the case study 
questions. More systematic reports were also produced including the 
transcriptions of the recorded interviews and the case study reports that 
contained an initial analysis about partnerships, other forms of municipal 
participation, and municipal government strategies for promoting participation in 
the city centres. The case study reports are classified into two types: individual 
case reports and a cross-cutting case report. The latter was sent to the 
informants interested in obtaining a summary of my research (ten in total, three 
58 On several occasions an electronic version of the documental source was obtained. In these 
cases, I underlined the points I was interested in rather than writing down a summarised report. 
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replied but just one stated that my analysis was useful for the municipality's 
organisational development). 
The interviews transcribed did not follow a verbatim version. 59 Instead, they 
contain a summarised and edited version of the original interview. The 
summaries of the interviews were considered a practical strategy as the 
interview transcriptions were translated into English. The aim of translating the 
interviews was to make more accessible the data collected to non-Spanish 
speakers, while the tapes are kept in their original version. 
Categorisation of data. This stage consisted in breaking-down the data and 
rearranging it into categories. Three categories were used: theoretical premises 
based on governance theory and participation; specific characteristics found in 
the data collected (that were not considered within the original theoretical 
framework); and elements of discourse analysis such as language and activities 
or practices reflected in government guidelines and policies and in local 
stakeholders' reaction to those guidelines and policies (based on Carver et al., 
2002; Fairclough, 1992). The categories cross-cut the data of both case studies; 
the analysis of each category is developed in Chapters 7-9. Table 5.2 
summarises the aspects (or codes) in each category. 
The whole categorisation process ran as an iterative process. This iteration 
helped to revise the theoretical propositions in relation to each case study. Also 
by iterating the categorisation process I was able to triangulate the data 
collected. The triangulation of data helped me to evaluate certain inferences 
that I made from the data obtained from one source, but not supported by data 
obtained from the rest of the collected sources. 
59 Transcripts are not copies or representations of same original reality, they are interpretative 
constructions that are useful tools for given purposes. Transcriptions are 
decontextualized 
conversations, they are abstractions, as topographical maps are abstractions 
from the original 
landscape from which they are derived. (Kvale, 1996: 165). 
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Data contextualisation. Once the triangulation of data were completed, I was 
able to bring together the elaborated categories. As a result, I identified the 
relationships between the units of analysis (partnerships, forms of participation, 
and reaction of government) and the three levels of analysis depicted in Figure 
4.1 (neoliberalism, legacies of a centralist, interventionist state, tacit 
understandings between elite groups and politicians). These relationships are 
developed in Chapters 7-9 by not only providing evidence in relation to the 
research questions and propositions, but also by contextualising the analysis 
with the macro level trends that entrepreneurial cities follow (destatisation of the 
political regime, denationalisation of statehood, and internationalisation of the 
national state). 
Table 5.2. Categorisation of data collection 
Category Aspects Data collected 
Theoretical premises Governance; Laws, regulations, 
Collaboration; programmes or projects, 
Coordination; reports, interviews (with 
Innovative strategies the three types of 
Partnerships: stakeholders) 





Level of inclusion 
Elements arising from International International and local 
data collection organisations' influence organisations' documents 
in promoting and reports, official 
partnerships; minutes of participatory 
Informal arrangements systems, reports and 
and tacit understandings notes written during 
(lack of written observation, secondary 
documents, regulations sources, interviews (with 
or codes of conduct); 3 types of stakeholders) 
Segmented system of 
participation 
Discourse Vocabulary used in oral Laws, regulations; 
and written text; organisations' reports, 
Activities or practices; programme reports, 
Policies minutes; interviews (with 
3 types of stakeholders), 
(all aspects focused on observation on physical 
inclusion, partnerships, space, newspaper 
coordination, innovation) articles 
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In analysing the data, I did not use a specific computer programme to help me 
categorise the data, as the number of reports, documents and interview 
transcriptions allowed for manual analysis. I also followed a systematic process 
in ordering and referencing the data in case the analysis procedure required 
repetition. The procedures taken to analyse the data are important to construct 
a valid or trustworthy relationship between the research findings and the real 
world (Maxwell, 1996). A multiple-case analysis and data triangulation are 
strategies that can enhance the validity of the research; however, other 
shortcomings have to be considered and minimised. These threats refer to the 
interpretation given by the researcher and the lack of consideration of other 
theoretical premises that could have explained the phenomena from another 
perspective (Maxwell, 1996; Yin, 1994). 
The interpretation threat was minimised by attaining feedback from other 
colleagues and supervisors. The feedback obtained in the seminars given 
during the doctoral period offered new ideas and underlined salient points on 
which to be careful when developing my interpretations. During the fieldwork I 
had the opportunity to present some of my findings to some colleagues at the 
Autonomous University of Queretaro. Due to lack of time I was not able to do 
the same in the case of SLP; however, I was able to discuss further my 
interpretations with academics familiar with the stakeholders analysed in the 
research. 
The theoretical threat was minimised by taking into serious consideration other 
theoretical premises that were indirectly considered in the original framework. 
However, these premises attained a greater significance after developing the 
data analysis. These other premises are related to theories of power, the 
analysis of informal or tacit arrangements, and the boundaries dividing 
participation sponsored by the state and participation by co-optation. As it is 
observed these other perspectives are considered throughout Chapters 2 to 4 
and 7 to 9, but the weak link can be identified in the research questions and 
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propositions, which did not consider in detail these aspects and which suggest 
fruitful strategies for undertaking complementary future research. 
5.6. The epistemological position of the research 
The position of the research is based upon a blend of `critical realism' (Sayer, 
1992) with the `integrative approach' of structure and agency (Mahoney & 
Snyder, 1999). Critical realism considers that the conditions and social relations 
of the production of knowledge influence its content. Hence to understand or 
explain the social phenomena involved we have to evaluate and criticise 
societies' own self-understanding (including that of the own researcher and 
his/her relationship with the social phenomena of study). 6° Critical realism 
accepts that there exits a field for agency to create knowledge that is able to 
influence the direction of an event; and consequently to influence structure. 
Following this argument, the integrative approach states that structures do not 
determine social phenomena but constrain or facilitate their development 
(Marsh & Furlong, 2002: 31). Thus a dialectical (or reflexive) interplay exists, 
meaning that social forces also shape and reshape structures. 
Within the integrative approach, historic structures are considered as important 
shapers of present and future social forces. This is related to `path dependence' 
where "the probability of further steps along the same path increases with each 
move down the path" (Pierson, 2000: 30). But according to this position, "the 
enduring effects of past structures must be balanced against allowing actors to 
play autonomous causal roles in subsequent... transformations" (Mahoney & 
Snyder, 1999: 17). This balance is attained through political institutions which 
are considered as meso structures that stand between actors and macro level 
structures (i. e. economic structures such as capitalism; political structures like 
60 To evaluate critically the researcher has to consider ideas, practices and material institutions 
that help to maintain those practices. The researcher has also to be aware of those concepts 
and theories that partially explain the reality of the world's events (Sayer, 1992, ch. 1) 
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that of a centralist regime, social structures enhanced by ideology). Through 
institutions, whether of a formal or informal nature, human agency is able to 
create meso level structures during critical junctures and to sustain those 
structures after these junctures (ibid). There are periods where structuring 
factors are least determining and actors have a greater degree of freedom to 
shape subsequent change. These periods can be observed during regime 
change (i. e. from authoritarianism to democratic regime) (Mahoney, 2003). 
Critical realism recognises that social phenomena are causal powers that 
explain how the world is socially constructed. However, not all social 
phenomena are directly observable producing, as a result, a gap between 
reality and appearance. This implies that the object of study is observed under a 
social construction or understanding that has transformed the object into a 
`social object', which differs from pure reality (Sayer, 1992). As a result, critical 
realists need to study both the external reality and the social construction of that 
reality (Marsh & Furlong, 2002: 31). Critical realism then attempts to 
acknowledge causal explanation on the one hand, and the intrinsic meaning of 
social practice on the other. The acknowledgement of both has raised the 
dilemma of structure versus agency, insofar as the latter is considered the 
object and subject of analysis (idem). 
In this thesis I do not try to solve this dilemma, but to contribute to the argument 
that agency can shape structures. Through the 'projective' and `practical 
evaluative' elements of agency it is possible that future trajectories of actions 
are reconfigured and practical and normative judgements are created in order to 
promote, for example, global capitalism (Robinson, 2004; Sklair, 2001). These 
elements are related to the actors' desires or fears for the future and they also 
respond to the emerging demands and dilemmas of currently evolving situations 
that agents encounter (Emirbayer & Mishe, 1998: 971). The projections of the 
future, in addition to the present evaluation of circumstances are mixed with the 
past patterns of action and thought. This simultaneous mixture allows 
the 
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existence of old structures within emergent new socio-political institutions that 
have the potential to transform the former type of structures. 
This thesis focuses on past structures, such as the legacies of an authoritarian 
state (based on (elitist) capitalist interests, with a centralised and interventionist 
organisation). It argues that they have had an effect in shaping the socio- 
political and economic contexts of municipalities. However, it also proposes that 
the social relationships existing within the municipalities are able to contribute to 
the shape of the new structures emerging from the democratisation process and 
economic globalisation that Mexico has experienced in the last two decades. 
In order to bring together past and present structures a multi level conceptual 
framework is used (Figure 4.1). At the macro and meso levels, past and present 
structures are observed such as the reconfiguration of the state and the 
legacies of an authoritarian state. In combining the meso and the micro levels of 
analysis, the agents' action is identified, attempting to build a relation with the 
considered macro structures. The emphasis on the agency is observed in the 
nature of the research aims and questions, which emphasise the role of local 
citizens and stakeholders promoting and reacting to regeneration partnerships. 
Furthermore, local stakeholders' interests in combination with past and present 
structures are considered as shapers of urban entrepreneurship. This 
entrepreneurship is sought by localities such as Queretaro and SLP. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has shown how the theoretical premises developed in previous 
chapters guided the preparation of fieldwork, data collection and analysis. It 
also discussed how the empirical setting and some practical restrictions 
prompted the researcher to reconsider certain theoretical concepts throughout 
the process of linking theory with practice. This process worked as a reflective 
tool insofar as challenges and limitations in the research were identified. 
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To contribute to the analysis of partnerships and participation in contemporary 
Mexican urban governance, this thesis used a case study approach. It was 
considered appropriate for pursuing questions regarding the `how' and `why' of 
civil and social organisations reacting to public-private partnerships in the city 
centres of Queretaro and San Luis Potosi. These two cities were considered 
typical cases in the Bajio Region 
The research attempts to provide an analytical generalisation of the theoretical 
propositions stated above. In other words, what the thesis attempts to provide is 
a basis for advancing theories of governance in contexts where state 
reconfiguration has been experienced. The data were collected through the 
methods of semi-structured interviews with the three types of stakeholders; 
documentary review of official and private reports and regulations; and non- 
participatory observation of partnership relationships and other forms of 
participation and of urban places. The data were categorised in order to provide 
an analysis of decentralisation projects promoting urban regeneration and on 
participation of social and civil groups within regeneration partnerships. 
Chapters 7-9 analyse the findings obtained from the two case studies. But first, 
the local contexts of the municipalities of Queretaro and San Luis Potosi are 
elaborated. 
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Chapter 6- The research context: the cities of Queretaro and 
San Luis Potosi 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce to the reader the socio-economic, political 
and cultural contexts of Queretaro and SLP. The characteristics of these 
contexts relate to the four criteria used to select the two case studies: the local 
authorities' reaction to the city's development in relation to the NAFTA corridor; 
the type of investment to promote development; collaboration between local 
authorities and private and social groups to promote urban development; and 
the history of collective action as a catalyst for local participation. 
These characteristics aid understanding of the two cities' urban development 
within a decentralised and democratised environment. There are two 
characteristics that are presented here but which are not further discussed in 
the thesis. These are the role of political parties in urban development and their 
representation in the municipal government, and the influence of the Catholic 
Church on cultural and political identity. These two aspects are significant in 
understanding urban regeneration policies, although they are not central to the 
argument of the thesis. 
This chapter discusses the following features of the two municipalities: location; 
population and urban growth; economic investment; employment and the 
informal sector; political party preferences; social class structure; evolution of 
partnerships; social mobilisations; and Catholicism as part of a regional identity. 
6.1. Location 
Both Queretaro and SLP are capital cities of the states with the same name. 
The former city is located at 220 km north from Mexico City and the latter at 420 
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km north from Mexico City. As mentioned in Section 3.3.1 Queretaro has been 
considered part of the polycentric region of Mexico City, while SLP's location 
has been more ambiguous due to its equidistance from Mexico City, Monterrey 
and Guadalajara. Nevertheless, the incremental transformation originated since 
NAFTA came into action has prompted geography scholars to classify the cities 
located along and around the corridor. 
The cities of Queretaro and SLP have been identified within the Bajio Region 
which is comprised of many states: the north of Michoacan, the southeast of 
Jalisco, Guanajuato, west of Queretaro and, to certain extent, of the south-west 
of SLP (see Map 3.1). 
6.2. Population and urban growth 
The cities of Queretaro and SLP began to grow exponentially during the 1980s. 
Table 6.1 shows the demographic growth. 
Table 6.1. Cities' population growth (number of inhabitants) 
1960 67,674 206,261 
1970 112,995 301,896 
1980 215,976 471,047 
1990 385,503 613,181 
2000 641,386 670,532 
(*) These numbers consider the whole metropolitan area, including part of the 
municipality of Soledad de Graciano Sanchez 
Source: INEGI-EHIM; Moreno; Cl, 1999. 
This growth was not expected by local authorities; hence urban planning 
strategies began to be developed since the late 1980s (interviews QR 12, 
SLP 3; IMPLAN_doc2,2002). State and municipal governments have faced 
serious challenges in terms of urban infrastructure, housing and natural 
resources (i. e. both cities encounter water scarcity). The provision of public 
services and housing has been a key aspect for these cities' development; thus 
it is unsurprising to find that their primary policies and programmes have been 
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related to changes in land use and improvement and maintenance of urban 
infrastructure (Actas Cabildo 1997-2003). 
An indicator of how investment in urban development has been a priority for 
municipal authorities can be found in the expenditure directed toward activities 
regarding street asphalting, pavements, road construction, drainage, sewerage, 
and electrification. For example, compared with other expenses, such as school 
infrastructure, urbanisation expenses have been higher in both municipalities. 
This is observed in the Garcia administration (2000-03) in Queretaro and during 
the de los Santos administration (2000-03) in SLP. However, as shown in Table 
6.2, a stronger bias toward urbanisation is observed in the latter case. 61 
Table 6.2. Municipal expenditure in education and urban infrastructures 2000-03 
Municipality Education Urbanisation 
Garcia administration -$ 126,557,104 $ 170,649,243 
Queretaro 
De los Santos $ 21,850,115.40 $ 248,283,474.53 
administration -SLP 
Note: the currency is stated in pesos at constant prices (my calculations based on SLP's 
municipal government reports 2000-03 and CPWA Qro 2000-03). 
The rapid demographic growth in these cities was due to rural immigration into 
the cities, but also from other urban areas such as from Mexico City in the 
1980s (Morales, 1998; Moreno, year unknown). This immigration was prompted 
by increased industrialisation and employment opportunities (including the 
increase of the informal sector). The cities' spatial extension more than tripled 
by the 1990s, merging Queretaro with its neighbouring municipality of 
Corregidora, and SLP with Soledad de Graciano Sanchez. In many official 
documents, when their neighbouring municipalities are taken into account, 
61 It is worth mentioning that the resources that helped to finance these urban public works 
came from federal allocations distributed through Branch 33, particularly the two funds 
transferred directly to municipal government: FAISM and FAFM. Nevertheless, resources 
coming from state government and the municipalities' own resources helped to finance these 
works too. 
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these cities are considered as metropolises (attaining over 1 million 
inhabitants). 
The direction of the urban growth, in both cases, has tended towards the 
country land surrounding the original urban layout in colonial times. In the case 
of Queretaro the city has tended to grow towards the north while SLP has 
grown towards the south and the west. These growth tendencies coincide with 
the land once owned by the hacendados which was fragmented and distributed 
to landless peasants after the Revolution. 62 The lost value of the land after the 
Revolution prompted landlords to sell the rest of the land they kept to 
government, who then sold it to enterprises like Ingenieros Civiles Asociados 
(ICA) or other local real estate businesses. Some of these real estate firms, 
which started profiting in the 1960s, are still in business such as the ICA's 
remaining real estate subsidiaries in Queretaro (AE_Qro, 2004); and the 
Valoran Group owned by the Rangel Lozano family - known as one of the elite 
business groups in SLP City (Prinver, 2002). Within the urban spaces created 
by the developers, one can observe the creation of industrial and retail parks, 
high-ranking residential neighbourhoods and hotels, university campuses, and 
leisure spaces such as parks and golf clubs. 
In parallel to the urban growth that SLP and Queretaro have encountered, they 
have also maintained their city centre's colonial layout and buildings. The 
architectural conservation of their buildings has been highly valued by their 
governments and inhabitants (Leyes de Protecciön del Patrimonio Cultural - 
SLP, 1990; Qro., 1991). These historic sites have not remained intact; several 
of their buildings were demolished in the first half of the 20th century, introducing 
a mixed architectural style such as is the case of SLP. Queretaro, on the other 
hand, has been more cautious in maintaining the original buildings, however, its 
central layout was partially transformed in the 1960s when a new road was built 
connecting the first industrial park with the rest of the city (Miranda, 2000). 
62 Hacendados were landlords of extensive pieces of land with self-sufficient productivity during 
the 19th century. The immense inequalities of land distribution originated the 1910 Revolution. 
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Table 6.3 indicates the proportion of the central area (which encompasses the 
original layout correspondent to the actual historic centre) in relation to the total 
size of the municipality. 
Table 6.3. Surface of the historic centres, central zones and municipalities 
Queretaro SLP 
Municipal proportion in 
relation to the total state 
surface 
6.5% 2.38% 
Municipal total surface 759.9 km 1443.14 km 
Central zone/delegation 19 km 16 km 
Historic centre 4 kM2 8.4 km 
Source: consulted 24/08/2005 http: //www. e-local. gob. mx, RPPCH_docl, 2000; Dossier, 2004 
At the international level, a series of meetings were organised between the end 
of the 1950s and the early 1960s promoting the conservation of historical 
monuments and buildings. These meetings were organised by UNESCO and 
prominent archaeologists and architects who produced international documents 
referring to conservation. Mexico started to recognise several of its monumental 
and historic towns as national heritage and to apply for UNESCO's world 
heritage nominations for cities like Mexico, Oaxaca and Puebla in 1980s. 
Queretaro and San Luis Potosi were nominated as national heritage sites in 
1981 and 1990, respectively. Later on, Queretaro was nominated as a world 
heritage site in 1996, whereas SLP in 2004 was still aiming to attain that 
nomination. 
6.3. The type of investment observed in the cities 
To maintain the cities' dynamics, economic development has been considered a 
significant factor. Since the 1950s both cities started to encounter national and 
foreign direct investment in areas including textiles, food, and automotive and 
heavy machinery appliances. It is worth noting how the first generation of rural 
entrepreneurs called hacendados started to get involved in urban modes of 
production. These modes referred to activities related to the 
food industry which 
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has continued until the 21st century through the establishment, in the late 1950s, 
of transnational firms such as Kellog and Gerber in Queretaro, Canel's in SLP, 
and Coca-Cola in both cities (Gonzalez & Osorio, 2000; Monroy & Calvillo, 
1997; Morales 1995) 
The federal industrial decentralisation strategy of the 1960s prompted many 
national industrial firms to move out of, but remain near to Mexico City. The firm 
ICA prompted Queretaro's industrialisation by constructing a road network 
between Mexico City and Queretaro, by urbanising the land for industrial use, 
and by financing heavy-machinery manufacturing firms such as TREMEC 
(Miranda, 2000). SLP did not benefit from the industrial decentralisation as 
much as Queretaro due to its further location from Mexico City; nevertheless its 
industry was also developed as a centre for services and trade between the 
north and the central-south of the country (Monroy & Calvillo, 1997). In fact, the 
strategic location of Queretaro and SLP in the corridor connecting North and 
South has been an advantage taken into account since colonial times. 
Since the 1980s, when corporate mergers, outsourcing, and subcontracting 
began to be industrial strategies to reduce costs, changes in the type of 
investment in Queretaro and SLP were also apparent. Many of the local firms 
(such as TREMEC) started to merge with the transnational corporations (such 
as Desc from a Mexican origin) (Cl, 1999). A new generation of transnational 
companies started to establish itself in the Bajio Region forming automotive and 
electro-domestic appliance clusters. For example, in Queretaro Daewoo, 
Samsung, Mabe (electro-domestic), and New Holland (building equipment and 
tractors) were established, while in SLP Mabe and Scania (heavy-duty trucks) 
arrived (PP_Qrol, 2003). 
Particularly, since the NAFTA was signed an increase in trade has been 
observed (through the establishment of retailers such as Wal Mart) as well as in 
foreign direct investment. Table 6.4 illustrates the increase in the amount of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) from 1995 to 2001 and Table 6.5 shows the 
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number of firms with FDI in the states of Queretaro and SLP. Even though 
these tables show data at the state level, it is worth mentioning that the 
municipalities of SLP and Queretaro concentrate a significant amount of this 
type of investment, for example the municipality of Queretaro concentrated 57% 
in 2004 (AE_QRO, 2004). In both states the majority of the FDI is directed at 
the manufacturing industry and the majority of investment comes from 
transnational firms originated in the US (AE_QRO, 2004; SCD_SLP, 2003). 
Table 6.4. FDI at national and state levels 
1995 2001 
National $8,230.7 $23,901.5 
State of Queretaro $42.0 $135.7 
State of SLP $131.5 $124.8 
Note: Amounts are stated in millions of dollars 
Source: INEGI-Anuario Estadistico por Entidad Federativa, consulted 7/4/2005, 
http: //www. inegi. gob. mx/prod-serv 
Table 6.5. Number of firms with FDI at national and state levels 
1998 2003 
National n/a 28,717a 
State of Queretaro 269* 428a 
1997 2002 
State of SLP 84' 139` 
(*)This refers to the number of exporting firms which differs from firms with FDI. The latter 
means firms that have certain percentages of foreign capital in their productive 
processes, including imports of fixed capital assets. 
Source: (a) AE_Qro, 2004; (b)CI, 1999; (c) Prinver, 2002 
The environment created for conserving and promoting the city centres of 
Queretaro and SLP as national or world heritage sites has promoted, at the 
same time, complementary economic activities that have helped to maintain this 
status. Among these activities are the promotion of tourism and cultural 
activities. In Queretaro an increase of 27% was observed from 1997 to 2003 in 
the number of hotels established in the city, making up 36% of the hotels 
distributed across the whole state (my calculations based on INEGI-CEM_Qro, 
2004). In SLP, an increase of 7% was observed between 1989 and 1995, even 
though this is not as high as in Queretaro, this comprised 33% of the hotels in 
the state (my calculations based on INEGI-CEM_SLP, 
1996). This 
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concentration implies an increase if it is considered that between 2001 and 
2003 five new hotels (from 3 to 5 stars) were built within the municipality 
(CPU_doc2,2004). 
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, cultural activities were also promoted 
through the restoration and construction of new museums such as the Federico 
Silva Museum in SLP and the San Francisco Museum in Queretaro. The cities' 
religious feasts or fairs were promoted and advertised as tourist attractions, 
such as the religious processions during Easter Holidays in SLP and Christmas 
in Queretaro. In parallel, dance and music festivals were promoted. Many of 
these events were sponsored by state government, who had contributed in 
underlining the city's cultural importance in relation to other localities in the 
state. This is partly due to the economic, political and cultural centralisation of 
the capital-state cities, maintained since colonial times. 
In Queretaro and SLP, the level of political centralisation is evident in the 
housing of the state government headquarters and the state congress, in 
addition to the municipal government's headquarters. This political 
concentration caused, during the authoritarian regime, serious rivalries between 
state and municipal governments, especially when the former established limits 
on how the latter had to act in administrative terms within its own territory. The 
economic concentration can be observed in terms of the GDP, where the city of 
Queretaro concentrated 85% of the total state GDP in 2000 and the city of SLP 
concentrated 80% of the total state GDP during the same year (my calculations 
based on prices of 1980 - Mexico_2020). 
6.4. Employment and the informal sector 
In Queretaro State the dynamism of its industry during the 1960s created an 
attractive environment for employment opportunities. This is illustrated, on the 
one hand, by the agricultural sector employing 69.8% of the economically active 
population in 1960 and its decrease to 17.36% in 1990. On the other hand, the 
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manufacturing and service industrial-sectors employed just over 30% of the 
economic active population in 1960 and increased to 76.72% in 1990 (Gonzalez 
& Osorio, 2000: 107). The environment of employment opportunities generated 
by Queretaro's industrialisation has not maintained high employment rates 
throughout recent decades. This can be observed, for example, since the early 
1990s when the open unemployment rate in the municipality of Queretaro 
started to register as above the national rate (see Table 6.6). 63 
In SLP's metropolitan area a similar phenomenon was experienced, however, 
the distribution of the economically active population was more biased toward 
urban activities than in Queretaro since 1960. In 1960,20% of this population 
was employed in the agricultural sector and 78.4% in the manufacturing and 
service sectors; while in 1980 the former sector only employed 3.9% of the 
economically active population and the latter two sectors 95.9% (Moreno, p. 18, 
year unknown). In the 1990s, SLP's open unemployment rate was not as high 
as Queretaro's rate and was lower than the national rate. The following table 
illustrates these details. 
Table 6.6. Open unemployment rate at national and municipal levels 
Year National Queretaro SLP 
1993-2000 3.82 4.2 2.45 
2001-2004 3.04 3.0 2.05 
Source: BIE-INEGI, consulted 16/05/2005, http: //www. inegi. gob. mx 
As a global phenomenon it has been observed that unemployment rates have 
tended to increase the number of people occupied in the informal sector. The 
informal sector has been considered as a direct alternative means to 
contributing to the family's income; but also it has been considered as an 
63 The open unemployment rate is defined as the percentage of unemployed people in the 
economically active population (EAP). The EAP in Mexico includes people 12 years and older who, at the 
time of the reference survey period, did not work at least one hour during the week, but who were either 
seeking employment or were trying to become self-employed. Consequently, this rate does not capture a 
large portion of the underemployed (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 
hftp: //www. dallasfed. orq/research/busfront/bus9901. html, consulted 27/09/2005). 
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outsourcing strategy that formal productive modes of capital require as a way to 
minimise their production and distribution costs (i. e. the proliferation of 
sweatshops around important industrial zones and informal commerce) 
(Robinson, 2003). 
In Mexico, according to official sources, the number of people occupied in the 
informal sector has increased from 8.6 million in 1995 to 10.8 million in 2003 
(INEGIa, 2001). Even though the construction subsector registered the major 
increase of workers occupied in the informal sector between 1995 and 2003; in 
2003 the services subsector (commerce, restaurants and hotels) remained 
concentrating the higher percentage of occupancy (31.7%) compared to the 
construction (16.8%) and the repair and personal services (15.2%) subsectors. 
Table 6.7 shows how an increase in the number of people occupied in the 
informal sector was also registered between 1996 and 2003 in the cities of 
Queretaro and SLP. In much the same manner as at national level, the 
percentage of people, in the cities, occupied by informal commerce was the 
highest within the whole informal sector, however, this concentration is tending 
to decrease. 
Table 6.7. People occupied in the informal sector and in the commerce subsecto r 
City No. of people occupied in the 
whole informal sector 
% of people occupied in the 
commerce subsector 
1996 2003 1996 2003 
Queretaro 43,681 62,522 35.9 32.5 
SLP 60,841 82,575 34.2 29.8 
Source: INEGIa, 2001 
The informal commerce is generally observed through street vending. This type 
of commerce is known for avoiding taxation and regulations regarding wages 
and quality of goods, although a similar type of irregularities can be found in the 
formal structures. However, due to the purposes of this thesis, specific attention 
is drawn to street vending in the city centres of Queretaro and SLP. 
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During 2000-03, there were 27 and 17 organisations representing street 
vendors within the city centres of Queretaro and SLP, respectively (BD_QRO, 
2000; CCA SLP, 2000-03). Many of these organisations were affiliated to 
urban-popular mobilisations as a way to protect themselves from social and 
governmental disdain. Street vending is strongly stigmatised by the middle and 
upper classes who consider it an illegal activity carried out by sometimes violent 
(that react against the use of force of local authorities) and corrupt leaders. 
Street vending is also rejected by formal established shop-owners who have to 
comply with taxes and regulations. Thus they consider it unfair that informal 
vendors are able to avoid these types of obligations. 
As opposed to middle and upper classes, popular groups consider street 
vending as an honest form of living. It is considered as a viable alternative to 
the limitations existing within the formal employment market (i. e. low real 
wages, unemployment). 64 In addition, the street vendor organisations' affiliation 
or alliance with other popular mobilisations has made them fight for political 
rights and basic needs, such as anti-clientelistic relations between political 
parties and their leaders, and housing and provision of urban services. These 
characteristics are important in considering cities such as Queretaro and SLP 
where part of their spatial expansion has been promoted by irregular and non- 
urbanised human settlements. Moreover, the negotiations that popular 
mobilisations have achieved with specific politicians have allowed informal 
arrangements that can favour the interests of these mobilisations, such as the 
regularisation of land or the permission for street vendors to stay in a certain 
area of the city. Some examples of these organisations are the former Union 
64 In 1996 the national minimum wage was of $20 pesos per day, similar to average daily 
income of the informal commerce, $27 pesos in Queretaro an d$ 24 in SLP. In 2003, the 
national minimum wage was of $41.5 pesos a day, while the daily average income of the 
informal commerce was more than twice the minimum wage in the case of Queretaro ($101 
pesos) and in SLP was of almost $73 pesos (my calculations based on INEGIa, 2001 and 
information downloaded from the Federal Labour Secretariat (STPS) - http: //stps. gob. mx, 
downloaded 23/08/2005). 
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Felipe Carrillo Puerto (UFCP) and Frente Independiente de Organizaciones 
Zapatistas (FIOZ) in Queretaro and the Antorchista Movement in SLP. 
6.5. Political party preferences 
The most popular political parties in terms of electoral support in the states of 
Queretaro and SLP have been the PRI and the PAN. The PRI has had a higher 
representation throughout the municipalities in SLP. 65 This preference was also 
observed in Queretaro until the 2003 elections when it obtained 44.1% of the 
total votes in the state regarding municipal elections and represented 14 out of 
18 municipalities within the state. When the PAN started to obtain more support 
its votes were concentrated in several urban localities. Thus it is not surprising 
to observe that the PAN first claimed victory in the two capital-states 
(characteristic observed in other localities across the country -Loaeza, 1992). 
The PAN's victory started to be seen in the early 1990s in the municipality of 
SLP, in Queretaro it did not achieve this until 1997. The PAN in SLP won 
control of the administration for the first time in 1983 and for the second time in 
1989. On both occasions it won with the allegiance between the Navista 
movement and the Democratic Mexican Party (PDM) which was supported by 
the strong religious group in the Bajio called the Uniön Nacional Sinarquista. 
The PAN's continuous control was disrupted in the 1995 municipal elections 
when the PRI won the municipal presidency. However since subsequent 
elections the PAN has retained office. At the state level, the PAN in SLP did not 
attain victory in the state elections of 1991. In these elections the Navistas allied 
with the PAN and the PRD in order to defeat the PRI; however, electoral fraud 
controlled by the latter prevented such a victory. It was not until 2003 that the 
PAN won the state elections. 
65 For example, the PRI in the 1997 municipal elections of SLP won in 41 of the 58 
municipalities within the whole state. However the PAN won over 11 % of the total votes in the 
state which represented only two municipalities: SLP and Soledad de Graciano Sanchez. 
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The PAN in Queretaro has followed a different path from that in SLP. The 
success of this party was promoted by middle-class immigration since the 
1980s from Mexico City. These new residents have tended to prefer the PAN 
especially those belonging to the upper-middle class (Morales, 1998). 
Queretaro until 1994 was considered as one of the most priista states in the 
country; but it was not until 1997 that the PAN won elections at both the 
municipal and state levels. The success of the PAN in 1997 was due in part to 
the success of the party in other cities within the region (Leon and SLP). But 
mainly, the cliques within the PRI in Queretaro accentuated a series of corrupt 
acts that prompted the electorate to support the PAN instead. This situation was 
considered by Queretans a key aspect that had to be overcome in order to 
achieve a more democratic system (Espino, 2003). 
Furthermore, local family and friendship ties between members of these 
opposed political parties blurred the formal boundaries between them. For 
example, in the case of Marcelo de los Santos in SLP, it was known that he 
coordinated in the late 1980s the priista financial campaign at the local level. 
However in 2000 he won the municipal presidency and then became governor 
in 2003, in both cases representing the PAN (interview SLP 5). Another 
example was the case of Governor Ignacio Loyola (1997-2003). He came from 
a local business family that has been known for supporting priista regimes. 
However, the cliques within the PRI in 1997, in addition to the personal rivalries 
between the priista governor in 1991-1997 and the forthcoming priista candidate 
in the 1997 elections resulted in the PAN candidate's victory. This victory was 
partly supported by the outgoing governor who contributed to the fragmentation 
within the local PRI (Espino, 2003). 
The close relationships between the members and supporters of these two 
political parties in Queretaro and SLP partly explain the shared vision in 
promoting the municipalities' urban development. This vision has focused on 
transforming the capital-states into centres concentrating the infrastructure that 
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favour transnational markets. These modes require road networks between the 
city and the rest of the country and, within the same city, between industrial 
parks and the main access roads. The advertisement of these cities' profiles as 
tourist centres (due to their colonial heritage) and as trade and distribution hubs 
(due to their strategic location along the NAFTA corridor) has been a policy 
promoted since priista times (interview QRO 14). However, a perception that 
these policies have been executed by the PAN was observed during fieldwork 
(RCP_Qro, 2000-03; CPU_doc2,2004). This perception coincided with the 
democratic transition and neoliberal consolidation that Mexico as a country has 
experienced. 
The differences between the PAN and the PRI in the two municipalities have 
been observed in two ways. Firstly, the PAN administrations have followed a 
more planned and ordered approach in modernising the provision of public 
services, in simplifying bureaucratic processes within and out of the municipal 
administration, and in creating a clearer methodological procedure in the 
promotion of citizen participation. However, this does not mean that the PRI 
administrations did not consider these factors. For example, in Queretaro during 
the priista administration of 1994-1997, several policies simplifying the 
administration and promoting more coordinated participation began to be 
carried out (Gutierrez & Maya, 1995). 
Secondly, the way in which the PRI has approached social mobilisations has 
been very different from the methods implemented by the PAN. On the one 
hand, the PRI has been known for co-opting many of the mobilisations' leaders. 
This method prompted various social groups to reform their internal 
organisation in order to avoid their leaders' cooptation and provide more 
accountability to their members about the decisions taken. These reforms have 
even been observed in social groups which have close relationships with the 
PRI (i. e. Antorchista Movement - based on interview SLP 20). On the other 
hand, the PAN has tended to eradicate any form of clientelism (method 
favoured by priistas). This strategy has resulted in the marginalisation of social 
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groups and has instead promoted participation through individual methods of 
citizen participation. Nevertheless, a tendency to re-create groups or 
organisations of citizens was observed in the early 2000s, but this re-creation 
was supported by a legal recognition (through a solicitor) that was not followed 
during priista times (based on interviews Qro 8, Qro 10, QR 7). The aim of this 
status is to create a more ordered deliberation between organisation 
representatives and the panista governments. 
6.6. The social class structure 
In this chapter, the social class structure has been classified using three 
categories: high, middle and low. Within the local high class of Queretaro and 
SLP it is common to find the families that once were hacendados before the 
1910 Revolution. As mentioned in Section 6.2 many of these families sold their 
land to government or to real estate businesses during the mid 1900s. 
However, in some cases these families were involved in the real estate 
business themselves. This class has also been formed by the urban 
bourgeoisie originated in the 1950s when the industrialisation of Queretaro and 
SLP began. Moreover, a new generation of the urban bourgeoisie can be 
identified if the CEOs of the new transnational firms arriving to Queretaro and 
SLP are considered. Many of the members of the upper class were involved in 
politics such as the case of two governors in Queretaro: Manuel Gonzalez 
Cosio (1961-1967) and Antonio Calzada Urquiza (1973-1979) (based on Diaz, 
2004). This class was not homogenous as some cliques existed, such as the 
ones between the old hacendado families and the new generations of CEOs 
which, for example, tended to live in different neighbourhoods (Morales, 1998; 
informal discussion local academic Adrian Moreno Mata). High ranking 
clergymen (i. e. archbishops) of the Catholic Church are also considered as part 
of this class (Diaz, 2004) 
The middle class is comprised of high ranking politicians, government officers, 
(highly and medium) educated families, businesspeople, and public and private 
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sector workers. My perception during fieldwork was that the high ranking 
politicians and highly educated families originally from Queretaro and SLP had 
close relationships (through family or friend ties) with the upper class. An 
example can be observed in the close relationships between medical 
associations (participating in politics) and real estate businesses in SLP 
(informal discussion with Adrian Moreno Mata - academic). However, some 
highly educated families who migrated to these cities and have lived there for 
more than 15 years, started to get involved in the same social activities as the 
upper class, for example the members of the Historic Centre Board in 
Queretaro. In the case of middle-low income families (public and private sector 
workers) they were observed to be involved in activities within the informal 
sector as another way of complementing their income. They relied on their 
home as a space for production (home goods or food) or sold goods in the 
streets (based on my observations and interview SLP 17). This observation 
illustrates that street vending is not necessarily an activity developed by the 
poorest, uneducated families. 
The middle class in the states of Queretaro and SLP has been the most active 
in creating and supporting social mobilisations; for example against an 
authoritarian regime (i. e. the Navista movement, SLP), against the withdrawal of 
financial credits and high interest rates as a result of neoliberal policies (i. e. 
Barzön Movement, Queretaro), against transnational firms affecting the 
environment (i. e. local mobilisations against foreign firms such as Metalclad and 
Minera San Xavier, SLP), or in demanding basic needs and human rights (i. e. 
Antorchista Movement, UFCP). Several civil associations or NGOs have also 
been created in order to support marginalised communities or to promote the 
localities traditions and festivities. The majority of these organisations did not 
appear to work together despite they were aware of the existence of other 
organisations with similar objectives. Many of these organisations followed the 
values promoted by the Catholic Church such as charity and the preservation of 
religious traditions which form part of the local or regional culture (Diaz, 2004; 
Santin 2004; JAQ, 2003). 
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The lower class is generally formed by the unemployed that have emigrated 
from rural areas. Many of these families represent ethnic minority groups that 
came from within the same states of Queretaro and SLP or that came from 
neighbouring states. This class has been the most marginalised in terms of 
public services provided by government and in many cases has been the most 
participative within the programmes and projects organised by local authorities 
(informal discussions with staff at the Citizen Participation Offices in Queretaro 
and SLP). This class has also been marginalised in terms of employment and 
housing, thus it is not surprising to find many of the families involved in the 
informal sector. The middle-upper and high classes identify this class as the 
one of "social disorder" due to their participation within many social 
mobilisations. In fact, it seemed that the upper classes are not able to 
differentiate between the middle-lower class and lower class. Finally, the lower 
class is the one that mostly depends upon government assistance (i. e. provision 
of basic needs, food, clothes, or temporal jobs). 
6.7. The evolution of public-private partnerships 
There is evidence that public-private partnerships in Queretaro and SLP have 
existed since the 19th century, when many of the local hacendados got involved 
in industrial activities. These activities were closely linked to the increase in 
profits generated by their ranches; for example, the promotion of a textile 
factory in a sheep breeding ranch, or the creation of a hydrological system that 
would water a hacendado's lands (Gonzalez & Osorio, 2000; Camacho, 2001). 
These types of industrial activities were achieved through the state 
government's support as they benefited indirectly other sectors of society. With 
the promotion of the textile industry various roads were built. The roads were 
financed by the hacendados and executed by government; a similar approach 
was associated with the construction of dams. Projects like these benefited 
particularly the development of the cities of Queretaro and SLP. 
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The close relationship between politicians and hacendados was also illustrated 
by family or friendship ties. For example, the governor of Queretaro, Francisco 
Gonzalez de Cosio (1887-1911), who owned a ranch himself, benefited from 
the textile policies promoted by his administration (Gonzalez & Osorio, 2000). 
Public-business partnerships have been observed, especially in Queretaro, 
through the intervention of the construction firm ICA which promoted the 
modernisation and development of the city (Miranda, 2000). The arrangements 
that were achieved as a result of a partnership between ICA and state 
government relied on: 
" the exemption of the equivalent of a property tax to all the lands bought by 
the enterprise for a period of 10 years; 
" the equal sponsorship (between federal government, state government and 
ICA) of the road that linked the motorway to the first industrial park; 
" the promotion of technical schools sponsored by the industry and state 
government to train workers on the operation of equipment used in firms 
such as TREMEC; and 
" the state government's compromise to convince all workers to affiliate to one 
of the old corporatist regime's union called CTM (this guaranteed peaceful 
and controlled strikes to the new enterprises establishing in Queretaro) 
Other more recent statutes promoting partnerships are the Federal Monuments 
and Sites Law (1972), the General Human Settlements Law (1993: art. 48, art. 
49 - frac. IV, V), and more recently the Planning Law (2002: art. 34). All of them 
state that federal government should supervise state and municipal 
governments in the creation of their urban development plans, for which 
complementary documents should be elaborated such as: state urban 
development laws or codes, urban development plans, and urban development 
partial plans in which historic centres are included. These laws emphasise that 
the federation, states and municipalities should promote collaboration and 
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coordination in heritage protection actions and investment between the social, 
the private and the public sectors (see Appendix 3 for more details). 
The creation of public-private partnerships regarding the preservation of historic 
sites and traditions was identified through the Queretan Feasts Board 
(Patronato de las Fiestas Queretanas) founded during the 19th century, as well 
as other smaller boards in charge of conserving temples (which are considered 
historic buildings safeguarded by the Catholic Church). The boards 
safeguarding these temples have been sponsored by the community; in other 
cases funding from any of the three levels of government have helped to restore 
important parts of these buildings. The Queretan Feasts Board started as a civil 
organisation sponsored by different rich families from the city of Queretaro, 
however in 1974 it started to receive state government funding promoting, as a 
result, other feasts organised throughout the state (informal QR 10). 
Public-private partnerships were also created concerning the regeneration of 
the city centre at a municipal level. In the 1980s, the River Queretaro Board 
(Patronato del Rio Queretaro), for example, aimed to regenerate the river 
considered as the city centre's northern border. This board focused its efforts on 
cleaning the river and beautifying its surroundings (interviews QR 3; QRO 14). 
The board was formed by the local community and its main job was to 
supervise the actions undertaken by the municipal authorities in relation to 
image improvement. In SLP, image improvement of its main plazas and parks 
was highly promoted by the end of the 1960s. However, since the late 1990s 
the projects regenerating the city centre were mainly led by state and municipal 
governments, inviting the private sector (mainly the city centre shop-owners) to 
sponsor part of the costs (Primer Informe Municipal_SLP, 2001). 
In summary, it can be observed that in the development of public-private 
partnerships, since the 19 century, the involvement of business groups has 
been persistent. Business groups may not have been the only type of partners, 
but it seems that they always have formed part of these arrangements. This is 
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further observed through the analysis presented in Chapter 7 concerning the 
Historic Centre Board in Queretaro and the Historic Centre Consultative Council 
in SLP 
6.8. Social organisations or mobilisations 
The democratic and the urban-popular movements that emerged in Mexico in 
the 1980s have left their mark on the organisation and activities of various 
social organisations in the states of Queretaro and San Luis Potosi. 
Categorising some of these social movements throws light upon the structure of 
today's system of participation in the two municipalities. 
The first category is related to a national scale. Within this category the Navista 
Movement can be identified because of its impact upon the democratic 
transition process in Mexico, especially in the early 1990s. During that time 
Navismo fought against the priista centralist and authoritarian regime. Navismo 
has been considered to be a popular movement due to the mix of social classes 
participating within it. Even though Navismo made a significant contribution to 
national democratisation, it has also been recognised as having a Potosin 
origin. Some academics argue that Navismo made a greater impact at a 
national scale rather than at the local level (Cabrero & Gil, 1999). Although this 
might be true, this thesis argues that it made an impact at the local level. 
Chapter 8 provides further discussion; Appendix 1 presents in more detail the 
origins and the legacies of Navismo at the municipal level. 
In the second category several urban mobilisations can be identified. These 
urban mobilisations represent popular interests or demands concerning basic 
human needs (i. e. housing, provision of public services, employment or auto- 
employment) and human rights (especially if their members come from an 
indigenous background). Many of these mobilisations are affiliated to political 
parties such as the Antorchista Movement (AM) with the PRI or the UFCP with 
the PRD. Other organisations have maintained their political independence 
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such as the FIOZ in Queretaro in the 1990s. However, this independence has 
made them more vulnerable to the subnational governments' use of force which 
has caused, in some cases, their disintegration as with FIOZ (St. Claire, 2002; 
interview QR_7). The AM and UFCP have had national representation, 
however, for the purposes of this thesis a specific focus is given to their roles in 
SLP and Queretaro, respectively (see Appendix 1 for more details). I consider 
these three types of organisations as some of the creators of new spaces for 
political participation. But these spaces do not follow a formal arrangement 
(written document or regulation) as their operation and implementation 
throughout different political administrations is not officially established 
Finally, in the third category middle-class mobilisations can be identified. These 
mobilisations involve the political participation of many entrepreneurial and 
professional groups (i. e. Coparmex, Canacintra, Canaco, architect and engineer 
associations, academic and research consultants). Previous studies have 
considered the entrepreneurial mobilisation as part of the broader democratic 
movement of the 1980s (Loaeza, 1991, Mizrahi, 1994). But as Chapter 8 
argues, their local impact in the municipalities of SLP and Queretaro have 
created a form of participation that has included the middle class in urban 
policymaking. Appendix 1 provides specific examples of how middle-class 
groups have been included in the official participative systems at municipal 
level. 
6.9. Catholicism as part of the regional identity 
The Catholic Church has implanted religious values throughout the Mexican 
socio-political identity that have acted in some cases as cohesive instruments 
but also as causes of conflict and violence between civil and clerical groups (i. e. 
the religious civil war in the 1920s - Guerra Cristera). In the case of the Bajio 
Region, catholic values have acted as cohesive instruments that have built a 
culture against the national, centralist state. A first sign of this was observed in 
the development of the Sinarquista Movement between the 1930s and the 
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1950s. This movement, on the one hand, rose against the national post- 
revolutionary state policies (i. e. land reform), the federal socialist education 
system, and the liberal, foreign political and economic ideology that started to 
influence the Mexican state (Serrano, 1992). On the other hand, it favoured 
private property, equal wealth distribution, religious education, and the non- 
intervention of the national state in local affairs. 
The movement was comprised of the urban bourgeoisie, clerical intellectuals 
(Jesuits), and high ranking clerics. However, this movement enjoyed popular 
support from those peasants and workers that were satisfied with the paternalist 
environment established by landlords and firm shareholders. Sinarquismo since 
those times has been known for building a local identity based on local 
traditions, customs, and a religious morality reflected across social classes. It 
also helped to construct an identity of social order and equilibrium to achieve 
social peace and prosperity (Serrano, 1992). This is reflected in contemporary 
times, for example through the political discourse and in the promotion of local 
traditions in Queretaro and SLP. 
The socio-political power that the movement attained promoted the state 
(through the President) to create strategies of control against the Church. But, 
instead of getting involved in another violent confrontation, the Church decided 
to negotiate tacitly with the state as an alternative way of achieving political 
power (Serrano, 1992). The tacit arrangements between the state and the 
Church were broken by the late 1940s, generating a crisis within the movement. 
Despite the end of the movement, the identity it formed in the previous years 
was consolidated in the BajIo Region. Sinarquismo, then transformed itself into 
a local political power which in the 1980s mobilised itself against the national 
political control of the PRI (ibid). The origins of the movement came 
from the 
city of Leön and its surroundings; thus it can be of no surprise that 
Leön has 
been a leading city in promoting the principles of electoral democracy 
in the 
region (Shirk, 1999). Navismo was another movement which 
had sinarquista 
support, especially through its political party the PDM. 
Sinarquismo has been 
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also identified as having some links to the PAN, which can be observed through 
the local alliances between the two in the 1990s. 
The religious values that people in the Bajio have followed have responded to 
their personal interpretations rather than to ecclesiastical structure (Garcia- 
Ugarte, 1992). The distance observed in the 1980s between the Catholic 
Church and the people was caused by the interests of the high ranking clerics 
to obtain political power. Clerics got more involved with the powerful groups as 
a strategy to obtain power (ibid). In the 1990s, the Church in the Bajio was 
opposed to the ideological foreign intervention which since then has prompted a 
diversification in social and political life that has tended to break with traditional 
values. The threat of this diversification relies on the enhancement of political 
and citizenship rights rather than moral and religious values (ibid). 
The lack of popular support that the Mexican state and the Church encountered, 
by the early 1990s, prompted a closer relationship between the two. As a result, 
the relations between the Vatican and the Mexican states were enhanced. 
Since that moment, the intervention of the Church in political matters has been 
more open publicly. This is reflected in Queretaro and SLP through the 
Archbishops' declarations supporting conservative political parties (i. e. the PAN 
rather than the PRD -interview QR_8; Carta Pastoral, 2003) and in the 
Church's distance from any social movements that used religiosity as a motor 
for organising and generating social action (Castillo, 2002; interviews: SLP 5, 
QR 8). 
Conclusions 
This chapter has explored the research context in Queretaro and SLP. In order 
to maintain their economic competitiveness, both cities pursued government 
projects and strategies that helped them to create the capacity for innovation. 
This has been observed in their aim to improve road communication networks, 
to regenerate their historic centres and to create new forms of political 
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organisation, such as public-private partnerships. The type of investment, 
inclined towards the food and automotive industries, has enhanced the need for 
road networks, especially because both cities are located along a free trade 
corridor. Also, investment reinforcing cultural tourism has enhanced the city 
centre's regeneration projects. 
Urban infrastructure and industrial activities have been accompanied by new 
social relationships, with effects on informal labour, migration, and new forms of 
participation at the municipal level. Partnerships can be considered as a form of 
stakeholder participation. Even though partnerships have been a form of 
organisation that has existed for as long as a century, they can be considered 
innovative insofar as urban policy decisions rely increasingly upon this type of 
organisational structure. It seems that today partnerships have become a 
familiar form for promoting urban development. Past social mobilisations have 
also had an impact on actual forms of participation, especially through their 
demands on local autonomy, accountability and pluralism. However, 
negotiations with political parties, tacit understandings and the endurance of 
class structures are also characteristics that shape each city's development. 
By examining these factors, differences and similarities have emerged between 
the two case studies. This discussion provides an important context within 
which to understand the analysis of the following chapters; specifically, 
regarding partnership formation, the role of social mobilisations and the 
direction of urban regeneration policy. The three remaining chapters analyse 
the data collected through primary research, drawing on the conceptual 
framework developed in Chapters 2-4. Each chapter illustrates how the three 
trends towards an entrepreneurial city are observed within the case studies. 
163 
Chapter 7- Historic-centre partnerships: comparing Queretaro 
and San Luis Potosi 
Introduction 
This chapter starts to analyse how Queretaro and San Luis Potosi are in the 
process of becoming `entrepreneurial cities', based upon the primary research. 
This type of city is characterised by an "entrepreneurial concern to create new 
combinations of economic and/or extra-economic factors which will further 
urban competitiveness" (Jessop, 1997: 31). Urban governments have to be 
innovative to create and sustain such new combinations within a context of the 
three trends in state restructuring (Jessop, 1997): destatisation of the political 
regime (shift from government to governance); denationalisation of statehood 
(decentralisation of the national-state to supranational and subnational levels); 
and the internationalisation of the state (national-state adjustments to 
international policies). 
City centre regeneration policies reflect two innovative aspects generally sought 
by entrepreneurial cities: (a) the creation of new types of places for living, 
working, producing, servicing, and consuming; and (b) the place-marketing of 
new areas that enhance the quality of life for residents, commuters or visitors. 
(Jessop, 2002: 188). This chapter focuses on the destatisation trend at local 
level, drawing upon governance in its particular sense. Specifically, 
regeneration partnerships are analysed in relation to the `collaborative 
advantage' they pursue and their role as a form of articulation between the 
public and the private sectors. The chapter makes reference to the other two 
trends (denationalisation of statehood and internationalisation of the state) but 
these are discussed further in Chapter 8 and 9. 
The chapter analyses data on regeneration partnerships in the historic centres 
of Queretaro and San Luis Potosi. The regeneration of 
these historic centres 
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has become a strategy to transform them into new places for living, producing 
and servicing. These municipalities have aimed to attract tourist and leisure 
investment (as a way of maintaining their urban competitiveness) by mainly 
improving their centres' image and to a lesser degree the quality of life of 
residents and users. Furthermore, the location of both Queretaro and San Luis 
Potosi, with respect to other metropolitan centres of production in the country, 
categorises them as convenient trade centres and hubs of distribution. This 
chapter argues that the creation and maintenance of these new places is 
reinforced by the existence of partnerships. 
The first section of the chapter discusses the innovative aspects of the two case 
studies' partnerships by comparing their structure and management. The 
following two sections discuss the differences and similarities between the 
partnerships. 
7.1. The structure of the case study partnerships 
This section explains the creation and operation of the historic-centre 
partnerships in Queretaro and SLP. It also shows how local stakeholders 
promoted partnerships in an attempt to pursue a strategy of urban 
entrepreneurship. The chapter argues that the operational and participatory 
strategies that the partnerships developed, until mid 2004, to conserve and 
promote the city centres illustrate weak entrepreneurial ism (as described in 
Section 3.3.3). The historic centre partnerships in SLP and Queretaro were 
formed in 2000 and 2001, respectively. SLP's partnership was called the 
Historic Centre Consultative Council (HCCC) and Queretaro's partnership was 
called the Historic Centre Board (HCB). 
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7.1.1. The Historic Centre Consultative Council. This partnership was 
created through a state government decree (Decree, 2000). 66 The objective of 
this partnership was to preserve, restore and promote the historic centre of San 
Luis Potosi. In 2000, when local stakeholders perceived major possibilities for 
this centre to attain world heritage nomination, the objective of elaborating a 
correspondent document, which justified this nomination, became the main aim 
of the HCCC. This document was known as the `dossier'. This new aim 
demanded an internal restructuring which simplified the partnership's operation, 
including at the same time, citizen participation as a result of a UNESCO's 
recommendation (interview: SLP 4). 
The formation of the HCCC was innovative as it was able to bring together 
representatives from the private and the public sectors to promote the 
importance of the city centre's development. This innovation was embedded in 
a cordial environment where the credibility of the partnership was underpinned 
by the clarity of the project (world heritage nomination) and the collaboration of 
priistas, panistas and navistas (interview: SLP 4). 
Even though the HCCC aimed, in an indirect way, to pool resources from 
different levels of government and other sectors, the HCCC administration was 
sponsored by state government, supported to a lesser degree by the 
Autonomous University of San Luis Potosi (interviews: SLP 4, SLP 4 bis). 
During the 1997-2003 administration, other similar partnerships related to urban 
development were formed such as the State Urban Development and Housing 
Consultative Council (referred to `expert councils' in Chapter 8). Several of the 
members from this partnership belonged to the HCCC as well. These members 
were representatives of professional, academic and entrepreneurial local 
organisations. 
66 The creation of the council was firstly promoted by Governor Horacio Sanchez (1994-1997) 
then it was formalised by Governor Fernando Silva Nieto (1997-2003) and continued by 
Governor Marcelo de los Santos (2000-06). 
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The HCCC was made up of a `directive' committee and a supervising 
commission. Another innovative aspect of the HCCC was the participation of 
citizens occupying the directive committee posts (president, secretary and 
treasurer) rather than having them held by government representatives. 
However, these citizens already had informal relationships with Governor 
Fernando Silva Nieto (1997-2000) due to their common interests in conserving 
the city centre (interview: SLP_4). Within this committee, the role of the state, 
municipal, and federal representatives was significant (i. e. State Secretary of 
Tourism, Municipal Director of Urban Planning, regional officer of the National 
Institute of Anthropology and History -INAH), especially as state and municipal 
officers occupied the presidency and secretarial substitute posts. Other 
representatives in the committee belonged to the Archbishop's Office, local 
entrepreneurial chambers, professional organisations, the Autonomous 
University of SLP, and members of the state congress. I observed that this 
committee was considered the strategic body due to its potential influence upon 
policy decisions concerning the historic centre. 
The supervising commission was made up of other private sector 
representatives belonging to other local universities or research centres, 
business groups, and civil associations (the majority were of local origin, but the 
international NGO, (COMOS, was also invited), as well as other state 
government agencies. From what I observed this commission only worked as 
an advisory body, without participating in the partnership's decision process. 
7.1.2. The Historic Centre Board (HCB). In Queretaro this partnership was 
created as a civil association, strongly supported by the municipal 
administration of Mayor Rolando Garcia (2000-03). The board's main objectives 
were: (i) to promote the historic centre's restoration, conservation and protection 
through interinstitutional programmes and citizen participation; (ii) to seek, in 
coordination with the authorities, for financial and physical resources to 
conserve and restore the area; and (iii) to coordinate activities from national and 
international organisations interested in the promotion of the centre (Acta 
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Constitutiva, 2001). The innovative characteristic of the HCB was that a civil 
association became the organisation in charge of promoting the historic centre's 
development. It was not only a governmental initiative but also a civil interest; 
as a member of the board expressed it "the innovation consists of civil society 
developing a concrete project" (interview: QRO 7, my translation). Furthermore 
it was not a state governmental initiative but a municipal one. These aspects 
can be interpreted as an example of the autonomy that this municipality attained 
in response to the national urban decentralisation policies. 
The HCB was made up of a directive and a technical council. The directive 
council was responsible for building relationships with strategic groups to obtain 
financial and political resources and to promote the interests of the board. This 
council was formed by ten citizens who were considered respected and 
distinguished persons in Queretaro. Some of these people belonged to 
traditional, local entrepreneurial families. 67 Some members had informal 
relationships with Mayor Garcia insofar as they were local (ex)politicians 
interested in conserving architectural beauty, as well as in developing the 
economic activity of the city-centre (culture and tourism). Even though other 
state and municipal organisations existed to promote Queretaro's economic and 
urban development, the HCB's members did not apparently participate directly 
in these other organisational arrangements. 
The technical council was formed by the board's president and technical 
director, the INAH's director in Queretaro, the State Director of Monuments and 
Sites and a mayor's representative. This council was in charge of revising 
technically the proposals made by the directive council; technical knowledge 
controlled to a great extent the board's policy decisions. Table 7.1 summarises 
the organisational structure of each board. 
67 These families were Gonzalez de Cosio, Urquiza and Ruiz Rubio which have been known as 
landlords or CEO's of transnational companies such as Coca Cola. 
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7.2. The differences between the HCCC and the HCB 
After comparing the structures of both partnerships, it is worth underlining the 
differences between them. From my perspective these are mainly explained in 
terms of their original structure. Three main differences were identified: the 
profile of their membership, the type of projects carried out by each partnership, 
and the strategies of social inclusion that each organisation followed. 
7.2.1. The profile of the partnerships' membership. In the case of the HCCC 
the posts of president, secretary and treasurer were occupied by individuals 
considered respected and distinguished within Potosin society. They had the 
ability to build new social networks and the potential to influence urban policies 
(interview: SLP_15). Apart from these three posts, it was interesting to see that 
the HCCC invited other local organisations that the HCB did not; for example, 
the chamber of commerce (CANACO) and the construction chamber (CMIC), 
the Autonomous University of SLP, the Archbishop Office, and the Architect 
Association; and, within its supervising commissions, various local civil 
associations promoting the city's conservation and traditions like: Tradiciones 
Potosinas, Tierra y Signo, and Pro-Defensa del Patrimonio Cultural. 
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Table 7.1. The organisational structure of the HCCC and the HCB 
HCCC SLP HCB Qro 
Aims To preserve, conserve and To preserve, conserve and 
develop the city centre; develop the city centre; 
To elaborate the dossier to To coordinate efforts 
attain the world heritage coming from local, national 
site nomination and international 
organisations 
Membership Led by distinguished and Led by distinguished and 
respected local citizens; respected elite citizens; 
Network of informal Network of informal 
arrangements due to arrangements due to 
previous social previous social 
relationships; relationships 
Formed by a wide range of 
civil and public 
organisations 
Main actors in the State Tourism Office; State Direction of 
partnership INAH; Monuments & Sites; 
Autonomous University INAH; 
SLP; HCB Director and 
Municipal Direction of President; 
Urban Planning (since City Mayor's particular staff 
2004); 
HCCC Director and 
President 
Structure Directive committee and Directive and technical 
supervising commission; councils; 
Promoted by state Supported by municipal 
government government 
Administration Directive staff received a Directive staff received a 
salary, other members salary, other members 
worked on a voluntary worked on a voluntary 
basis; basis; 
Administration costs Administration costs 
sponsored by state sponsored by private 
government and to a lesser sources and operation 
degree by the Autonomous costs by municipal 
University of SLP government and local 
businesses 
Innovation Gathering of public and Collaboration between 
private organisations (with public officers and a group 
different political of citizens for conserving 
tendencies) to promote the and developing the city 
city centre's development centre 
and local identity; 
Collaboration between 
citizens and public officers 
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In the case of the HCB, its membership was more elitist and individualist. It was 
elitist in that many of its members were related to some of the prestigious 
families in the city; however, it only invited individuals (instead of organisation 
representatives) with the ability to attract political and financial resources and 
knowledge. It did not invite the Autonomous University of Queretaro (which was 
a prestigious institution), other civil associations which were active in promoting 
Queretaro's traditions and open spaces, nor any of the representatives of the 
local business groups - although indirect links existed through the HCB 
president who was also the 2004 vice-president of CANACINTRA. Regarding 
the Church, it was not until mid 2004, that the board decided to invite a 
representative of the Archbishop's Office as a member of the directive council 
Differences in membership (in scope and profile) appeared to be affected by the 
level of government initiative. The HCCC, as a state government initiative, had 
a wider vision of inviting different organisations to liaise with it; whereas the 
HCB, as a civic initiative, only focused on its immediate interests. The curious 
thing is that in the HCB's documentary discourse and activities, the participation 
of other citizens was more important than it was for the HCCC. A couple of 
reasons that explain this participative interest are (a) the UNESCO's 
recommendations that closely guided the HCB's objectives and activities68 and 
(b) the reflection of Mayor Garcia's political interest in building up a participative 
society (as he thought that Mexicans had to understand that government alone 
was not going to resolve all the problems - interview QRO 16, my translation). 
In the case of the HCCC, despite its original purpose of including various private 
organisations, it was not able to integrate them beyond its rhetoric. The 
strongest participants were the INAH and the University through their provision 
66 This influence came from ICOMOS and the European organisation called Urb-Al which based 
their working vision on the Washington Charter (its official name is Charter for the Conservation 
of Historic Towns and Urban Areas). The Charter was published in 1987, aiming to preserve 
and integrate historic and religious sites within modern urbanised areas across cities around the 
world. 
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of technical and logistic support. The HCCC's lack of broad membership 
participation seemed to be related to its focus on the dossier elaboration, which 
required technical knowledge and expertise. This reason emphasised the role of 
the INAH, leaving other members within the council with few tasks or 
responsibilities to carry out 
7.2.2. Projects carried out by the partnerships. In the case of HCCC, the 
main project accomplished was the dossier elaboration within a period of four 
years. Even though there were various projects carried out regarding the 
centre's regeneration between 1994 and 2004, none of them were managed by 
the HCCC. Before the HCCC was formally constituted in 2000, regeneration 
projects were generally considered to be the governor's priority programmes. 
These projects concerned image-building improvement measures such as the 
restoration of temples, colonial buildings and public gardens, street 
pedestrianisation, and some underground cabling. For most projects state and 
federal governments were the main sponsors. However, a third of the cost of 
street pedestrianisation, in 2001, was sponsored by the local shop-owners 
(Primer Informe Gobierno SLP, 2000-03). This project can be considered as 
weak or instrumental due to its short term duration. 
The HCB was more active than the HCCC. It was responsible for carrying out 
projects regarding underground cabling that helped to bring into relief the 
buildings' architectural beauty. It also developed technical tools that were 
necessary for governmental agencies to elaborate an adequate city centre 
development plan regarding the diagnosis of land use, urban services, housing, 
and building conditions. The board was able to carry out various specific 
projects thanks to the sponsorship of municipal government within the period of 
2001-03.69 Some evidence existed which showed that the HCB received small 
donations from firms located in the city like Daewoo and Coca-Cola. However, 
these amounts were very limited compared to the sum given by the municipal 
69 The HCB received an amount of $10 million pesos equivalent to £500,000 sterling pounds 
(AA, 2001). 
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authorities (P-01_HCB). It was the mayor's personal interest in promoting the 
city centre that significantly helped the board to obtain resources. After Mayor 
Garcia's administration ended, the HCB started to encounter serious financial 
problems in continuing to develop the projects it had in mind (interviews: QR 2, 
QR 4). It was arguably its lack of accountability to the rest of the public which 
hindered further development. 
7.2.3. The partnerships' social inclusion strategies. In both cases, the 
partnerships were influenced by UNESCO's recommendations on participation 
during the conservation process of historic sites. Particularly, this was 
established in the Washington Charter: 
The participation and the involvement of the residents are essential for the 
success of the conservation programme and should be encouraged. The 
conservation of historic towns and urban areas concerns their residents first of 
all (Washington Charter, 1987, my emphasis). 
This international recommendation was enforced at a national level by the Law 
of Archaeological, Artistic and Historic Monuments and Sites (1972). The INAH, 
through its regional offices located in Queretaro and SLP, was responsible for 
promoting ideas of social participation and inclusion into the conservation of 
heritage sites as well as supervising the implementation of this law. Moreover, 
the direct relationship that each partnership had with international organisations 
for conserving historic urban sites (i. e. Urb Al, ICOMOS) prompted them to 
include in their discourse the importance of citizen participation. Statements, 
such as the one above from the Washington Charter, were used by the I NAH to 
complement the ambiguities or gaps of the 1972 law, especially those 
concerning the integration of urban historic areas with modern ones (informal 
discussion with INAH conservation officers). For this reason, it can be argued 
that an international recommendation can influence particular cases, such as 
the HCCC and the HCB, through their close relationship with the INAH offices. 
This situation exemplifies the internationalisation of the local state through the 
creation of partnerships. 
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However, the broad recommendations suggested by the Monuments and Sites 
Law and international organisations did not specify the strategies to promote 
citizen participation in the conservation and development of historic sites. This 
situation led the HCCC and HCB to develop different understandings of 
participation. The HCCC, as previously mentioned, was more plural in inviting 
various organisations to be part of the council's directive committee or 
supervising commission. Nevertheless, the predominant role of the INAH and 
the focus on the elaboration of the dossier limited the HCCC's capacity to 
include all of its members in a meaningful way. It appeared that the HCCC 
director had never met some of the members forming part of the directive 
committee. The holding of only one meeting during a period of four years 
supports this statement. 
The reason given by the HCCC director, as to why the supervision committee 
met only once, is that it was due to its lack of technical contribution to the 
elaboration of the dossier. Another reason that can explain the partnership's 
weak internal coordination was the low number of staff in charge of organising 
the council's events (three people). This situation complicated the logistic and 
administrative operations even further. Thus the plural participation that the 
HCCC claimed, by creating a wide membership, was mere rhetoric as many 
members were involved in name only. 
Social participation was also understood by the HCCC as the people - from 
different backgrounds and social classes - participating in religious processions, 
as well as in the logistics and organisation related to them (Dossier, 2004). This 
is why the HCCC invited civil associations, such as Tradiciones Potosinas, in 
charge of organising these types of events. It is worth mentioning that the 
pilgrimage, and the social participation involved, was one of the criteria that the 
partnership used to promote San Luis Potosi as a world heritage site. 
However, participation was not interpreted in terms of popular groups being 
able to influence the agenda or decision-making process of the HCCC - 
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including street vendors and neighbourhood boards (either autonomous or 
sponsored by local governments) - on which this research focuses. What is 
paradoxical is that the HCCC was aware of the need to relocate street vendors 
to designated areas in order to highlight the architectural characteristics of 
buildings and plazas (PRUCH_SLP, 1997), as well as of the need to improve 
the housing conditions of those residential neighbourhoods in the city centre. 
In Queretaro, the HCB's attempts to involve other individuals and organisational 
representatives were more effective than the HCCC's; one of the first tasks of 
the partnership was organising a public consultation and a series of workshops 
(apparently sponsored by municipal government - interview QR 4). In these 
events different members of society participated in order to debate the elements 
that the city centre should conserve and develop. 
Despite these efforts at inclusion, the HCB was perceived as closed and elitist 
by people belonging to other civil associations interested in conserving the 
historic centre such as Fundacion Esencia Queretana and Centro de 
Informaciön Ambiental. This view was also reflected in various articles in the 
local newspapers (P-02_HCB). The criticisms focused on how public 
consultation was not well publicised and on how the workshops were just 
directed at people or organisations somehow related to the HCB's interests. 
According to the HCB director, taxi-drivers and newspaper sellers were invited 
to the workshops, but checking the attendance list there was no evidence of 
such participation. Residents and representatives from local businesses also 
stated that they had attended the workshops but were unable to make any real 
contribution (interviews: QRO 6, QRO 11, QRO 12). Later on, I found out that 
several residents were informed about the existence of the HCB through the 
municipal delegational meetings, instead of being approached by the HCB 
(DPVS_doc, 2000-03). From my point of view, the HCB made a mistake in not 
providing information about its development to the representatives of civil 
organisations and residents, especially to those that were invited to the 
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workshops in an attempt to listen to the residents' views on the city centre's 
conservation. 
With regard to housing improvement and the relationship with street vendors, 
the HCB found barriers that obstructed its coordinating capacity, accentuating 
as a result its weak participatory inclusion. The HCB made an initial attempt to 
start a housing improvement project. This attempt consisted of diagnosing the 
condition of many houses (owned by low income families) within the 
neighbourhoods of San Francisquito and San Sebastian. Within this project the 
HCB attempted to lobby federal and state housing agencies to pool financial 
resources or credits to help these families improve their housing conditions. 
However, the HCB's lack of official status as a local authority undermined its 
coordinating capacity to gather together the different levels of governmental 
housing agencies to discuss the matter. As for the residents, they were initially 
contacted to diagnose the state of their house; however, after this stage was 
over they were no longer informed about the status of the project (interview 
QR 5). 
By the time the HCB was created, it encountered an advantageous situation 
regarding street vending. This advantage was due to the street vendor 
relocation programme that the Garrido administration (1997-2000) carried out in 
the city centre. With this precedent, the HCB did not have to plan strategies to 
relocate street vendors in order to highlight the architectural beauty of the city 
centre (See Chapter 8& Appendix 1). However, if the HCB was looking to 
improve the quality of life of the centre's residents and users in an inclusive 
way, it was not illogical to think that the board would have approached street 
vendor organisations to listen to their points of view, especially after becoming 
important stakeholders for promoting the area. 
Nevertheless, this did not happen for two reasons. First, the board did not 
include the established shop-owners in their activities and decisions on a 
continuous basis (interview QRO 12). Second, there existed a 
lack of 
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information about the organisational structure of street vendors, which 
increased the social fear and rejection towards them due to their `autarchic' 
behaviour witnessed at the end of the 1990s (see Appendix 1). For example, 
the HCB director declared that street vendors were not invited to the workshops 
because the board dealt with legally constituted organisations (interview 
QRO 15). However, he did not seem to be aware that several street vendor 
groups had become legal associations, as the local panista administrations 
sought to dissolve the old regime clientelistic relationships of the old regime 
(interviews: QRO 8, QRO 10 - see Section 6.5). 
Not surprisingly, the issues of street vending and housing are part of the 
international agenda. ICOMOS supports that the relocation of street vendors 
and housing improvements in historic towns are problems in need of special 
attention. Regarding housing, the Washington Charter underlines that "the 
improvement of housing should be one of the basic objectives of conservation" 
(WC, 1987), whereas street vending is considered as a `pest' that needs to be 
controlled to achieve conservation (Campesino, 2001). The international 
discourse may be one reason to understand why the HCCC and the HCB 
included in their rhetoric the importance of integrating residents and street 
vendors' perspectives in the centre's conservation project. 
In summary, this section has compared the two partnerships by discussing the 
chief differences in their composition, their type of activities and their response 
to the discourse of participation (among their members and with the outside). 
The strategic selection of their members (including public and non-public 
stakeholders) revealed the efforts of local governments in Queretaro and 
SLP to 
comply with innovative forms of organisation by formalising 
the collaboration 
between the public and the private sectors. This was the case with particularly 
image-building strategies. These types of projects reveal their level of urban 
competitiveness to be weak as it focused only on creating 
immediate outcomes 
without achieving a more inclusive and active participation. 
This exclusion was 
evident on the lack of participation of popular groups or neighbourhood 
board 
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representatives as part of the partnerships' membership. This shows a limited 
understanding of other participatory methods in the municipality. In particular, 
this exclusion illustrates that not all partners are equal. The following section 
argues that, among these stakeholders, the role of government is central as it 
works as initiator, sponsor, decider, and problem-solver of the partnerships' 
activities. 
7.3. The similarities between the historic centre partnerships 
A marked similarity concerned the significant role of government (at all levels) in 
promoting the creation and management of both partnerships. The 
government's role was observed through four dimensions: the types of activities 
that the partnerships carried out; the partnerships' accountability; the INAH's 
strong influence on the partnerships' final decisions; and the way in which each 
partnership depended on local governments to overcome social conflicts. 
7.4.1 The partnerships' motivation to carry out activities. Chapter 4 
proposed that an organisational structure of governance can provide integrated 
action through coordinating mechanisms in order to acquire goals otherwise not 
attainable (Stoker, 1994). To pursue such a goal, the HCCC and the HCB were 
created to promote the city's marketing strategies that converged with political 
interests. Box 7.1 exemplifies this statement. 
The examples in Box 7.1, show that it was in these governments' interest to 
start a partnership to exploit each city's economic potential. In the case of the 
HCCC it was Governor Fernando Silva Nieto who published the decree of its 
creation (and maintained by his successor Governor Marcelo de los Santos). In 
the case of the HCB it was Mayor Garcia who strongly supported the integration 
of the board as a complementary body to sustain the demands that an 
international event required. These examples reflect the urban regime model, 
showing how the politicians' leadership tends to attract and coordinate 
resources within a multi-actor and high risk scenario. 
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Box 7.1. Examples on politicians' dominant interests 
The HCCC's dossier was used to promote SLP's national importance and as an 
instrument to attract additional financial resources (Actas Cabildo, 26/09/2000). With 
the dossier in hand, governor Marcelo de los Santos (2000-06) gained from the 
national habitat programme (run by the federal social development secretariat) 
financial support for regenerating several streets in the city centre (interview: SLP_4 
bis). This source of funding shows how SLP has developed a city centre 
conservation policy which is just as important as the other nine cities nominated as 
world heritage sites in Mexico. 
The regeneration of the Platitos plaza by the HCB was also considered a strategic 
project that showed how municipal government was able to diminish social nuisance 
by shifting musical bands playing in the plaza (mariachis) to another area wHere the 
residents would not be disturbed. The musicians' noise had been being reported as a 
municipal problem since the early 1990s (P-01_HCB). 
Mayor Garcia nominated Queretaro as the expo-universal venue in 2010 
(implan_doc3). This international annual fair gathers different companies and firms 
from across the world to promote products and services. The potential volume of 
people that this kind of event attracts is an opportunity to invest in the city's 
infrastructure. The re-imaging of the Ocampo street by the HCB was considered as 
one of the pilot projects to enhance the infrastructure required. 
The involvement of several representatives of the private sector (including 
people with professional links to local business groups) in the partnerships' 
membership was important to sustain innovative forms of organisation. 
However, the support of local governments was vital for these partnerships to 
work. In both cases it was observed that governmental representatives formed 
part of the strategic groups within the partnerships. The governmental 
representatives belonged to the three levels of government, state government 
and municipal government playing a primary role in the case of 
SLP and 
Queretaro, respectively. In both cases the INAH's participation was observed to 
be equally strategic in helping each partnership to attain its aims. 
7.3.2. The partnerships' accountability. As discussed in Section 4.5, 
partnerships need to be accountable, especially when 
they have been created 
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for a public purpose. Accountability is understood as the existence of electoral 
arrangements regarding the formation of membership, as well as the access to 
information and codes regulating standards of conduct (Sullivan & Sketcher, 
2002). 70 In the British experience, partnerships have tended towards a shortfall 
in accountability terms, due to the location of partnership bodies at arm's length 
from centres of elected political authority and the majority of members are not 
being subject to an electoral mandate (ibid). Another reason for this shortfall is 
the considerable degree of discretion in defining the partnership's programmes 
and targets within broad and ill-defined national or regional policy contexts 
(2002: 157). However, this high degree of discretion, leading to informal 
arrangements, has been considered of relevance (and to some degree 
inevitable) for understanding urban politics (Lowndes, 2001; Stone, 1989 - 
Section 4.4. ). For the cases studied in this chapter, a similar argument can be 
found regarding the shortfalls of accountability. 
The HCCC and the HCB can be considered as an extension of the elected 
political authority, specifically of the heads representing state and municipal 
governments. In each case, respectively, the governor and mayor intervened in 
selecting the members that formed each partnership. However, they maintained 
their direct participation separately from the partnerships' formal activities. This 
separation aimed to counterbalance the governor or mayor's decisions in order 
to guarantee an objective and plural regeneration policy. This counterweight 
also aimed to create an institutional environment for this kind of policy to 
continue throughout different administrations. However, the counterweight that 
this separation attempted was undermined by informal arrangements between 
the heads of the executive power and the partnerships' membership (limiting 
accountability to other civil groups). I observed these informal arrangements 
through the lack of a delivery plan and the lack of written codes of conduct. 
70 It is important to notice that the aspects referring to accountability at this level are related to 
the aspects of broader democracy's horizontal and vertical accountability, see 
Section 2.2.1. 
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Neither of the partnerships had develop a delivery plan focusing instead on 
specific projects demanded, to a great extent, by local authorities (i. e. dossier 
elaboration, street re-imaging). These demands accentuated the tacit 
understandings between the partners and politicians. Based on staff statements 
these agreements were arrived at during the partnerships' meetings which were 
not recorded in any formal document (informal discussion with HCB and 
Direction of Monuments and Sites staff). These agreements were also approved 
by the INAH (and by the Direction of Monuments and Sites in Queretaro) whose 
technical opinion worked as a final filter to decide on a project's feasibility. 
In the absence of their own delivery plan (without being subject to the demands 
of government), there was no instrument for the partnerships to become 
accountable to the public. Both partnerships were aware that it was important to 
inform the public about their projects. But the lack of a working plan, against 
which they could to be evaluated, created an assumption between their 
members of not having to report to the public. The initial period of their work, in 
which both partnerships were studied, was characterised by strategies that 
provided them with practical credibility rather than legitimacy from the general 
public. This attitude caused the public bitterness detailed in Box 7.2. 
In the case of the HCB it was seen as more important to spend money on 
restoring a building than on pamphlets or updating their website (interview 
QRO 7). In the case of the HCCC, it was more its fear of creating a forum of 
slow action which led to limits being placed on inviting the general public to 
participate in the partnership's activities. This fear was based on SLP's 
background of social and political conflicts that prevailed in the 1990s; as one of 
the members in the council stated "an open consultation... [or] to open a 
process as a plebiscite style would be like committing suicide! " (interview 
SLP 4, my translation). 
A lack of accountability also existed regarding the partnerships' financial 
reports. The creation of the HCCC as a para-governmental body explained its 
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direct reports to the State Treasury Office, only. In Queretaro, municipal 
government was questioned by other civil associations about the resources 
given to the HCB, which was also registered as a civil association. The 
preference toward the HCB was considered as favouritism by other 
Box 7.2. Pubic bitterness as a reaction to limited accountability 
In Queretaro, the HCB's lack of financial accountability generated public bitterness. 
The bitterness came from citizens involved in the city's urban development, such as 
the members of the Centro de Informaciön Ambiental and some political opposition 
leaders. In the case of the former group, letters were sent to state congress and to 
municipal government demanding that the accounts on how the HCB spent the 
resources be given by municipal government. The aim of this group was to 
accumulate information to show to the general public how the panista municipal 
administrations were duplicating efforts that could be simplified through other 
organisational structures such as the institute of municipal planning (IMPLAN). 
(informal discussion with the Centro de lnformaciön Ambiental staff). 
By the end of 2004, in SLP, the installation of underground cabling to improve the 
street visual image and the maintenance of the water tube system and drainage, in 
the historic centre, generated local business bitterness; especially from those located 
on those streets who claimed that their sales were going to be affected (interview: 
SLP_ 13). Their perception was that the works done in order to improve the image 
were unnecessary as the infrastructure state of those streets was in good conditions, 
as they were last repaired in the mid 1990s. Some businesses thought that these 
works were a waste of time and money (interview: SLP 17). The shop-owners were 
informed in advance about the close down of those streets (due to repairs) however, 
the general public visiting the city centre was unaware of this close down. The HCCC 
knew about the project but it was not in charge of its coordination and thus 
uninterested in informing to the public. The state public works secretary was mainly 
responsible for coordinating the financial resources from the three levels of 
government however, it had a limited information strategy (observation and based on 
interview SLP 4 bis). 
associations, since municipal government did not follow a procurement scheme 
which justified the HCB as the legal organisation in charge of regenerating 
the 
city. " The dependence of the HCCC and HCB on governmental resources 
emphasised the relevance of local governments as a partner. 
This is shown not 
71 The procurement scheme is based on the Acquisitions and 
Services of the Public Sector Law 
which states that all public agencies should 
bid for private services in an open and equally 
based procedure; choosing the organisation that offers 
the most efficient service in terms of 
price and quality. 
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only in government being the principal sponsor but also in the partnerships' 
behaviour in that they reported their accounts to government only. (In either 
case I was not able to consult the finance books as they were considered as 
confidential information). 
In summary, the non-existence of a public and written code of conduct 
regulating this type of partnership showed the weak and limited vision that local 
politicians had when creating these partnerships. No public document stated the 
way in which they should operate and inform in relation to the public. Their 
creation acts stated how the partnerships should be formed, but without 
reference to an electoral process, operation or financial plan. Consequently, 
tacit codes of conduct prevailed, showing to the rest of society that these 
partnerships worked by blending public and private efforts, but in a secretive 
and elitist style. 
7.3.3. The dominance of the INAH upon the partnerships' final decisions. 
The dominance of INAH was clearly observed in both cases. This was partly 
based on the concentration of technical knowledge that the institute had 
acquired since authoritarian times, monopolising as a consequence national 
conservation interests and skills (interview: QR_2; SLP 18). However, this 
concentration of knowledge became more political when it came to deciding 
how the budget was to be spent by the partnership (specifically in the case of 
Queretaro) and in sharing information between agencies representing different 
levels of government (informal discussions held with INAH public officers and 
the HCBs' staff - see Box 7.3). In addition, the role of INAH 
increased as it 
acted as the supervisor of governmental and nongovernmental organisations for 
respecting the Monuments and Sites Law. 
The examples in Box 7.3 show how federal (i. e. INAH) and state agencies 
absorbed the job of municipal agencies when they proved 
to be knowledge- 
weak or disorganised (financially or logistically speaking). 
It seemed that, when 
municipal governments were not able to cope with 
historic-centre partnerships, 
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then an automatic response would come from a higher level of government. 
This can be interpreted not only as governmental agencies telling partnerships 
what to do, but also as federal government agencies becoming responsible for 
what municipal agencies are not able or willing to do. These examples illustrate 
the discussion in Section 4.3.2 on the over-reactive role of national government 
in guiding new organisations created at a subnational level. 
Box 7.3. The INAH's dominance 
In Queretaro, the municipal administration (2003-06) was not interested in financing 
the HCB. This change of support affected negatively the board's objective of 
elaborating a delivery plan which was called the 'methodological conservation and 
development plan'. The lack of financial support diverted the HCB's attention from 
the plan's formulation and instead the INAH and the state direction of monument and 
sites became responsible for carrying its elaboration out (interviews: QR 1, QR 2, 
QR_4). Later on, the HCB also encountered a lack of support from the INAH and the 
state direction when they decided to create their own geo-referenced information to 
elaborate the plan instead of using the one created by the HCB. The excuse for 
doing so was the lack of interest of both governmental agencies in buying information 
from the board (informal discussion with the INAH conservation staff). This type of 
reaction shows a lack of trust and reciprocity between organisations in the moment a 
partnership stops being supported by its initial patron (in this case municipal 
government). 
In SLP, the INAH's dominance was observed throughout the dossier elaboration, 
where a close coordination existed between the HCCC's director and the INAH 
conservation officer. The INAH's contribution to the dossier created a short-term and 
instrumental coordination between these two organisations. Particularly, the agenda 
setting and the criteria on which to base conservation was defined by the federal 
agency. Furthermore, the INAH's influence was observed in convincing municipal 
government to expand the limits of the historic centre (in order to include residential 
neighbourhoods in the conservation project). (interview: SLP 18) 
7.3.4. The dependence of partnerships on subnational governments. The 
HCCC and the HCB relied on subnational governments when they had to 
coordinate with other organisations and social groups to achieve success 
in 
their projects. A challenge that turned into a problem for both partnerships was 
the lack of response from other public and private organisations when 
they tried 
to coordinate efforts to attain specific projects. In the case of 
Queretaro, TV 
broadcasters, telephone companies and electricity suppliers failed to respond 
efficiently to the demands that the HCB made when 
trying to lay underground 
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cabling in one of the main streets of the city centre. This disadvantage, as 
mentioned above, was partly due to the HCB's lack of official status (interviews 
QR 5). In SLP a similar situation arose when the HCCC asked the Municipal 
Department of Urban Planning to collaborate in updating the city centre's urban 
development plan (interview: SLP 4). Thus coordination problems were not 
only encountered with private organisations but also with public organisations. 
Furthermore, the opportunity for partnerships to coordinate neighbourhood 
associations' efforts to improve the quality of life within the city centre was 
minimal in Queretaro and non-existent in SLP. This can partly be explained by 
the isolated participatory strategies that municipal governments promoted. It 
was, on several occasions, the lack of communication between municipal 
departments which obstructed the links between different citizen participation 
methods. For example, the negligible degree of communication between 
neighbourhood boards (promoted by the Municipal Directions of Participation) 
and the HCCC or HCB (related to the Municipal Urban Planning Units) was a 
case in point. The lack of interaction between different forms of participation 
illustrates local governments' low integrating capacity. Their low level of 
integrating capacity coincided with the corporatist nature of authoritarianism, 
which worked by creating various organisations without any linkage between 
them in order to maintain political control (Cornelius, 1996). These examples 
show the combination of old institutions with new ones, which underline the 
importance of temporal and spatial dynamics (Lowndes, 2001). 
Finally, the dependence of these partnerships on government, as the 
responsible body, was also evident in dealing with social conflicts, such as the 
problems raised by street vending (i. e. image nuisance). As an active member 
of the HCCC stated about informal commerce "I do not believe this matter 
[street vending] concerns to the council, it is a social problem and thus is has to 
be solved by municipal government" (interview SLP 15, my translation). 
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Across the four similarities, it has been shown how different levels of 
government were needed to promote, manage and coordinate these 
regeneration partnerships. The examples provided in this section reveal that 
national government still plays an important role within partnerships: through the 
strong role of the INAH. However, decentralised policymaking can be observed 
insofar as local government becomes more responsible through promoting 
partnerships, social relations and regulations that maintain such forms of 
organisation. These examples illustrate the concept of governance understood 
as through the national-state-centric approach (see Section 4.3.2). 
Conclusions 
In the context of the decentralisation process that Mexico has experienced over 
the last twenty five years, this chapter focused on the collaboration between 
different levels of government and sectors in order to attain a desirable urban 
regeneration. The combination of multi level participation (international, national 
and local) and the cross sector working underline a tendency towards one of the 
trends denoting urban entrepreneurialism: destatisation of the political regime 
through governance mechanisms. 
However, at the local level, the case study research revealed that the legacies 
of an authoritarian regime remained simultaneously alongside the introduction 
of governance as a collaborative form (particular sense). The characteristics of 
the old regime included a federal centralisation within the reconfiguration of the 
state, which led to an interventionist and protectionist state apparatus. For the 
cases of the HCCC and the HCB, the authoritarian legacies were described 
according to four similarities. Analysis showed that private initiatives were 
commonly overridden by political interests, which dovetailed with the interests 
held by the local private-sector elite. It was also clear that when lower levels of 
government were not able to show coordination, capacity or knowledge, federal 
agencies took the decisions - and to some extent these decisions converged 
with international recommendations (i. e. INAH following UNESCO's 
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recommendations). The analysis showed the continuous intervention of 
subnational governments in the social conflicts and problems the partnerships 
encountered, reflecting low responsibility on the part of some stakeholders 
involved in the partnership. 
The persistence of a central role for government (at all levels) in the promotion 
of regeneration partnerships was clear. The two partnerships were identified as 
organisational forms that acted as enablers to promote local development and 
followed national and international organisational pressures. This chapter 
argued that the HCCC and the HCB helped to create urban entrepreneurship by 
tending to formalise hybrid collaboration between local government and the 
private sector. 
The partnerships worked, to a certain extent, as an experimental mechanism to 
pool resources and as a reflection of a consensus between the different 
interests of local stakeholders. However, the pooling of financial resources 
mainly involved public intervention, whereas consensus among a wider set of 
actors was expressed in some cases by informal arrangements and, in other 
cases, was non-existent. These partnerships were an initial attempt at 
coordination between different levels of government and public-private sectors. 
They even combined market mechanisms (by creating the historic centre as a 
place for urban competitiveness to attract investment) with hierarchical 
mechanisms (by relying on different levels of government to attain political, 
social and financial stability to carry on with the partnership). 
The HCCC and HCB sought to create in the city centre a niche of investment 
through tourism and the re-imaging of the area. This project can be seen as a 
device for surviving the dynamic of globalisation at local level. The strategy 
creating the city centre as a niche for investment led to weak urban 
entrepreneurship. The main interest of the partnerships focused on improving 
the appearance of the place, despite the existence of an inclusive and 
participative rhetoric. Operational barriers such as a lack of communication and 
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trust between different levels of government, and the reliance on tacit 
understandings between partners, emphasised the limited concern for 
explaining to the public the purpose of each partnership. 
This chapter concludes that partnerships are a necessary, but not sufficient 
form of organisation to promote inclusion in a context of urban 
entrepreneurialism. The partnerships' role (under pressure from national and/or 
international declarations) is thus considered significant insofar as it helps to 
institutionalise (or legitimise) the discourse of collaboration between levels of 
government and between sectors. However, this type of collaboration tends to 
be exclusive. The exclusivity refers to the profile of a partnership's members, 
who tend to belong to the upper-middle class and have well-established 
relationships with local politicians. This class is based within academic or 
professional organisations, decentralised public agencies, NGOS, political 
parties or civil associations; all of which are interested in shaping the direction 
of local policies. 
The empirical findings show the potential of governance for creating more plural 
structures (including stakeholder participation). But, just as new plural forms of 
organisation were promoted, new factors obstructing complete inclusion 
emerged. The dominance of certain partners over others, problems in 
accounting to the general public, and the rivalry between private stakeholders 
(as opposed to other forms of political participation) are examples of these 
obstructing factors. The following chapter compares the role of these 
partnerships with other forms of political participation. 
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Chapter 8- Participation in the historic-centres: partnerships 
and other approaches 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the link between social mobilisation and the emergence 
of regulatory frameworks for participation within urban policies. The participation 
in public affairs of Navistas, the upper-middle class and popular-urban 
mobilisation, is considered as illustrative of the relationship between municipal 
government and contemporary local civil society (based on Diani, 2001; 
Foweraker; 1995). 
The two historic-centre partnerships are compared with other organisational 
arrangements in which social participation is promoted by the local 
governments of SLP and Queretaro. These participation initiatives respond to 
fiscal decentralisation policies and to the democratisation process, and in 
particular, to the decentralised national planning system. This institutional 
framework encourages localities to promote their own economic development, 
at the same time taking political participation into account. This combination of 
processes of decentralisation and democratisation exemplifies the 
denationalisation-of-statehood trend that characterises entrepreneurial cities. 
The chapter also considers informal organisational arrangements between 
governmental stakeholders and citizens or members of social organisations to 
promote urban planning. Informal arrangements are understood here as those 
mechanisms with no official document or regulation supporting or guiding them, 
but that are publicly known and, to some extent, accepted by society. 
The chapter categorises three approaches to participation: expert councils, 
neighbourhood boards and urban-popular negotiations. These approaches are 
categorised as official and contingent. The first section discusses the operation 
of the official expert councils or committees (i. e. historic-centre partnerships). 
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The second section analyses the neighbourhood participation boards, also 
classified as official. The third section discusses the negotiating sessions with 
popular-urban groups, in particular with street vendors which are categorised as 
contingent. Table 8.1 summarises the classification on approaches and 
categories of participation. Through this classification, it is argued that urban 
competitiveness in Queretaro and San Luis Potosi is supported through ideas of 
democracy and governance, formulated on a local, daily basis. 
Table 8.1. The categorisation of participation forms 
Categories Official (based on Contingent (informal 
regulatory framework or arrangements to support 
official documentation) official category) 
Particpative - Expert councils or - Urban-popular groups approaches committees negotiations (street 
- Neighbourhood vendors) 
participation boards 
8.1. `Official' expert councils or committees 
The expert councils or committees (ECs) are categorised as `official'. I chose 
this latter term to refer to those participative approaches that respond to the 
legal frameworks, plans, and programmes established by national and local 
governments. In the case of the ECs, a legal framework referred to their 
existence but did not cover their operation in detail. Neighbourhood participation 
boards are also categorised under the term `official', but they are discussed in 
Section 8.2. The national system of planning and participation did not establish 
different forms of participation. However, the implementation of these national 
guidelines prompted local governments to create expert councils or committees 
and neighbourhood participation boards. 
The ECs were created in the 1990s to help state and municipal authorities to 
design, implement, and evaluate planning programmes, subject to local 
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governments' development interests. 72 The historic centre partnerships can be 
considered a type of EC. As the focus of the chapter is to locate these 
partnerships within the broader context of participation, this section focuses on 
the municipal ECs that had an impact in the historic-centre development in SLP 
and Queretaro. The ECs' functions related to urban development were broadly 
defined by the Urban Code of Queretaro State and by the Urban Development 
Law of SLP State. 
The majority of these ECs were considered permanent bodies of civil (political) 
participation that aimed to advise municipal governments on human settlements 
and land-use planning within the main `population centres'. In general, EC 
members served for the same administrative period as any municipal 
government, and when a new administration took office, the members changed 
subject to the new municipal president's invitation. However, there were some 
exceptions independent of political administrative periods, including the historic- 
centre regeneration partnerships. Representatives from professional and 
academic organisations, business associations, worker unions and sometimes 
other popular associations with a strong representation in the municipality, were 
generally invited to the ECs. 
An example, different from the historic-centre partnerships, were the urban 
development ECs. They can be seen as municipal partnerships due to the 
existence of a coalition of interests drawn from the public and the private 
sectors in order to prepare and oversee an agreed strategy regarding land use. 
According to the Urban Development Law of SLP State, the urban development 
EC in each municipality had to submit agreements made to their respective 
municipal congress for approval. This congress had the capacity to reject the 
agreement in a partial or total way. But, once the points in the agreement were 
approved they had to be respected in order to, for example, protect ecological 
zones or promote industrial infrastructure. A similar process was followed in 
72 The policy development arenas commonly found were: health, education, environment, urban 
development, public safety, administrative accountability and transparency. 
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Queretaro after this type of EC agreed on an urban development municipal plan 
(CUEQ, 1992). These processes show that agreement and collaboration 
existed, at least for setting the urban political agenda. 
However, in the municipality of SLP the last time the urban development EC 
was formed was during the period 1997-2000 (based on interview SLP 3); 
afterwards the municipality seemed to depend on the decisions taken by the 
corresponding state level EC (also formed of the representatives of 
professional, academic, business and other social organisations). The case of 
SLP exemplifies the relaxed political environment for updating the municipal EC 
to higher levels of regulation. Even though this was not observed in the case of 
Queretaro, the freedom that the municipal president had in choosing the council 
members revealed their flexible operation (RSCMPS_Qro, 1998: art. 14, frac II). 
Additionally, the lack of internal guidelines on how ECs in both SLP and 
Queretaro worked and on how decisions were taken, accentuate the level of 
informality in which this type of method has developed since the 1990s. 
In Queretaro, another example of ECs was the `thematic councils' which formed 
part of the broader System of Social Participation Councils (see Figure 8.1). In 
the case of SLP the `municipal auxiliary organisms' aimed to carry out tasks that 
benefited the general public. Inter-municipal bodies, trusts and partnerships 
were considered as auxiliary bodies (RIFOAM_SLP, 1998). The auxiliary 
organisms complemented the structure formed by the Citizen Organisms (CO) 
(see Figure 8.2). 
In particular, the Historic Centre Consultative Council in SLP and the Historic 
Centre Board in Queretaro (Chapter 7) had a more formal structure than other 
urban development ECs, but similar to the thematic councils in Queretaro or 
other auxiliary organisms in SLP. The higher level of formality was based on a 
legal framework justifying their existence, as well as on an internal regulation 
establishing the organisation's aims, projects, and administrative operations 
(including their increased autonomy from political administration periods). The 
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historic-centre partnerships show a tendency towards municipal decentralisation 
and governance between different tiers of government and between the public 
and the private sectors. 
The fieldwork identified three general factors that promoted the ECs' level of 
formality: 
" decentralisation at the municipal level that strengthened urban planning and 
acted as a counterweight to the figure of the municipal president (as an 
interviewee stated `to make of the city mayor an administrator of ideas' - 
interview: QR 19); 
9 continuation of urban development and planning policies between political 
administrations; 
9 organisational structures that involved political participation. 
The advantage of having citizens participating in the ECs was that they 
continued being citizens, interested in improving and developing the 
municipality (independent from the political party interests or political 
administrative periods to which a politician might be subject to). This advantage 
supports the participation of long lasting and prestigious organisations in the 
localities such as universities, professional associations, and business groups 
which showed, in the past, their interest in getting involved in public affairs. Box 
8.1 provides some examples. 
Box 8.1. Why did civil organisation representatives participate in the ECs? 
The background that the Autonomous University of SLP had in criticising an 
authoritarian and corrupt regime (during Navismo in the late 1950s), in addition to 
the prestige of being a centre where technical knowledge was concentrated, were 
factors that could explain why university representatives were invited to form of 
the ECs in SLP, this includes the HCCC 
The participation of the COPARMEX and CANACO, in the early 1990s, in pro- 
democracy mobilisation at the national and local levels was a factor that could 
have prompted their members to participate in the ECs and increase their political 
participation in other matters. Appendix 1 details the case of various mayors in 
SLP and Queretaro. 
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Nevertheless one of the limitations of ECs was their membership profile, 
consisting of citizens with academic or technical knowledge (based on 
RSCMPS, 1998). These people could be considered privileged as they 
represented the middle and upper-middle classes. This factor reveals that the 
promotion of ECs can tend to be more plural (as various organisations are 
invited), but selective insofar as a citizen had to fulfil the municipal 
government's expectations. 
Expert and technical knowledge was needed in the EC meetings as urban 
planning, architectural restoration, education methods, pollution levels, and the 
extinction of species were apparently discussed (interview QRO 6 and informal 
discussion with a member of the Centro de Informaciön Ambiental). A politician 
in Queretaro stated that technical knowledge was needed as the citizens' daily 
experience was not sufficient for the task; instead agreements should be based 
on `hard data' analysis (interview QRO 16 bis). From this rationale, it can be 
argued that a risk of some citizens participating in the hard data elaboration is 
that of creating a distance between those with higher education and ordinary 
(and probably uneducated and marginalised) citizens. 
Another limitation of the ECs was their lack of coordination with other forms of 
participation, for instance between the HCCC or the HCB and the 
neighbourhood boards in the city centre. The lack of coordination was partly 
due to a weak municipal capacity in creating the necessary infrastructure for 
political participative approaches to interact. But another reason related to the 
differences in interests between the citizens participating in historic-centre 
regeneration partnerships and the citizens in the neighbourhood boards. It 
seemed that upper-middle class citizens were motivated to participate beyond 
the provision of basic urban services (drainage, sewerage, and road pavement) 
such as urban re-imaging. In contrast, low-income families focused on the 
attainment of urban services which in some cases contradicted the regeneration 
projects. For example, a lower-middle neighbourhood in the city centre of SLP 
wanted the streets asphalted rather than cobbled as the former style was more 
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resistant to holes. But the HCCC preferred cobbled streets to maintain the 
character of the city centre (based on interviews SLP 14). 
Another example of the lack of coordination among forms of participation was 
found in the Regulation of Municipal Councils of Social Participation in 
Queretaro. The regulation stated that the thematic councils should advise the 
neighbourhood boards on the feasibility of a project. However, in practice the 
support that these councils could offer to the boards did not exist due to the 
aims and operative restrictions imposed by regulation (see Box 8.2). 
Box 8.2. Thematic councils and neighbourhood participation boards in Queretaro 
According to the Regulation of Municipal Councils of Social Participation, 
thematic councils should advise the neighbourhood participation boards on the 
feasibility of a project. When a project referred to urban development, the 
thematic council on urban development was the one held responsible. However, 
this council was not able to give advice to the neighbourhood board. The Local 
regulation was specific only on the delivering and executing of urban minor works 
(i. e. street pavement, sewerage cleaning, road asphalting) rather than more 
general service improvement where thematic councils could have a say 
(interview QR 11). This obstacle emanated from municipal government's reliance 
on federal government regulation (related to Branch 33 funds) which earmarked 
the resources for public works rather than for service improvement mechanisms 
(i. e. giving advice on the feasibility of a project). 
In sum, a participative segregation appeared to develop in SLP and Queretaro; 
first, because of the mechanisms derived from national and local regulatory 
frameworks and the government's lack of capacity-building; and second, 
because of differences in interests among citizens. The following section 
develops this argument further. 
8.2. `Official` neighbourhood participation boards 
These neighbourhood boards emanate from federal decentralisation projects 
and institutions, such as the COPLADEs and the COPLADEMs, established to 
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coordinate the planning efforts between the three levels of government. 73 
Although the ECs also emanated form the decentralised planning system, the 
neighbourhood participation boards were covered by more explicit regulations 
than the former. 
The system of participation in Queretaro was named the System of Social 
Participation Councils (SSPC), while in SLP it was known as the System of 
Participation (SP). These systems of participation had an impact across the 
whole municipality; however, the analysis in this section is based on those 
neighbourhoods located in the city centre area. 
Although these municipal systems were designed to incorporate their own local 
forms of participation, they mainly relied on the decentralising policies that 
federal government has promoted since the 1990s. Thus, the SSPC and the SP 
became the umbrella systems through which the COPLADEMs planned, among 
other topics, urban policies. Consequently, a close relationship existed between 
the Social Development Agreement, the Fiscal Coordination Law (specifically 
the FAISM and FAFM in Branch 33) and complementary local regulations (see 
Appendix 3). 
Despite the fact that the SSPC and the SP promoted citizen participation 
beyond the neighbourhood level, the neighbourhood was the main unit upon 
which the systems were based. In the next subsections that follow this point will 
be developed, alongside the consideration of participative segregation identified 
between historic-centre partnerships and the neighbourhood boards (especially 
those within the city centre). 
73 The COPLADE was generally headed by the state governor. Other members were 
representatives of state and federal secretariats, municipal presidents (which 
head the 
COPLADEM in their municipality), and representatives from the private sector (which could 
have been the same as those participating in the COPLADEM). In the case of Queretaro the 




8.2.1. The System of Social Participation Councils in Queretaro. This 
system was designed during the municipal administration 1994-1997. The 
introduction of this system divided the municipality into seven micro-regions 
called `delegations'. The 1994 regulation, however, had an ambiguous 
operating structure which did not detail the process of decision making 
(SMPS_QRO, 1994, interview QRO 14). In 1998, the regulation of the social 
participation system was reformed by Mayor Garrido (1997-2000). In this 
version the operation and coordination of the system was more detailed 
(RSCMPS, 1998). New classifications were introduced specifying the tasks to 
be assigned to each council forming the system. Within this reform, the 
municipality remained divided into 7 delegations, and during the 2000-03 
administration the delegations were subdivided into approximately 40 regions 
and 400 neighbourhood committees (interview QRO 5). 
This reform classified four types of participation councils, structured in a 
hierarchical way, as shown in Figure 8.1: 
Figure 8.1. System of Social Participation Councils in the Municipality of 
Queretaro 
Citizen Consultative 
Council = COPLADEM 





Source: Manual de Consejos de Participaciön Social 2000-03 
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The 'neighbourhood committees' were formed by residents of the same 
neighbourhood. Each committee had a board formed by a president, secretary, 
and treasurer. These posts were democratically elected by their residents. 
These committees were either prompted by municipal government or were 
autonomously formed. 74 The 'regional councils' were formed by neighbourhood- 
committee presidents within the same zone (these zones were officially termed 
as `regions'). Each delegation was subdivided into regions; in the case of the 
Historic Centre Delegation, encompassing both the historic centre and the 
surrounding neighbourhoods, it was subdivided into 5 regions and had 97 
neighbourhood committees (RPPCH, 2000). 
According to the SSPC regulation the decision making process was as follows. 
Each neighbourhood committee had to prioritise its needs in relation to the 
provision of minor urban works delivered by municipal government. During the 
regional councils each neighbourhood president presented his/her 
neighbourhood priorities. From the total of priorities listed by each 
neighbourhood president, the whole council voted for the five most important or 
urgent works that the region needed. The criteria to prioritise needs were based 
on the poorest and marginalised neighbourhoods (informal discussion with a 
member of staff of the Municipal Social Development Secretariat). A 
representative from the Social Participation Secretariat was responsible for 
chairing these meetings. A representative of the municipal congress also 
attended the meetings as a way of linking the priorities taken by the 
communities with the decisions taken by the congress subject to the 
municipality's budget and plans. 75 
74 When promoted by government it meant that citizens were asked to create a committee 
representing the neighbourhood by electing the members of the board (discussion with staff at 
the Municipal Social Development Secretariat). Many of the autonomously formed committees 
were legally constituted and registered as civil associations several years before the reform was 
introduced (approximately 5 to 10 years - interviews: QRO 6, QRO 11, QRO 13). 
75 However, the attendance of some of members from the municipal congress started to be 
more frequent during the 2003-06 administration (observation during 
Regional Meeting 
3/08/2004, supported by interview QRO_ 14) 
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Once prioritised, the five needs of each region in a delegation were then 
discussed by the `delegational council'. The delegational council was formed by 
municipal government representatives, 76 neighbourhood presidents elected by 
their regional council, and a citizen (also participating in the neighbourhood 
committees) who was in charge of monitoring the discussions' transparency. In 
the delegational meetings, the audience was informed of final decisions (based 
on technical and budget restrictions). However, the audience did not take a 
direct decision upon the delegation's needs. The final decisions were taken by a 
`citizen consultative council' formed by municipal government representatives 
(some of whom were in the delegational council), seven persons invited by the 
municipal president and seven citizens from the thematic councils (or ECs) 
(RSCMPS, 1998). " 
According to the Regulation of the System of Social Participation Municipal 
Councils (RSCMPS, 1998: Art. 21), the thematic councils (represented by 
citizens with academic and professional expertise on a specific topic) had to 
advise to the whole system of participation. However, thematic councils offered 
advice to the delegational meetings and, if appointed by the mayor, to the 
consultative council meetings too. The thematic councils did not provide support 
at the regional level because the regional meetings in the Historic Centre 
Delegation were not fully implemented by 2003. Specifically, some residents 
and staff from the Social Participation Secretariat believed that the lack of 
compromise from the historic centre delegate, during the Garcia administration, 
76 The municipal government officers were the Delegate, an attorney inspector, and a 
representative of the Social Participation Secretariat. 
" The consultative council was the equivalent to the COPLADEM. It was formed 
by the 
municipal president, members of the municipal congress, representatives 
from state 
government agencies, and members of the private sector such as professional and 
business 
groups and representatives of neighbourhood associations. 
The governmental representatives 
were the mayor, representatives from the Municipal 
Secretariats of Social Participation and the 
attorney office, the seven delegates appointed by 
the municipal president, and a municipal 
congress representative. 
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constituted the principal obstruction to implementation of the system in the area 
(interview QRO 6 and informal discussion with member of staff of the Municipal 
Social Development Secretariat). "' 
A second reason why thematic councils did not participate in the neighbourhood 
committees and regional councils was due to the limitations imposed by the 
regulation (see Box 8.2). A third reason is linked to a particularity: on several 
occasions I observed that the members of the thematic councils were also 
members of the neighbourhood boards. This dual membership provided an 
informal but direct way of knowing what was happening between the two levels 
of participation because the same people were involved in the two tiers of 
participation (observation health thematic council 15/07/2004 and supported by 
interview QRO 6). Many of these people with a dual function lived in middle 
class neighbourhoods such as Carretas, Jardines de Queretaro, and Ninos 
Heroes. Not surprisingly, they were also worried about the conservation of the 
historic centre (interview QRO 6, informal discussion with a member of the 
Centro de Informaciön Ambiental). This observation hence raises issues about 
exclusion within this segmented system of participation. 
From my fieldwork it was not evident how the decision making process within 
the citizen consultative council worked. It was not clear who formed that council, 
how often it met, and even less how decisions were taken. It seemed that the 
78 In this delegation regional councils started to operate in mid 2004. By the time the fieldwork 
was carried out, I observed first, that several neighbourhood presidents representing a region 
did not argue in favour of the region but in favour of their neighbourhood. Second, during the 
regional meetings they encountered problems on how to prioritise needs; for example, to 
prioritise the need for pluvial drainage (which was crucial during rainy seasons) in one 
neighbourhood over the need for street lighting in another which had been asking for the service 
for 20 years (interviews QRO 11, QRO-13). 
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consultative council was a 'black box' which made decisions that had to be 
implemented. 79 
What was decided by the consultative council was published in bulletins 
referred to as the Operative Annual Programme Reports. In these bulletins the 
amount of money allocated by federal government (Branch 33 funds) to the 
municipality was published, as well as how the money was spent on minor 
public works. They specified what works were done in each delegation and the 
neighbourhoods and number of residents who benefited. However, they did not 
describe the process of prioritisation. In other words, there was no registration 
of all the priorities listed from the neighbourhood committees passing through 
the regional and delegational councils, meaning that the criteria used by the 
citizen consultative council to take the final decisions were not publicly known. 
Based on Figure 8.1, it can be argued that the decision making carried out by 
the neighbourhood system represented three quarters of the process, whereas 
a quarter was ambiguously decided by the consultative council. The 
neighbourhood board helped municipal government to set the agenda on how 
the budget was going to be spent, while the consultative council had the final 
say. It cannot be denied that the neighbourhood boards had a level of 
participation in the policymaking of the municipality's minor urban works. 
However, it should not be forgotten that some agents had better opportunities to 
participate, as during the `black box' process. " 
79 Unfortunately, there were no archived reports or documents found where this process could 
have been explained. Instead I could have interviewed the officers in charge during the 
administration 2000-03, however, further time was needed to have been able to trace them. 
80 For example, the system's regulation established that some thematic councillors were able 
to 
participate in the black box process; however I found evidence where 
thematic councillors 
argued that authorities undermined their decision during the 
delegational meetings (minute 
28/08/2002 in DPSV, 2000-03). 
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Despite the SSPC being carefully regulated, especially in relation to 
neighbourhood participation, some flexibility was shown in relation to both the 
influence that thematic councils had upon the consultative council decisions and 
the consultative council's own mechanisms for decision making. The different 
bodies of participation within the SSPC, and the top discretionary mechanisms, 
support the argument on how old and new institutions can be identified within 
the reconfiguration of the state at the local level. On the one hand, the creation 
of additional bodies that promoted political participation is observed through the 
SSPC. On the other hand, the prevalence of an old version of centralised 
decision making from a nucleus (i. e. consultative council) is observed. 
Specifically, the informal arrangements achieved by the consultative council 
without being explicitly informed to the public undermine accountability, similar 
to the old regime's fashion. Thus it is observed how more participatory 
democratic mechanisms tended to be implemented, while at the same time, that 
outmoded mechanisms of decision making used by the top council prevail. 
The awareness of unequal decision making was observed through Mayor 
Garcia's actions, which supported the creation of the Historic Centre Board, as 
well as of the Institute of Municipal Planning (IMPLAN) and the Queretan 
Environment Trust (FIQMA). These ECs aimed to undermine the local elite 
informal arrangements by formalising citizen participation within urban planning 
decisions. However, three aspects limited the full achievement of the aim. The 
first aspect concerned participation being dominated by citizens with higher 
education, generally concentrated in the middle class (interviews QR 9, 
QRO 20). The second aspect was the lack of coordination between HCB, 
IMPLAN and FIQMA and between these last three and the neighbourhood 
boards in the SSPC. 81 The third aspect concerns the freedom that a new 
municipal president had to ignore what the citizens in these organisational 
81 I observed that some attempts to link all these forms of participation existed. However, they 
were at a very initial stage. The HCB and IMPLAN organised presentations within the SSPC 
meetings to publicise their aims and to invite people to participate in their open workshops 
(DPSV, 2000-03 and observation in delegational meeting 29/07/2004). 
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structures wanted. An example of this was observed during the Rivera 
administration (2003-06) through the lack of financial support to the HCB and 
Mayor Rivera's absence in the IMPLAN meetings (where expert citizens had a 
say - interview QR 9). Finally, the lack of open discontent among citizens when 
government undermined their viewpoints, revealed a degree of exclusion. 82 
The analysis of the SSPC and the ECs in Queretaro shows how the inequality 
in policy decision making (based on resources, skills and organisation) is 
reflected in the types of participative approach promoted by government (official 
category), which tend to form a segregated system of participation. 
8.2.2. System of Participation in San Luis Potosi. The SP was formed by two 
bodies: `citizen organisms' and `auxiliary organisms' (or ECs). Citizen organisms 
(COs) aimed to complement ECs, under which boards and partnerships 
between the public and private sectors were classified. I believe that the 
complementary role established by the municipal regulatory framework did not 
state clear links for articulating auxiliary and citizen bodies. As a result, a distant 
relationship was observed between the COs and ECs such as the Historic 
Centre Consultative Council (see Figure 8.2). 
Some precedents promoting public-private partnerships were the 1958 state 
law that established neighbourhood improvement boards (NIBs) to help local 
authorities with the execution of projects, and the 1966 State Law of Service 
and Works Boards that preceded the 1998 Municipal Regulation on Auxiliary 
Organisms. Nevertheless, it was not until the mid 1980s that political 
participation began to feature in the planning process. This was further 
reinforced by the State Planning Law (2001) and the state and municipal 
development plans during the 1990s. The precedents of the private and social 
sectors participating with government provided a basis for old organisational 
structures to address modern needs in order to comply with the 
federal 
82 However for several officials, the passive participation from the majority of citizens was 
due to 
their lack of interest in intervening in public affairs (interviews: QRO 
16, QRO 13). 
203 
decentralisation process. For example, the NIBs 1958 Law was useful for the 
pro-Navista administration to publish the 1990 NIBs regulation at the municipal 
level. Afterwards, in the 1997-2000 administration, this regulation was updated 
following the COPLADEM requirements. 83 
Figure 8.2 depicts the citizen organisms and the auxiliary organisms working as 
parallel but separate structures. In particular, the COs were formed of NIBs and 
the Municipal Council of Social Development (CMDS). The set of `other 
organisms' refers to the future creation of other citizen organisms (based on 
RIOPC, 1997). Even though the CMDS existed as an independent body from 
the NIBs, the neighbourhood remained as the main unit on which the whole 
system of CO was based. 
The urban area of SLP was divided into 7 zones. The division was based upon 
the chronological urban growth that the city had encountered rather than on an 
administrative basis as in the case of Queretaro. Each zone was divided into 
subzones and each subzone contained between 8-10 neighbourhoods. Zone 1 
or the central zone encompassed the historic centre area which was divided 
into 10 subzones and 154 neighbourhoods (CPU_doc1). Specifically the historic 
centre comprised seven neighbourhoods. 
83 The Administration Law of Transferred Allocations to the State and Municipalities of San Luis 
Potosi established how the COPLADEM is linked to the federal allocation system established 
by 
the Agreement of Social Development and the Branch 33 of the Fiscal Coordination Law. 
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Figure 8.2. System of Participation in the Municipality of SLP 
Citizen organisms 
CMDS = COPLADEM 
NIBS 
Other organisms 




(i. e. HCCC) 
The influence that the NIBs had in relation to policymaking referred to minor 
urban works only. Based on this, I observed that the decision process worked 
as follows: Each neighbourhood had to democratically elect a board formed by 
a president, secretary and treasurer. The board's working period lasted only as 
long as the municipal administrative period, so when a new government came 
into office elections would be carried out in each neighbourhood (a second re- 
election was possible but as a maximum - RIOFAM, 1998). Each 
neighbourhood prioritised the needs of the community and then the board 
presented its petitions to the Direction of Citizen Participation (DCP). 
The DCP then channelled the neighbourhoods' demands to the respective 
municipal department. 84 These departments were in charge of deciding whether 
a demand was technically and financially feasible. Alternatively, the NIBs could 
have stated their demands through the Citizen Wednesdays Programme, the 
84 For example if a neighbourhood needed its streets to be paved then the demand would be 
channelled to the Public Works Direction and so on. The demands however could regard other 
petitions apart from minor works and still they would be channelled to the correspondent 
department. In that case, the demand would be sponsored from the municipal budget rather 
than from the resources of Branch 33. 
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Municipal Coordination of Citizen Attention Oust opposition groups), or through 
personal relationships with political parties, politicians (mayor, municipal 
congress-people, deputies), or philanthropic NGOs (based on interviews 
SLP 14, SLP 20). 85 
Simultaneously, the DCP invited all neighbourhood boards to participate in 
general elections to vote for a subzone representative, who gained a seat on 
the CMDS. Each of these representatives was informed by the DCP about the 
demands that the neighbourhoods in the subzone made. Consequently, the 
representative monitored that these demands were discussed in the council's 
meetings. The members forming this council were the subzone representatives 
and four public officers. 86 Each member had the right to vote and the municipal 
president had also the power of veto (RI, 2002). 
The CMDS had to decide on the urban infrastructure projects proposed by the 
NIBs, by the municipal president or by either of his cabinet members. This 
range of proposals meant that the decisions taken by the council did not only 
cover the minor public works demanded by the NIBs but also major works such 
as road communication networks (which had started to be seen since the end of 
the 1990s - interview SLP 3 and CPU_doc2). The decisions made were 
subject to the amount of resources allocated by the two municipal funds in 
Branch 33.87 In the case of minor works, when they benefited a neighbourhood 
85 The Citizen Wednesdays Programme allowed citizens to enquire or complain of any 
municipal service in a direct way with any public officer, including the mayor. This programme 
was run every fortnight. Queretaro also had the same programme but it ran weekly in all seven 
delegations. 
86 The number of subzone representatives varied according to the municipal administration in 
charge. Between 1997-2003 the average number of citizen representatives was 70, but in 2003- 
06 this number was 42 (ACDSM_2000-04; interview SLPR_2). The public officers were the 
municipal president, the director of citizen participation, and two members of the municipal 
congress (RI, 2002). 
87 These two funds are the same as in Queretaro: Infrastructure Municipal Fund and Municipal 
Enhancement Fund. 
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area, the residents who benefited most directly had to cooperate with a 5-30% 
of the total cost. 88 
By comparing the processes of decision making between the cases of 
Queretaro and SLP, I observed that in the latter the process was clearer and 
less hierarchical. The clarity of the process was observed through the COs' 
regulations and the CMDS internal regulation. Additionally, the open invitation 
that the CMDS made to external observers offered a more comprehensive 
understanding of the decision-making process. To put it another way, no `black 
box' was found in this process. 
It was less hierarchical as the system of citizen participation did not involve the 
number of filters (different types of councils) that Queretaro presented. Also, the 
system seemed more inclusive with the possibility of an ordinary citizen (with 
primary education only) becoming part of the CMDS. Furthermore, the 
opportunity that citizen councillors had for voting on aspects of major public 
works (i. e. bridges connecting motorways) involved them more in the 
municipality's urban transformation process (based on interview SLP 10). 
I perceived that one of the reasons that the SLP citizen inclusion in the decision 
making process was more open and accountable was due to the legacies of 
Navismo (see Section 6.8 and Appendix 1). This mobilisation aimed for 
accountability (especially on the use of public monies scrutinised by citizens) 
and the importance of the neighbourhood as the organisational nucleus of the 
municipality's development. Additionally, the enforcement given to the operation 
and coordination of the CMDS by the administration of Mayor Zapata (a 
Navista) in 1997 could also be considered as an enabling factor. 
However, some aspects were observed that undermined the participation of 
citizens in this council. First, it is worth mentioning that Mr. Zapata's strategy for 
88 In theory, the percentage varied based on a progressive criterion of neighbourhood income 
(GBS, 2000-03). 
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enhancing the CMDS's operation coincided with the first round of federal 
allocations distributed to municipal governments (interview: SLP 2). These 
allocations required a degree of social participation to help decide on how the 
resources were going to be spent. This point underlines the influence of federal 
policies in promoting participation. Second, during the administration 2000-03, 
Mayor Marcelo de los Santos demonstrated particular special interest in citizen- 
councillors deciding on major urban works. According to one of these 
councillors the opinion of citizens was genuinely taken into account by Mayor de 
los Santos (interview QRO 10). Nevertheless it is perhaps possible that Mr. de 
los Santos encouraged the citizen's opinions due to his interest in becoming 
state governor in the 2003 elections, which he in fact achieved. This point 
underlines how a politician's interests can help to promote a culture of 
participation. 
Third, in each new administration the municipal president, supported by the 
municipal congress, was able to determine the number of citizen councillors in 
the MCSD. This implied that the number of subzones was modified depending 
on the number of citizen councillors. What I observed was that a tendency 
prevailed to reduce the number of citizen councillors representing, as a result, 
enlarged (surface) subzones (see footnote 85). With a smaller number of citizen 
councillors it was easier to take decisions in the CMDS meetings. Moreover, 
each new municipal administration could also determine the percentage of 
resources, from the two funds in Branch 33, on which the CMDS decided. 
These two aspects illustrate how the rules of the game could be established 
according to the government's interests. 89 
89 During the administration of 2003-06 the CMDS was able to decide upon the fund of 
municipal enhancement only. The council stopped having power of decision over the fund of 
municipal infrastructure, which had a bigger bid. The justification for this change was an 
ambiguous interpretation between the Fiscal Coordination Law and the State Law of Federal 
Allocations for the State and the Municipalities of SLP. It was believed that this decision was 
taken to guarantee that those resources were used for the construction of road networks, 




Fourth, the training that citizen-councillors had to enable them to understand the 
objectives and operations of the CMDS was not appropriate. I observed that to 
take decisions on the execution of projects, knowledge of public accountancy 
was required. In 2004, the training course on the operation of the Branch 33 
funds started when the seventh session of the council was already carried out 
and some decisions had already been made (observation during the CMDS 10th 
ordinary meeting, 28/10/2004, supported by discussion with the Director of 
Citizen Participation). There was an opportunity for former citizen councillors 
(who had accumulated knowledge and skills during the previous 
administrations) to teach newcomers. However, this option was not considered 
by the DCP (interview SLP 10). So without proper training (at the appropriate 
time) and with no possible contact with former councillors, the new councillors 
arrived at the CMDS sessions without having a clear idea what their 
participation actually involved. 90 
Furthermore, citizen-councillors and the NIBs, according to regulation, had to 
inspect and evaluate the public works done based on quality measures. This 
implied that citizens possessed technical skills related to engineering or 
architecture which would enable them to evaluate whether a construction was 
built appropriately. However, this type of training was not provided by DPC or 
any other municipal office, leaving citizens to evaluate works based on their 
personal experience (based on interview SLP 10). 
Finally, the lack of articulation between the system of citizen bodies (NIBs and 
CMDS) and the auxiliary organisms (i. e. HCCC) obstructed the achievements of 
common objectives. For example, the lack of networking between these forms 
of participation was observed through the HCCC staff, who were conscious of 
90 It could have been the case that the councillors with no higher education were in a more 
disadvantaged position than those that had it. For example, one subzone representative was an 
accountant and had more understanding of how the MCDS decisions worked (based on 
interview SLP 16). 
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the need to improve street asphalting and housing (also listed within the NIBs 
demands - interview SLP_14) but who remained passive in coordinating efforts 
with the DCP or the CMDS. The perception of a lack of articulation between the 
historic-centre partnership and the neighbourhood boards is based on the fact 
that the HCCC, after four years of existence, focused only on obtaining the 
world heritage nomination, without creating an organisational infrastructure to 
promote the inclusion of the historic centre NIBs in the partnership's activities. 
The narrow aims of the HCCC can be part of the reason why the NIBs and the 
partnership were so distant organisationally speaking. This lack of collaboration 
and networking accentuated, from my point of view, the segregation between 
the COs (participation of ordinary citizens) and the auxiliary organisms or ECs 
(participation of highly educated citizens). Box 8.3 exemplifies this argument. 
Box 8.3. The participation of the middle class within the COs 
According to a public officer who worked in the Direction of Citizen Participation 
(during 1997-2003), the middle class neighbourhoods were not interested in 
participating in the COs. In some cases it was observed that upper-middle boards 
participated in the system because residents aimed to attack a particular 
nuisance (i. e. a bar establishment in a residential area). That was the case of 
Zone 2 were 12 neighbourhood boards were formed and only one represented 
an upper-middle neighbourhood (Lomas), the rest were from the Garita a low 
income neighbourhood. Zones 3,4 and 5 showed a concentration of the boards 
in the system because they were inhabited by members of the working class and 
immigrants (from rural areas and other cities). Zone 1 -or city centre - was also 
under-represented because of its more commercial profile and the abandonment 
of its neighbourhoods by middle income families (based on interview SLP_12). 
Nevertheless, there were cases where middle class neighbourhoods in Zone 1 
participated, such as Himno Nacional. This board started to participate in 2000 as 
before that date their residents were unaware of the system (interview SLP 16). 
In summary, the official category encompassing ECs and the neighbourhood 
participation boards revealed that these two forms of participation worked as a 
mechanism to involve different levels of participation in urban policy decisions. 
As a result, a two-tier participation system was observed, as the ECs 
represented more highly educated citizens while neighbourhood boards tended 
to represent cit izens with only basic educatio n. Because of the skills and 
knowledge that the former citizens had, they had a better opportunity to 
influence policy decisions, especially regarding planning. In contrast, ordinary 
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citizens participated more in expressing their experience to help set the criteria 
on how the funds of Branch 33 had to be spent. 
It was argued that the SLP's experience with Navismo built a more open and 
transparent system compared with Queretaro. However, in both municipalities 
informal arrangements or flexibilities undermined ordinary citizen interests, 
although regulations sought to overcome this problem. This was observed by 
the freedom that municipal presidents had in changing the rules on what 
citizens could decide (i. e. any change in the number of citizen councillors on the 
CMDS) and in their ability to undermine the citizens' participation by ignoring 
the meetings in which officers and citizens had a say (as in the lack of support 
for the NCB's projects during the first year of the Rivera administration and the 
shallow training that citizen councillors had for the CMDS meetings). It was this 
flexibility, and the presence of special arrangements, which limited participation 
despite an inclusive rhetoric. The following section illustrates how informal 
arrangements can also be created with a different type of citizen; this is based 
on the third participative approach (see Table 8.1). 
8.3. Urban-popular group negotiations 
Urban-popular group negotiations are encompassed by the contingent category. 
This category is different to the official type, as the negotiating mechanisms did 
not become part of the official organisational structure. In contrast to the ECs or 
neighbourhood participation boards, the urban-popular group negotiations were 
a form of political participation which did not undergo regulation or possess any 
written document about their formation or operation (at least none publicly 
known), nor any specific mechanism of continuity between administrations. 
Instead participation, under the contingent category, worked as a tool for sorting 
out problems that the administration in office encountered in achieving specific 
goals. The contingent nature depended to a certain point on the willingness of 
the municipal president and the abilities of his cabinet to create temporary 
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organisational structures to cope with expected but imprecise reactions from 
those opposing groups. 91 To bring the account to life, this section focuses on 
street vendor organisations (a type of opposing group) in the city centres of 
Queretaro and SLP. 
8.3.1. The case of street vendors in Queretaro. This case became well 
known among neighbouring municipalities, especially among those governed by 
the PAN. The innovation of this case lay in the negotiations achieved between 
government and street vendor groups (Pardo, 2002). These negotiations 
emerged during the Garrido administration which aimed to relocate, order, and 
standardize the street stalls throughout the city centre (PDM 1997-2000). By the 
time the Historic Centre Board was founded the regeneration projects were 
more easily carried out, partly because the strongest problems with street 
vendors in the area were overcome by 2001. 
During the Garrido administration, there was a sub-programme called 
Encuentros (1998-2000) which aimed to seat at the same table business- 
people, street vendor leaders, and municipal government (as chair) in order to 
create solutions that led to a win-win situation for all commercial activities 
developed in the city centre. Encuentros was strongly supported by various 
business groups such as the CANACO, the Historic Centre Entrepreneurial 
Group, Coparmex, and citizens interested in the matter. All these organisations 
knew beforehand the objectives of Encuentros (interview QRO 1). This 
advance information may have biased negotiations towards business and 
middle-class interests; however, street vendors' opinions were also considered 
during the meetings. The bias supported the understanding that municipal 
government and formal shop-owners in the city centre had towards street 
vending. Generally, street vending was considered by formal shop-owners as 
`disloyal competition' as the products sold in their shops were also sold in the 
91 Opposing groups are autonomously created groups, which work collectively and 
that due to 
their political force (and in some cases radicalism), they 
do no accept the methods of political 
participation established by government. 
212 
streets but at lower prices (interviews QRO-12, SLP 8). However, the products 
sold on the streets did not have any guarantee nor did they follow the quality 
prerequisites determined by the Federal Consumer Attorney. Additionally, the 
street stall owners did not pay any type of taxes (social security, profit tax, 
wages, services like electricity, the use of a public space, extraordinary licenses 
for advertising sales, etc. ). Furthermore, due to the irregularities already 
encountered, the environment was conducive for some street vendors to sell 
illegal products, promoting piracy and smuggling. 
In contrast, street vendors argued that this type of vending was an `honest' way 
of living. The advantages were a higher monetary gain than the minimum wage 
obtained from the formal sector and a degree of flexibility in working hours 
(Osorio, 1994). 92 Originally, it was believed that street vendors came from 
marginalized backgrounds, such as in the case of indigenous groups selling 
handicrafts. However, I observed that more educated people from middle-lower 
income families participated as well (based on interviews: QRO-_8, QRO 9, 
SLP 19). The increase in the informal sector across the country during the past 
ten years, prompted politicians to consider street vending as a social and 
economic problem which could not be solved through direct eradication (as SLP 
attempted in 1993), but only by finding alternatives to regulate formal and 
informal trade (based on interview QRO 16 bis, SLPR 1). 
The awareness that society in Queretaro had towards street vending created an 
easy collaboration between municipal government and the private sector 
representing the middle class (i. e. professional organisations, residents, the 
Church - St Claire, 2000), especially small and local entrepreneurs and 
residents that frequented the city centre. Consequently, municipal government 
sought an alternative that would support the reordering programme by creating 
92 It is also important to consider that the average open unemployment rate in Queretaro, 
during 
1993-2000, was of 4.2%, higher than the national rate of 3.8%. The level of unemployment can 
be considered a reason for prompting people to look for a productive activity within 
the informal 
sector (based on ENEU-INEGI, www. inegi. gob. mx/cgi-win/bdieintsi. exe, 
17/05/2005). 
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"allies [private sector] and weakening enemies [street vendor organisations]" 
(interview QRO 1, my translation). 
The arrangements achieved with the allied group were, first, that only street 
vendors selling traditional products could stay within the core of the city centre. 93 
Formal businesses did not want to get rid off traditional handicrafts as they were 
considered a city-centre attraction. Second, the street vendors selling products 
similar to those sold shops were relocated to the peripheries of the city to 
diminish `disloyal' competition. Thirdly, the appearance of the remaining stalls in 
the centre was improved and standardized to maintain an image of order and 
cleanliness. 94 Finally, the private groups supporting Encuentros published in the 
local newspapers their support and the need for regularising street vending (i. e. 
CANACO urging for street vending regularisation - Diario de Queretaro, 
29/01/1998). 
After the 1998 strategy of weakening street vendor organisations (by 
dismantling and imprisoning some of their leaders - see Appendix 1), the 
municipal government invited all street vendors to propose ideas on how and 
where their stalls could be relocated. Approximately 57 proposals were received 
(interview QRO 1). From those the most feasible in financial and technical 
terms were to be discussed in the sessions where all those concerned 
participated (businesspeople, street vendor leaders, municipal authorities). 
Finally, Mayor Garrido and his staff had a final word on what decision to make. 
The various proposals did not only come from the private sector but also from 
street vendors. For example, one proposal from an old street vendor to relocate 
the vendors in the limits of a roundabout outside the hospital zone (located at 
93 Traditional goods and services refer to the handicrafts produced by local groups or activities 
carried out for many decades (such as the sale of balloons, fruit and home made crisps and 
shoe polishing). 
94 In 1996 Queretaro attained the world heritage nomination so, the need to improve the image 
of the area was important. 
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the outskirts of the historic centre -interview QR 6) was followed by the 
government. Another example was that of the vendors located in the Alameda 
Park. In particular these vendors, affiliated to the FCPU, stopped the authorities 
from relocating them out of the city centre. As a result, the union remained but 
in a restricted area of the park (interview QRO 8). This arrangement was not 
what the allied group had in mind as it wanted a park free of street vendors. 
However, the arrangement did persuade the union to standardize their stalls 
(based on the union's own design criteria) and a wall was built to cover the 
stalls that surrounded the park. This example shows how Encuentros created a 
negotiating environment between all parts, municipal government being the 
broker to attain a more or less `balanced' result. 
From these negotiations municipal government also accrued some benefits. By 
relocating street vendors, the government was able to raise a census within the 
city centre boundaries. Also the number of vendors in the centre was reduced. 95 
The criteria for selecting the vendors remaining in the area were the number of 
years they had been in business, their geographical origin and their annual 
income. Additionally, one stall per family was assigned as a maximum within the 
central area. Accompanying the stall standardization, the government also 
repainted walls, re-paved streets and carried out underground cabling of the 
electricity used by the stalls. With all these modifications street vendors started 
paying three types of taxes: an annual license or permit to sell, monthly 
electricity bills, the use of public space, and the rent of the cart substituting the 
irregular stalls when applicable (informal interview QR_6). 
By the end of 2000, street vending in the historic centre had been reorganised. 
This policy was attained by the willingness of Mayor Garrido to control street 
vending despite the social conflicts that this decision implied (interview QRO 1). 
95 The number of stalls in Alameda Park was reduced from 900 to 350; and in the central alleys 
from 250 to 115 stalls. The vendors who did not remain in the city centre were relocated to open 
markets set up in the peripheries of the city (called tianguis). During 
1997-2000 a total of 6000 
(approximately) worked in the city centre (interview QR 6). 
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In the end, the Garrido administration considered there was more gain than 
loss, as the city centre was considered `the pride' of Queretaro. It was perceived 
that this achievement generated social support which advanced Mayor 
Garrido's political career (as he was elected governor in 2003). This social 
content was observed through local newspapers (at the time) and hotel chains 
expressing their gratification at the relocation of street vendors (interview 
QR 12). Also, some residents living in the area suggested that living through 
the `chaotic period' again was undesirable (interview QRO 11). Even some 
street vendors (those selling traditional goods) expressed their satisfaction with 
these negotiations due to the tranquillity in which they subsequently developed 
their business (as the threats of being displaced by the police were over - 
interview QRO 9). But the FCPU did not have good memories of the Garrido 
administration due to the constant confrontations between the two sides. 
However, the ability of municipal government to accept the proposals suggested 
by FCPU made the union more inclined to accept the new rules of the game. 
However, the street vendor policy had further social implications that are related 
to repressive actions during the authoritarian reigme. The 1997-2000 municipal 
administration together with the state administrations (1997-2003,2003-09) 
became known as repressors of popular organisations. This was observed in 
the statements by popular group leaders such as FIOZ and the Antorchista 
Movement 
'They [state and municipal governments] are planning to disintegrate those 
organisations that have been the first in supporting citizenship, now government 
judges us as criminals and a jeopardy to society' (stated by Sergio Jeronimo in 
La Tribuna Universitaria, 10/03/1998, my translation). 
`They [Governor Garrido and his cabinet] state that their administration... does 
not deal with organisations but with individual citizens... however, these people 
have never explained the motives that support this statement, on the contrary 
they are violating... the ninth article of the Constitution of the Republic [which 
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states the freedom to act collectively]' (declared by Aquiles Cördova, 
17/09/2004, www. antorchacampesian. org. mx/articulos, my translation). 
These statements reflect a serious downside to the local panista 
administrations, which dimantled popular organisations and invited them, 
instead, to participate in the methods pertaining to the official category, as the 
sole mode of communication. It can be argued that local government had 
dismantled popular organisations as a reaction against clientelistic relationships 
between popular organisations and the old priista regime (see Section 6.5 and 
Appendix 1). As a result, popular organisations such as FIOZ were dismantled, 
or they learned to deal with these new administrations by relying on opposition 
political parties (i. e. FCPU to the PRD) and by adapting themselves into the 
official participatory structures (i. e. Cooperativa Artesanos de Libertad who 
became a micro-entrepreneurial association to promote handicrafts sold on the 
streets). The paradox, however, lies in the government's acceptance of 
professional or business organisations participating in the ECs but rejection of 
popular organisations, independent from governmental structures. 
The repression against popular groups in February 1998 (see Appendix 1) 
illustrates the schizophrenic meaning of participation within the political 
discourse. This relies on the use of physical repression followed up by the 
strategy of participation and negotiation with street vendors in the historic 
centre. Even though the repression against popular riots were not part of the 
municipal plan, there was no doubt that they helped the Garrido administration 
to gain allies in order to carry out the reorganisation of street vending. 
It was mentioned at the start of this section that the contingent category works 
as a tool for sorting out problems in order to achieve government goals. The 
negotiations carried out with street vendors during the Garrido administration 
are a clear example of this. The street vending reorganisation in the city centre 
meant getting involved with opposing groups through repressing mechanisms 
intended to attenuate their reactive behaviour, and afterwards through 
negotiating schemes. These schemes had the opportunity to become part of 
the 
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political discourse of participation, in a more sustained way. This continuity 
could have been promoted by subsequent administrations. However, the 
negotiating process that was developed (as an innovative organisational 
structure during 1997-2000) was undermined by the Garcia administration 
which did not promote the integration of street vendors in the public 
consultations and events organised by the HCB or the IMPLAN. Instead, the 
officers in charge of organising these events decided not to invite street vendors 
due to their reactive behaviour (interview QR 12). These aspects show that the 
relocation policy had an instrumental purpose which did not help to break the 
stigma against street vending. 
In summary, the street vending case in Queretaro shows that, despite the 
positive aspects that the negotiating sessions produced in terms of creating a 
more inclusive participative environment, limits existed within and after the 
Garrido administration. These were the weakening of popular organisations, 
since the incident in 1998, and the lack of political continuity that the 
negotiations had with new forms of organisation like the HCB. These aspects all 
reveal a limited interest in urban reimaging as a way of maintaining urban 
entrepreneurship, and the existence of informal arrangements that, in the end, 
seemed to favour the local elite (politicians, business groups, professionals). 
8.3.2. The case of street vendors in San Luis Potosi. A conflict was also 
encountered with street vendors in 1993. However, the socio-political context of 
the municipality was different to Queretaro. The city centre encountered a 
chaotic situation similar to the previous case. The `disloyal' competition of street 
vending prompted formal businesses to use stalls out of their shops to compete 
on a similar basis. Thus serious commercial disorder was caused by informal 
and formal vendors (interview SLP 8, SLP 13). 
The disadvantage that established shops encountered (by paying taxes and 
following regulations), prompted shop owners to close their businesses for one 
day and demonstrate outside the city hall. This mobilisation was led by various 
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members of Nuestro Centro (which was the city centre entrepreneurial 
association with close links to the CANACO in SLP). Nuestro Centro, years later 
became a member in the HCCC. However, I observed that its role in the 
partnership was very passive. 
This business mobilisation surprised governmental authorities; as a result, 
federal government put pressure on state and municipal governments to 
collaborate on attaining order. 96 But in contrast to Queretaro, the actions taken 
at that time by Governor Sanchez and Mayor Leal tended to eradicate rather 
than negotiate with street vendors. In this case, the reason to eradicate street 
vendors relied basically on the antagonism that local businesses had against 
them rather than being mixed with image `boosterism'. 
The eradication policy caused harsh reactions from several organisations such 
as the Union del Centro (interview SLP 17). In this case one of its leaders was 
imprisoned for demonstrating against this political decision. To compensate for 
the eradication, municipal and state governments decided to construct two in- 
door markets so that the vendors affected could move in. However, this strategy 
did not work, as one of the markets was used as storage and the other was 
used as a street fight arena, while vendors kept selling on the streets (based on 
own observations and interview SLP 13). 
I was able to identify three reasons why this strategy was so unsuccessful. The 
first one refers to a cultural belief, which emphasised that customers were 
attracted more easily by standing in the streets rather than being in an enclosed 
place. The second refers to the government's incompetence in not convincing 
water and telephone companies to establish a payment branch in the market 
(based on interview SLP_20). With this type of service people might have been 
attracted to the market and the first reason would have been resolved, but this 
96 It is important to remember that in 1991 SLP emerged from a strong political conflict headed 
by Navismo. The 1993 disorder in the city centre could have been considered as a possible 
threat to political stability and thus the need to control any possible social disorder. 
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was never attained. Finally, the clientelistic relations between some street 
vendor leaders and political parties (especially with the PRI) convinced vendors 
to move away in the immediate period; but the needs of the people (who made 
their living from vending) and the 1995 economic crisis (which accentuated 
unemployment and reduced consumption acquisitive power), increased the 
number of street vendors once again (interview SLPR 1). 97 
Furthermore, many of the street vendors who sold in Las Vias Street on 
Sundays (in the periphery of the central zone) also owned a formal shop in the 
city centre. Thus vendors acted as both formal and informal businesses, 
simultaneously. The reason for this was the low sales that businesses in the 
centre faced, partly because of low demand but also because of the arrival of 
retail centres in the city since the end of the 1990s. Big retailers (with 
transnational and national capital) attracted people to the peripheries of the city, 
affecting the concentration of trade that characterised the city centre as the 
main place for shopping (interviews: SLP 13, SLP 17). 
Even though Nuestro Centro recognised that street vending increased during 
the last ten years, its members were not willing to start another demonstration 
like the one they initiated in 1993 (interview SLP 13). This was partly because 
the seriousness of the problem had not reached the chaotic level encountered 
in the city centre in 1993; and partly because the main streets and plazas (until 
mid 2004) were still free from street vending, resulting from the 1993 policy. But 
another reason why Nuestro Centro members did not react as radically as in 
1993 was because of its awareness that many of the local shop-owners in the 
city centre were also involved in the informal sector, as in the case of Las Vias 
Street. The ambiguous situation that many of the shop-owners faced suggests 
97 According to an ex- leader, street vendors in the central zone, in 1993, were near 1000, 
whereas in 2004 street vendors increased to 3000 (interview: SLP 17). However an official 
document reported that during 2000-03 the total number of street vendors in the city centre was 
of 1130. (CCA SLP, 2000-03). The biggest organisation of street vendors in the city centre was 
the Antorchista Movement representing 20% of the vendors during 2000-03. 
220 
that Nuestro Centro did not feel it had the full support and capacity to start 
another strong demonstration against street vending. Besides, its concern 
started to focus on making its members more competitive in relation to the big 
retailers (interview SLP 8). 
Informal sector activities were not easy to control from the municipal level as 
employment policies were managed by state and federal governments. As a 
result, municipal governments had to create alternatives to find a balance 
between the two. Queretaro did it throughout its negotiations in the late 1990s. 
In the case of SLP, the 1993 eradication policy exacted a high price from Mayor 
Leal's political career (lack of popular support - based on interviews: SLP 8, 
SLP 20). This may suggest that his experience taught subsequent politicians to 
be more tolerant towards street vending, or oppositional groups in general. 98 
This more tolerant behaviour was observed in the negotiating sessions that the 
Municipal Department of Commerce started to hold in mid 2004 (interview: 
SLP 17, SLP 13). These sessions attempted to follow a process similar to the 
one implemented in Queretaro. Different street vendor organisations, local 
business, primary school representatives, Church representatives, and 
universities were invited to the sessions. The main actors, however, were street 
vendor representatives and local businesses located in the city centre (based 
on interviews SLP 13, SLP 17). The idea accompanying these sessions was 
that of urban re-imaging, a strategy that had became more important since local 
governments wanted to attain the world heritage nomination. In this first stage 
of the negotiations only traditional street vendors were involved, while other 
98 This argument is supported through the existence of the Coordination of Citizen Attention 
Office which was in charge of assisting opposing group demands such as those of the 
Antorchista Movement. This unit supplemented the Direction of Citizen Participation and Citizen 
Wednesdays. If a opposing group's claim was supported by the municipal president, then it was 
possible that part of the resources from Branch 33 were directed to cover these demands 
instead of following the MCSD decisions (interviews: SLPR 4, SLP 10). 
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types of vendors were supposed to be involved at a second stage. 99 
Nevertheless, the impression that some informants had regarding these 
negotiations was not very positive. They thought municipal government was 
only aiming to beautify the area instead of helping street vendors to co-exist 
with the historic centre's regeneration. 10° As an informal vendor expressed: 
`To be honest, all of this seems to be a simulacrum [referring to the negotiating 
sessions].. . [The municipal authorities and formal shop owners'] real aim is to 
relocate us, to send us to the boundaries. They do not want to mention the word 
relocation, but that is the truth that nobody wants to recognise' (interview 
SLP 17, my translation). 
From my perspective, this distrust suggests that the experiences learnt through 
negotiation and collaboration within the contingent category encounter a 
problem of sustainability. The problem is partly a result of the lack of a 
regulatory framework for the management and decision making process. But 
the problem also arises from this category's instrumental character which drew 
on both repressive and consensual policies to attain an adequate political 
environment for historic centre regeneration. 
With regard to the relationship between the HCCC and street vendors, is worth 
mentioning that the relationship was just as distant as the one between HCCC 
and the NIBs. Furthermore, the HCCC considered that, when social conflicts 
arose, local government was there to solve them (see Section 7.4.4). This 
99 I could not gain access to the documents that the Direction of Commerce held regarding the 
negotiating sessions. I knew about their existence based on what interviewees said. The access 
to this material was completely denied. This reaction in addition to the secrecy that a previous 
officer (with knowledge of street vending) asked of me during the interview, suggest that street 
vending was a very delicate subject. 
100 Part of this distrust was based on what had been heard about Queretaro. Those negotiations 
were considered fake as in the end municipal government did not care about 
the conditions in 
which vendors worked outside the city centre. 
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shows how new participative organisations, such as public-private partnerships, 
were not internalising the responsibilities that a more active society involved. 
The survival of street vendor organisations in Queretaro and SLP was achieved 
through their ability to build networks with political parties that offered them a 
more formal organisation and more strength to face governmental decisions. 
That was the case of those vendors affiliated to the FCPU in Queretaro and to 
the Antorchista Movement in SLP (for more details see Appendix 1 Sec. 2). 
Street vendor organisations, and in general those organisations representing 
the informal sector, were considered of relevance by municipal governments. 
This recognition was observed through the increasing tolerance towards this 
type of vendors through the creation of organisational structures that allowed 
their participation in the implementation of the city centre regeneration (which 
also reflect the previous mobilisations organised by local businesses). However, 
this type of inclusion did not seek to change the stigma that described informal 
vending as reactive, illegal, and `disloyal' towards other sectors of society. 
In addition to the stigma created, the limitations that the municipalities of SLP 
and Queretaro showed in integrating street vendor negotiations with other 
approaches to participation (i. e. ECs or neighbourhood boards) revealed the 
limits to inclusion environment within collaboration for the regeneration of the 
historic centre. These points underline the way in which the contingent category 
works as a strategy where old institutions (repression and co-optation) prevail 
within the same dimension as new institutions (promoting collaboration and 
pluralism). 
Conclusions 
This chapter discussed the three approaches to participation identified in the 
municipalities of Queretaro and San Luis Potosi. By categorising them as 
official and contingent, it was argued that the expert councils and the 
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neighbourhood boards were officially regulated; in contrast to the negotiations 
between urban-popular groups and municipal governments. 
Although these approaches to participation, specifically the ECs, focused on 
other policy arenas such as health and education, they were important in 
promoting urban planning, regeneration and image `boosterism'. These 
approaches reflected, to a certain extent, the different social mobilisations that 
the municipalities encountered during the 1990s: the legacies of Navismo in 
SLP, the urban-popular mobilisations (representing informal vending), and the 
upper-middle class mobilisations (in favour of a more accountable and plural 
regime). 
The legacies of Navismo were observed in the creation of neighbourhood 
boards in the municipality of SLP. Upper-middle class legacies were observed 
in the participation of ECs such as the historic-centre partnerships, as well as in 
the frequent involvement of local entrepreneurs into local politics. The popular 
organisation legacies were observed in local governments' development of 
more standardised ways of negotiating with street vendors. In other words, each 
form of participation was associated with a particular social mobilisation. 
Nevertheless, differences existed in the way each form of participation worked. 
The differences relied on regulatory frameworks that enforced their operation 
and on the informal arrangements that moulded their operation and final 
decisions. Despite the fact that urban-popular negotiations were particularly 
vulnerable to informal organisational arrangements, due to their lack of a 
regulatory framework, these also existed arrangements within the ECs and 
neighbourhood boards. This observation underscores the importance of 
informal arrangements in both the official and contingent categories. These 
arrangements were in part dependent on the municipal president's 
understanding of inclusion and social participation (i. e. in Queretaro - the 
creation of more municipal bodies that brought more citizen inclusion into the 
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planning process; and in SLP - mayors being able to change the number of 
citizen councillors within the CMDS). 
The participative segmentation (formed by the lack of articulation between ECs 
and neighbourhood boards) tended to contain and channel the social 
mobilisations of the 1990s, along with the political discretion of local leaders. 
These factors contributed to the formation of a structure that limited the 
possibilities of participation. However, having such a structure in place paid lip 
service to the notion of inclusiveness and, once contained in a legal and official 
framework, set parameters that might eventually be accepted. In this sense, a 
limiting structure was produced out of the rhetoric and popular demand for 
democratisation. The discourse of participation and increased participative 
awareness, in the context of important limitations, enhances formal 
collaboration, but also finds ways to obstruct a genuine and inclusive 
participation of all social groups. That was the case in examples such as the 
obscure process of decision making in the citizen consultative council in 
Queretaro; the limitations that the citizen councils encountered when 
participating in the CMDS sessions; the lack of trust that street vendor 
organisations had towards municipal government, and the lack of articulation of 
historic-centre partnerships with other forms of participation. It seems that the 
local elite interests (politicians and entrepreneurs) were `constrained' to adopt a 
discourse of democracy and inclusive participation (based on Roberts, 2005: 
120), which had been imposed on them by federal government in following the 
denationalisation trend. 
Throughout the chapter the central role of government (at all levels) in 
promoting and implementing the whole participatory system was revealed. This 
responded to the fiscal decentralisation of Branch 33 (specifically the two funds 
earmarking municipal development) which required citizen participation to set 
the agenda on how the resources were to be spent. However, the 
implementation of the whole decentralisation process has prompted local 
governments to create at least three approaches to participation. Even though 
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there was a planned linkage between the three, especially with the ECs and the 
neighbourhood boards, the coordination between themselves was weak and 
even weaker when urban-popular negotiations are also considered. 
The role of municipal government was significant. It was the primary 
stakeholder promoting civil and social participation and collaboration between 
the three levels of government and the public and the private sectors. 
Interestingly, local governments designed forms of participation that promoted a 
more democratic society, based on the legacy of social mobilisations. In many 
of the cases these mobilisations had a national impact on the democratisation 
process such as Navismo or business chambers such as Coparmex and 
CANACO. Despite their national impact, some local effects were observed in 
the legacies left upon urban political matters through expert councils and in the 
creation or modifications of local laws and regulations enforcing political 
participation. In the case of street vendor negotiations, they tended to be more 
formalised through a more structured mechanism that broke with old, 
clientelistic arrangements. However, the negotiations maintained a stigmatising 
character that segmented them from other forms of participation. 
Within a context of the denationalisation trend and of cross sector participation 
supporting urban entrepreneurialism, this chapter concludes that the 
governmental apparatus in the municipalities of Queretaro and SLP played a 
significant role in motivating civil society to participate, through the structures 
formed during the 1990 social mobilisations. Particularly, the preference shown 
for involving the upper-middle class in ECs, such as in urban regeneration 
partnerships, emphasises the segmented system of participation that these 
municipalities have embedded. The differences in how citizens can participate 
underline how governance, in itself, can magnify pluralism and the active 
participation of citizens in policy decision. The recognition of other theoretical 
tools such as urban regimes, participation and new institutionalism enables an 
analysis that digs further into findings, revealing the importance of informal 
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arrangements (putting limits on political participation) and the simultaneity of old 
and new institutions working together. 
The following chapter discusses how municipal governments, apart from 
responding to national decentralisation guidelines, they also reacted to an 
interweaving of international pressures and, specifically, local influences. 
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Chapter 9- The role of municipal centres: top-down and bottom-up influences 
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the third trend of urban entrepreneurialism - the 
internationalisation of the national state - and the local pressures that municipal 
governments encounter. This trend relates to the national-state's adjustments to 
international policies, based on a discourse of decentralisation and participation. 
This discourse has developed simultaneously with a reduction in state 
intervention, supported by the neoliberal policies that Mexico has been subject 
to since the 1980s. The adjustment to these policies can involve the creation of 
regeneration partnerships and other approaches to participation, at the 
municipal level. These organisational structures have been designed to 
maintain urban competitiveness and to create a more participatory and inclusive 
civil society. Through the regeneration of the city centre a transformation of 
space has been planned to create a local advantage. Space is understood in 
terms of social processes (in particular organisational structures) that result 
from changes in productive modes of capital and increasing globalisation 
(Massey, 1994). 
This chapter argues that these organisational structures are the response of 
municipal governments in Queretaro and SLP to national and international (top- 
down) policies of regeneration and participation. However, it is also argued that 
municipal policies are also subject to bottom-up pressures which originate from 
a social awareness of civil participation reflected in the intervention of local 
businesses in local politics and the conflicts arising from urban-popular groups. 
Under these types of pressure, from the top and the bottom, municipal 
governments search for policy approaches that allow them to carry out urban 
development. 
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The chapter examines, first, how municipal governments in SLP and Queretaro 
have followed international and national guidelines to promote urban 
development. The next section discusses how municipal governments are 
pushed away from the top-down discourse on inclusive participation due to local 
management failures and market rivalries. Finally, the last section discusses the 
manner in which these failures provide municipal government with flexibility to 
cope with the pressures coming from above and below. 
9.1. Municipal governments' response to top-down policies 
This section looks at how Queretaro and SLP municipal governments have 
responded to federal decentralisation policies which, at the same time, have 
complemented neoliberal policies recommended by international organisations - 
like the World Bank (World Bank) and the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), United Nations affiliated agencies such 
as UNESCO and UN-Habitat, and other international financial institutions as the 
Interamerican Development Bank (IDB). World Bank and OECD began to 
recognise, during the 1990s, that successful economic structural reforms in 
developing countries needed strong institutions to guarantee an effective use of 
the aid provided (OECD, 1998; Santiso, 2001). Particularly, this institutional 
strength was based on the concept of good governance (see Section 4.3.3). 
Good governance has encountered different definitions (Kjaer, 2004: 173); but 
its core features imply managing public affairs in a transparent, accountable and 
participatory manner to reduce corruption and strengthen `rule-bound behaviour' 
(Kjaer, 2004; Santiso, 2001). The existence of strong institutions has become 
so relevant in the case of the World Bank that financial aid is not only 
determined by the objective needs of a recipient country but also by its 
performance on implementing reforms in governance. 
I observed that three terms were used in the political discourse of 
international 
organisations and the municipalities under study: participation 
in public 
policymaking, the prevalence of the rule of law and 
the existence of regulatory 
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organisational structures. Civil society's involvement in public policymaking was 
observed through the participatory systems in Queretaro and SLP. These 
systems, despite their limitations, aimed for citizens and non-governmental 
stakeholders to be more proactive in the decisions regarding municipal urban 
infrastructure. 
The World Bank understands the `prevalence of the rule of law' as the 
"developing of sound financial markets with appropriate regulations and 
supervision, enhancing the legal and regulatory environments" (Santiso, 
2001: 15). In the case of the municipalities under study, I observed that the 
`prevalence of the rule of law' refers more to the creation of new state and 
municipal legal frameworks to regulate the operation or to complement the 
policy decisions taken; for example, the municipalisation of the police or the 
creation of the Street Commerce Regulation in Queretaro and SLP during the 
1990s. Even though the understanding of this point differs between the World 
Bank and the municipalities, it can be argued that they complement each other. 
The differences identified for each level of policy are natural if it is considered 
that the Bank has a global perspective on the development of markets (for 
which the financial sector matters), while the municipalities had a local 
perspective, in which the distinction between formal and informal sectors 
attained more importance for the development of local markets (OECD, 1998: 
92). 
The World Bank promotes the checks and balances through horizontal and 
vertical separation of powers (i. e. executive vs. legislative powers) (Santiso, 
2001). The case study municipalities promoted the creation of expert councils or 
neighbourhood boards to provide an additional counterweight to a sole 
individual's (i. e. mayor) decisions based on discretionary arrangements, even 
corruption. Thus the Bank recommends counterweights between the judicial, 
legislative and executive powers as a mode of promoting accountability within a 
nation, whereas these municipalities have strengthened the counterweights to 
the municipal stakeholders through different forms of participation. 
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There are cases in which the World Bank focuses on local aspects by 
sponsoring projects that diminished corruption. The case of the IMPLAN in 
Queretaro, sponsored by the World Bank and federal government, won the 
anticorruption project to define the land use of protected environmental areas. 
This was designed by enhancing information systems (i. e. the creation of 
documents and websites), the involvement of civil society (i. e. the creation of 
workshops and citizen councils), accountability, and by controlling the negative 
effects of discretionary (or informal) arrangements (IMPLAN_docl, 2004). The 
case of IMPLAN reveals the impact of international organisations upon 
municipalities. The links are dependent, however, upon regulatory guidance 
provided by federal government. This guidance can be reflected in fiscal and 
political decentralisation policies regarding urban planning and development 
and their incorporation of citizen participation in the legal framework (see 
Appendix 3 and Section 3.3.3). 
This guidance can be interpreted as part of state pro-activeness insofar as 
national-states adapt local organisational projects into international policies. 
This guidance does not necessarily undermine the role of the national-state, but 
shifts its functions towards becoming a vehicle of collective interest in an era 
that tends towards economic and political globalisation, which includes 
subnational reconfiguration (Brenner, 2004; Pierre & Peters, 2000). Policies of 
the federal government in Mexico have localised international recommendations 
related to the deconcentration of the industrial sector in Mexico City, to improve 
the transportation and communication systems, to revitalise city centres, and to 
promote awareness of environmental sustainability and participation among 
different tiers of government and civil society. All of these policies support the 
development of economic growth and help to diminish the rates of urban 
poverty (based on WB_MUDR, 2002). These policies were underlined in the 
National Urban Development Plan (1995-2000; 2000-06) and in the National 
Programme of Urban Development and Territorial Ordering (2000-06). 
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9.1.1. The regeneration of city centres. The preservation and regeneration of 
historic or sacred city centres have been considered in the international 
discourse as a source for building social self-esteem and sense of community 
(Serageldin et al., 2000). These two aspects, as a part of culture, are able to 
nurture economic development through social cohesion or social capital. The 
regeneration of city centres has been considered a leading action for economic 
transformation through the service sector (i. e. real estate, tourism, leisure). 
Thus, it is argued that this trend is generating "new employment opportunities, 
contributing to the increased production and consumption for cultural goods and 
services, and stimulating local art markets" (2000: xvi). Many of these 
opportunities take into consideration the creation of public-private partnerships 
(Bromley & Jones, 1999). 
The proactive role of the national-state can be exemplified in the 
recommendations of UNESCO-ICOMOS for conserving historic towns and the 
effect of this on the localities. These recommendations stated (a) the need for 
the prudence of a systematic approach and discipline for conserving an area 
and (b) the multidisciplinary studies that conservation plans should precede 
(WC, 1987). The statements above were very vague and a more specific 
strategy needed to be defined to implement them. 
In Mexico, during the 1980s, there was a lack of national guidance for 
establishing which specific organisations (apart from INAH) were responsible for 
developing a systematic methodology with a multidisciplinary focus. Despite the 
fact that the Monuments and Sites Law existed since 1972, it only justified the 
importance of conserving historic sites without establishing how to manage and 
implement their conservation. It was during the 1990s, with the creation of the 
Association of Mexican World Heritage Cities (AMWHC), in 1996, and through 
the 100 Cities Programme (1992) and the national programme Habitat (2000), 
that more specific guidelines were established. These guidelines provided more 
information on how heritage should be managed and financed at the local 
level. 
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The AMWHC was a national partnership formed by federal and state tourist 
offices and municipal agencies as well as by the private sector in each of the 
cities considered as world heritage. 101 Furthermore, this association had direct 
links with international organisations interested in funding historic sites around 
the globe. Thus one of its main purposes was to pool both national and 
international resources to promote the conservation of these cities. 102 
As its principal strategy, the association aimed at the creation of national and 
partial development plans that would guide the urbanisation of these cities. In 
particular, it promoted particular projects such as strategies to enhance the 
economic development of the historic centres; the updating of the Mexican 
world heritage legal framework; the renovation of urban furniture (i. e. benches, 
bins, street labels, street lamps, etc. ); illumination for historic monuments; and 
tourist publicity. I observed that some of these projects were carried out in 
Queretaro and SLP through the HCB and the HCCC, such as the updating of 
the street nomenclature sponsored by the Federal Tourism Secretariat. 
However, one of the limitations that this association had was its focus on image 
`boosterism'. I observed this through the projects that the HCB and the HCCC 
developed, which tended to improve urban image and infrastructure. Even 
though the association cared for land use regulation and local economic 
development, 103 these projects depended more on the strategies that local 
governments implemented to attain them. For example, municipal governments 
were the ones responsible for defining the land use throughout the city, as well 
as deciding on the strategies to enhance tourism and commerce (i. e. to build a 
museum or a shopping centre). 
101 There are nine cities in the country under this category: Mexico, Oaxaca, Puebla, 
Zacatecas, 
Morelia, Campeche, Queretaro, Guanajuato and Tlacotalpan. San Luis Potosi is not included 
but is aiming to attain that nomination. 
102See http: /www ciudadesmexicanaspatrimonio. org/index fla. htm 
103 In the case of the historic centres the land use has to be compatible with a mixed area were 
residential and commercial uses co-exist. 
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Regarding the inclusion of marginalised groups within the policies promoting 
conservation, UNESCO-ICOMOS suggested the involvement of residents living 
in the historic areas (WC, 1987). But rather than promoting a mere gentrification 
of the zone, the preservation of different social classes was promoted by 
including low-income housing projects. 104 It is the mix of social classes which 
has helped to maintain traditions within a neighbourhood, such as religious 
festivities. This inclusive recommendation was reflected locally in the strategies 
that the HCB and HCCC wanted to promote. However, the predominance of 
local elite interests within the partnerships in addition to the coordination costs 
obstructed the involvement of other popular groups. 
An example, mentioned in Chapter 7, was the improvement of housing within 
the historic centre of Queretaro. Many houses, considered historic, were 
occupied by low-income families, who did not have enough money to restore 
the house's facade or structure. An alternative was to provide these families 
with the necessary help via governmental subsidies and loans. However, the 
immense coordination that it implied to involve federal and state governmental 
agencies paralysed the HCB's activities. 
UNESCO's inclusive participation for the conservation of historic sites was 
reflected in the National Urban Development Programme during 1995-2000 and 
in the national programme Habitat. 105 The latter programme was coordinated by 
the Federal Social Development Secretariat in collaboration with state and 
municipal governments. Habitat's main aim was to alleviate poverty in urban 
localities. Specifically, there was a category that sponsored those cities with 
historic centres nominated as world heritage. The provision of urban equipment 
104 Gentrification means the occupancy of an abandoned area by upper-income people to 
economically revive the area, often resulting in displacement of low-income individuals/families. 
105 Habitat followed closely the recommendations stated by the UN-Istanbul Declaration on 
Human Settlements and a partial loan from the IDB in 2000 (see 
http'//wwN. unhabitat. org/delcarations/istabul a-S-P-; AUP_IDB, 2000). 
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and image improvement were considered as the principal actions within this 
category. 
Although direct participation of the residents was not emphasised in these 
actions, Habitat's general aims promoted the participation of residents and civil 
organisations in the execution of the works, or asked them to contribute with 
10% of the total costs of a project. 10' However, I observed that the residents' 
participation in the conservation of historic centres promoted by this programme 
was still limited; for example, the rehabilitation of the main streets in the centre 
of SLP did not include resident participation. However, a partial reason which 
could justify this case was the predominance of local businesses in the area. 107 
In summary, Queretaro and SLP had been influenced by top-down policies 
coming from international institutions. Internationally, governance has tended to 
refer to public matters being accountable and transparent. This requirement 
favoured strong institutions that could guarantee these characteristics. 
Particularly, the prevalence of the rule of law and of participatory organisational 
structures seemed to promote the collaboration between public and private 
sectors in an accountable way. 
Those aspects, brought forward to the municipal level, were translated into a 
concern for accountability and transparency in public matters, through the 
creation of additional counterweights to municipal politicians through 
partnerships and other approaches to participation. However, the municipalities' 
understanding of these terms would not have been as similar, in the cases of 
106 The rest was covered by federal and local governments based on interview SLP Obis and 
on: Formato para la asignaciön y operaciön de subsidios del programa Habitat, 
http: //www sedesolgob mx/subsecretarias/desarrollourbano/documentosdeinteres. htm 
downloaded 27/01/05) 
107 Even though SLP does not belong to the group of historic centres nominated as world 
heritage, its strenuous effort to attain the nomination has created an informal acceptance within 
Habitat's group of historic cities (interview: SLP 4bis). 
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SLP and Queretaro, without federal strategies promoting decentralisation and 
local governance. These strategies favoured: multi-level agreements between 
governments, the creation and modification of urban administrative and 
planning laws across the country, and the creation of official organisational 
structures such as the historic centre partnerships and neighbourhood boards. 
These examples illustrate an association with national policies and international 
recommendations; the urban space being the arena in which organisational 
structures and social relationships were built. 
9.2. Municipal governments' reaction to bottom-up pressures 
This section focuses on the limitations in the operation of the organisational 
structures influenced by top-down policies. It also focuses on the rivalries 
between local interests that made municipal governments react with different 
strategies (termed here as paradoxical strategies - Section 9.3). This reaction is 
understood, on the one hand, as the ability of municipal governments to create 
organisational structures that followed national urban planning guidelines; but, 
on the other hand, as involving an inability to maintain the genuine civil 
participation that the national and international discourse advocated. The 
section discusses the impact of local factors as they relate, first, to 
organisational structures and, second, to market rivalries. 
9.2.1. Organisational structures. The organisational structures that followed 
national urban policies were the historic-centre regeneration partnerships and 
the participation systems in Queretaro and SLP. These structures aimed to 
maintain urban competitiveness and innovation through the regeneration of the 
city centre and the inclusion of civil society into the urban policy process 
(including the city centre). However, a lack of accountability and the negative 
effects of informal arrangements used by municipal stakeholders, undermined 
the operation of these structures and, thus, of urban competitiveness and 
innovation. In order to exemplify the contradictions that municipal governments 
encountered, the cases of the Historic Centre Board in 
Queretaro and the 
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Municipal Council of Social Development in SLP are used. The case of the 
Historic Centre Consultative Council was not analysed due to the limited 
activities of the partnership, which focused only in obtaining the world heritage 
nomination. Its limited actions did not provide enough material to deepen my 
analysis, so the MCSD case was analysed instead. 
The first example in which municipal governments encountered problems when 
trying to comply with top-down policies was in the inability of the HCB, to be 
accountable to others. Chapter 7 mentioned some of the HCB's limitations 
regarding three main points: (a) the lack of a master plan where objectives, 
strategies and actions were stated, (b) the lack of open and clear accounts on 
how the HCB spent the money given by municipal government, and (c) the lack 
of a state or municipal regulation which could establish the codes of conduct, 
communication and operation within a public-private partnership. 
The case of the HCB showed, on the one hand, the intentions of municipal 
government to create new organisational structures where different sectors of 
society could collaborate. This partnership also showed the creation of an 
innovative structure to promote the continuity of conserving and regenerating 
the city centre. This continuity was revealed through the registration of the 
partnership as a civil association which aimed to counterweight municipal 
government's actions (Acta Constitutiva, 2001). But on the other hand, the 
secrecy of its operations and planning due to the lack of a detailed legal or 
official framework to establish codes of conduct broke with the conception of 
strong institutions that top-down declarations advocated. 
Additionally, the social reaction against the partnership's lack of accountability is 
also important (see Box 7.2). This reaction criticised the HCB's secret 
operations which were considered to benefit the partnership members' personal 
interests. In particular, the administration of public monies by a civil association 
on behalf of a public interest caused the greatest number of complaints, as this 
type of administrative arrangement had not been seen before or at least had not 
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been publicly known (interview QRO 14 and informal discussion with a member 
of the Centro de Informaciön Ambiental). 
The activities carried out by the HCB were accompanied in 2003 by the political 
instability that state and municipal elections generated. During this period the 
activities of the partnership were used in favour of or against Mayor Garcia's 
performance or the political party he represented, the PAN. The interest of 
Mayor Garcia in promoting the creation of the partnership in 2001, in addition to 
his regime's interest in promoting the city centre's economic development, 
revealed the close links between the HCB members and himself. As a result, 
this strategy was considered by some people as the personal project of Mayor 
Garcia reflected in his interest of becoming the board's development leader 
after his administration was over (interview QR 1). 
When Armando Rivera came into office (2003-06), the HCB's activities 
diminished as the new municipal administration seemed to have some 
reservations about it. These reservations can be explained, first, because 
Mayor Rivera did not have a strong interest in developing the city centre; 
instead his administration focused on infrastructure for water provision and anti- 
flooding. Second, the innovation of a civil association managing public monies 
caused distrust. Even though this arrangement was not illegal, it was supported 
by a loose regulatory framework. 108 I believe that this fault discouraged the 
Rivera administration from continuing with the HCB's development. 
Consequently, this decision undermined the activities of the partnership. This 
was because the innovation of bringing together the INAH, the Direction of 
Monuments and Sites and the private sector in the development of the city 
centre was disrupted by the lack of the mayor's support. As a result, these 
organisations remained fragmented; leaving the INAH and the Direction of 
Monuments and Sites in a more advantageous position than the HCB due to 
108 It was not illegal as the public resources were transferred to the partnership as a donation 
from municipal government. 
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their resources (knowledge, skills and technology) and their authoritative role 
(informal discussion with the INAH conservation staff and informal interview 
QR 3). 
A second example of the way in which municipal governments encountered 
problems when trying to comply with top-down policies was in the extent of 
citizen participation when deciding on minor urban works. Section 8.2.2 
discussed how the CMDS became an organisational structure to comply with 
the guidelines established by fiscal decentralisation policies to strengthen 
municipal infrastructure. 
This council followed a top-down policy (i. e. Branch 33) by incorporating the 
participation of neighbourhood residents into the decision making of the 
implementation stage. The council was subject to the amount of resources 
allocated by federal government as well as to the issues upon which these 
resources were to be spent. These issues regarded street paving, drainage, 
sewerage, street electrification, road networks, regeneration of community 
spaces (i. e. parks, temple restoration) and their maintenance. 
At first glance, the CMDS seemed to be a pluralistic promoter of participative 
democracy, accountable and legitimate: (a) pluralistic, as the council was 
formed by a range of different neighbourhood residents representing different 
zones within the municipality; (b) a promoter of participative democracy, as the 
residents or citizen councillors needed to get involved in public affairs regarding 
daily citizen's needs; (c) accountable, as the decisions on how to spend the 
funds were known by neighbourhood representatives and published once a 
year; 109 and (d) legitimate, as the decisions taken by municipal government on 
minor urban works were supported by local residents' needs, (represented by a 
citizen councillor). 
109 The outcomes were published once a year in joint with the Municipality Annual Report. 
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Despite the fact that the council was regulated by state laws and municipal 
regulations, 10 some discretionary arrangements were identified that weakened 
the council's participative nature. The discretionary measures related to the 
objectives that the municipal president had in developing social participation on 
issues related to urban works. Three factors illustrate these measures. The first 
one relates to the municipal president and his cabinet's ability to convince 
citizen councillors that a particular project was necessary for the city's 
development. The case of the road network infrastructure, in Box 9.1, helps in 
understanding this point. 
Box 9.1. Road network infrastructure as an example of urban modernisation 
The interest of SLP municipal presidents in enhancing the road network had been 
observed since 1997 (CPU_doc2,2004). This political strategy aimed to enhance the 
urban modernisation process of the municipality, considered as a trade hub. Some 
examples of the development of this road network concerned the peripheries of the 
city centre, such as: the Juarez Complex, Salvador Nava Circuit, and the Bocanegra 
Underpass. 111 The importance that the road network system had implied for the 
municipal administration since 1997 was transmitted during the CMDS's sessions. 
The ability to convince citizen councillors about the importance of this matter made 
them understand that not only were the coverage and maintenance of public services 
significant, but also the modernisation of the city as a prerequisite to attract 
investment and create jobs (interview: SLPR_2). A citizen councillor during Marcelo 
de los Santos' administration stated that: 
'Marcelo [also prioritised] ... road and 
bridge infrastructure. Some people were 
against these decisions... This people did not understand that this was a step 
towards modernising the city... in order to attract investment all this 
urbanisation was needed' (interview: SLP 10, my translation). 
The second factor relates to the opportunity that SLP's municipal presidents 
had to decide the number of citizen councillors, as discussed in Section 8.2.2. 
This decision was not unilateral as the municipal congress' approval was 
needed for the number to be passed. However, the tendency for a decreasing 
number of councillors from 1997 to 2003 illustrated that a preference existed 
towards a smaller group for taking decisions. 
110 Laws like: Administration Law of Transferred Allocations, Internal Regulation of the CMDS, 
Fiscal Coordination Law. 
"' These developments unite the centre of the city with the roads leading to other important 
cities in the region many of which are linked to the 
NAFTA route (number 57). 
240 
Finally, the third factor was reflected in the ambiguous statement of the Law of 
Federal Allocations for the State and Municipalities of SLP, which left unclear if 
municipal councils such as the CMDS had a full approval on both funds derived 
from Branch 33 (see Section 8.2.2). This ambiguity allowed the Pedroza 
administration (2003-06) to limit the CMDS's decision on the budget. In 2004, 
the CMDS was able only to decide upon the Social Infrastructure Fund, which 
curiously was the fund with the least amount of resources (interviews SLP 10 
and SLP 12, INAFED, 2005). 
These last points underline the operational variants within the CMDS which 
undermined its pluralistic, accountable and participative nature. The slowly 
decreasing number of citizen councillors and the radical change for the CMDS 
to decide upon the budget coming from Branch 33 can be considered as an 
instrumental strategy that seems to comply only with the rhetoric of 
inclusiveness. This rhetoric was accompanied by the local government's desire 
to achieve an effective road network (also considered a priority in the de los 
Santos administration as governor (2003-2009); El Heraldo de San Luis, 
5/05/2005) and, possibly, Mayor Pedroza's lack of experience in negotiating 
with social groups (which made him avoid dealings with large citizen groups 
during the policy process - based on interview SLP 12). 
Citizen groups expressed their disagreement with the tendencies followed by 
the CMDS through the local press (based on interview SLP 10). However, no 
other type of reaction was observed during the fieldwork that demonstrated, in a 
more explicit way, citizens' discontent. This makes me think that the 
neighbourhood boards' limited awareness prevented a stronger mobilisation 
against the changes led by municipal presidents. It is worth remembering that 
the NIBs were created as a structure of inclusion that was later merged with the 
CMDS to comply with the national decentralisation and planning policies. This 
prompted the municipality to look for strategies to develop a participatory 
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budget through the neighbourhood boards, leaving aside the training that citizen 
councillors needed to carry out a more representative or active role. 
In summary, this section underlines that, if operational processes are not well 
regulated, gaps can appear to undermine accountability and participation. 
These gaps mean that social groups were not included in the decision-making 
process in a genuine way. However, it is worth noticing that, at first glance, 
these municipalities were following with national and international aims that 
impact beyond the historical-centre area (i. e. CMDS). They followed the 
national and international requirements as long as the rule of law and the 
institutional checks and balances prevailed (i. e. the existence of partnerships 
and citizen participation methods). However, none of these top-down policies 
seemed to acknowledge the reality of personal political interests and citizen 
awareness as factors that undermine or promote accountability and 
participation. 
It cannot be denied that certain levels of pluralism have been enforced through 
top-down urban planning. This pluralism is represented in the coordination 
between different levels of government and civil society, represented mainly by 
business and professional groups. This pluralism did not exist during the 
authoritarian regime in such an institutionalised structure as it exists today (with 
organisations that continue through time based on regulatory frameworks). 
However, this pluralism has reached a point where shared responsibilities have 
been limited by new strategies or discretionary measures that seem to restrict 
its development (i. e. legal interpretations, operational failures). Thus political 
stakeholders' awareness appears to be a significant factor in developing a 
degree of inclusiveness and co-responsibility within organisational structures. 
This awareness involves finding a balance between top-down policies and 
bottom-up interests, within a context led by urban competitiveness. 
9.2.2. Market rivalries. I observed a rivalry between economic subsectors 
within the area of the historic centre. Previously it was noted that the historic 
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centre had been considered as a niche for investment. Consequently, this niche 
could contribute to the municipality's economic development. The 
transformation of this area has been relevant in attaining this development, 
especially through regeneration projects. 
During the fieldwork period, this regeneration ranged from street `beautification' 
(cleaning and gardening) through street pedestrianisation, to the substitution of 
traditional urban furniture for more modern designs. Other projects involved 
underground cabling and the changing of the water flow levels. These types of 
projects involved mainly local governments and the HCB or HCCC as 
coordinators. Projects that involved other types of actors were taken into 
account in both municipalities, such as the coordination between different levels 
of government to improve housing or a park's regeneration - in which real 
estate, leisure and commerce businesses were involved. However, the active 
participation of other actors such as urban popular groups or residents was 
undermined by the lack of coordination functions within the projects. 
In addition to the coordination difficulties, which can be associated with the 
dilemmas of organisational structure, both municipalities encountered problems 
regarding the rivalry among service and trade sectors. The first rivalry that I 
observed was between the formal and the informal groups. The `disloyal' 
competence which formal shop-owners accused street vendors of for selling the 
same products at a lower price, plus the degree of anarchic behaviour in 
invading the streets, pushed municipal and state governments to look for radical 
solutions to control the phenomenon. 
In both municipalities repression was the common mode to control street 
vending. The repression varied according to the extent to which government 
wanted either to eradicate or control the phenomenon. Both repressive and 
inclusive strategies (that invited vendors to contribute to the formulation of 
alternatives as discussed in Section 8.3) had socio-political implications. These 
implications were not considered by international and national agencies, but 
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had to be sorted out by municipal government and in some cases supported by 
state government. That was the case in regenerating the city centres in the 
country. This policy at first looked to re-image the area without taking into 
consideration the urban organisations affected. After the high political costs 
which were encountered, as in the case of the SLP repression, other 
municipalities started to negotiate with street vendors. 
The demands of the informal groups affected other institutional areas as well; 
for instance, the CMDS in SLP decided to divert resources for minor works to 
certain neighbourhoods to fulfil the demands of autonomous urban-popular 
mobilisations. The diversion of resources was arranged through the Municipal 
Coordination of Citizen Attention Office which assisted opposing group 
demands, such as the ones from organisations that tended to invade lands and 
represent street vendor interests (i. e. Antorchista Movement - interview 
SLPR 4). It is the existence of the informal sector and its close relationship with 
urban planning (i. e. regeneration and the regulation of land use) which 
distracted and delayed local government's compliance with national policies. In 
the course of the past decade, the municipalities of SLP and Queretaro 
continued with regeneration policies; however, social problems emerged that 
prompted them to act in a contradictory manner, using first repressive and then 
inclusive strategies (more details in Section 9.3.1). 
A second rivalry was between big retail companies and local shops situated in 
the city centre. Through the arrival of big retailers to Queretaro and SLP since 
the early 1990s, the city centres have been less visited by locals when doing 
their shopping (a perception noticed throughout informal discussions with shop- 
owners). Nevertheless, the city centres still encompass an important 
percentage of the commercial area in the city. In SLP's historic centre, 50% of 
the properties are used for commercial and service purposes (Dossier, 2004), 
whereas in Queretaro the percentage is about 42.5% (including residential and 
services - RPPCH, 2000). Small local shops, altogether, 
in these cities had an 
employment occupancy index as significant as the occupancy index reported for 
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big retail companies. 112 These data reveal that local businesses play an 
important role in the local economy; hence attracting big retail firms generates a 
sensitive issue for municipal government; despite the fact that the establishment 
of these big companies was considered an incentive to attract further capital 
investment. 1' 
Even though I did not observe any real opposition between local and retail 
business groups, I was able to perceive that this was a matter which could 
generate future political and social problems. The political impact that small 
local businesses generated when they demonstrated in the city centre streets of 
SLP and Queretaro (when threatened by street vendors) is an example of a 
bottom-up pressure on local governments. The small businesses' level of 
satisfaction was relevant to maintain local political stability. Furthermore, it was 
not in vain that small-shop entrepreneurs were involved in local politics by 
participating as candidates in pubic elections (see Appendix 1- Sec. 3). 
It is interesting to note that the rivalry between business groups also tended to 
generate competitiveness between urban areas within the same city (i. e. retail 
area vs. city centre). As a result, municipal government attempted to satisfy rival 
business groups by alternating policies that favoured first one and then the 
other. That was a problem identified in SLP where some entrepreneurs stated 
that the city had not found its vocation for an industrial centre, a tourist centre or 
trade hub (based on interviews SLP 9, SLPR 6). 
112 Based on BIE-INEGI (www. inegi. gob. mx, consulted 10/08/2004) the occupancy employment 
index in the city of Queretaro for small commerce businesses was of 99.9,83.55,92.49, and 
114.7 in 1994,1997,2000 and 2003, respectively. These are relatively higher than the big retail 
companies that reported an index of 100,86.9,88.6, and 90.28 in 1994,1997,2000 and 2003, 
respectively. Similar data for SLP reported an index of 100 in both categories; and in 2000 and 
2003 the big retail company index was slightly higher than the small shop index by: 103.6> 
94.05; 104.26>103, respectively, 
113 For example, the CEO of an industrial firm and his/her family's need for a shopping mall and 
other services in order to feel motivated to move in to a new city. 
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The third rivalry was based on a potential enmity between the tourist and the 
commercial sectors in the city centre. This rivalry is referred to as `potential' as 
no clear rivalry was observed during the fieldwork period. However, some of the 
informants' understanding showed how the two sectors were starting to 
compete with each other. The conflicts were related to the transformation of a 
locality which implicated the promotion of tourism vis-ä-vis the commercial 
sphere. Box 9.2 exemplifies this rivalry through the restoration of old buildings in 
the city centre for cultural purposes, such as galleries or museums. 
Box 9.2. The case of the Federico Silva Museum and the Post Office Building in 
SLP 
This museum was inaugurated in 2003. The building which housed the museum 
used to be a hospital and then a school for 300 years. Its location was in the core of 
the city centre, surrounded by local shops. The creation of this museum aimed to 
enrich the activities that could be carried out within the city centre. Especially, it 
targeted tourists and middle-class groups as a way to promote the cultural 
environment in the city. It also aimed to attract people who had stopped visiting the 
city centre. 
However some shop-owners, associated to Nuestro Centro, argued that the creation 
of the museum was a bad strategy as it was not attracting the number of people it 
expected. This because its commercial surroundings were not compatible with the 
atmosphere that the museum needed. This belief was based on the fact that the local 
shops aimed to target lower-middle class families who tend to be uninterested in 
visiting a cultural centre (interview SLP 8). 
This precedent questioned the use to be given to another neoclassical building where 
the Post Office was located. For some shop-owners, the building should have been 
used as a pay-bill centre rather than an art gallery, as was planned until mid 2004. 
They argued that if the latter option was chosen a similar situation would happen as 
with the museum. Instead, shop-owners argued that if the building were used as a 
pay-bill centre or as a restaurant (owned by a famous chain in Mexico called Cafe 
Sanborns) the place would be more compatible with the surroundings of the building 
(interview SLP 8). 
However, it is worth noting that this argument favoured the shop-owners' interests, as 
that use would attract more low income families interested in buying in their shops. 
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Box 9.3 provides another example based on the modification of the pavement 
height and the closure of streets for pedestrian use. 
Box 9.3. The change of pavement height and the fear of street vehicle closure in Queretaro 
As a way of promoting tourism in the city centre, the HCB thought of changing the 
height of the pavements, especially in those areas were plazas existed. The idea 
promoted the elimination of pavement to homogenise the level of the streets with the 
plaza. It aimed to make a more walker-friendly environment for locals and tourists. 
The implication of these changes was related to the prohibition of vehicles across 
these streets, especially because of the danger to pedestrians. This implication 
caused the opposing reaction of the Association of Entrepreneurs of the Historic 
Centre who argued that the street vehicle closure affected sales or profits (interview: 
SLP 12). 
The association sustained that by allowing vehicles to circulate along the streets 
motivated people to park and have a look at the shops. This argument was based on 
its past experience when street vendors occupied the streets by obstructing the 
vehicle flow. In the 1990s, street vending diminished the shop-owners' profits by 
more than 50% (reported by CANACO in La Tribuna Universitaria, 30/12/1997). So 
the change in the pavement height threatened sales once again. 
Some opposing points of view were identified regarding the modification of a 
locality. Even though this type of conflict can be considered as a common 
problem that any locality may encounter, the peculiarities that small shops in 
Queretaro and SLP presented can cause further problems. The importance of 
local shops or businesses in being a niche of (self) employment and their 
relevance in number, converted them into important stakeholders regarding the 
city centre regeneration. In many aspects tourism and commerce allied to 
issues related to street vendor relocation; but in other aspects they were in 
disagreement, as was the case of modifying a place for tourist or local 
purposes. Just as the urban regime model suggests, the strong involvement of 
local entrepreneurs and chambers of commerce in political affairs cannot be 
denied by municipal authorities. Thus a conflict is encountered by government 
in trying to satisfy the needs of tourism on the one hand (as a new source of 
investment) and local commerce on the other (as a source of current 
employment and stability). The regeneration of a place and 
its compatibility 
between commerce and tourism may imply in itself a strategy for gentrification. 
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However, this opposes the UNESCO declarations that emphasise the need for 
creating an environment where different social groups can interact. 
The three different rivalries exemplify how municipal governments encountered 
a competitive situation when decisions were taken to promote economic 
development. They encountered circumstances that might not sustain a global 
business environment by favouring small shop businesses rather than tourism 
or big retailers. But, at the same time, municipal strategies considered small 
and big businesses (either with national or external capital) as relevant 
participants within the urban policy processes. The diversity among businesses 
made municipal government seek for flexibilities to act in discretionary ways, 
which contradicted the discourse of full participation by acting in a repressive or 
exclusive mode towards urban popular groups or residents. As a result, 
municipal governments followed paradoxical strategies (Section 9.3) in order to 
cope with the obstacles encountered when attempting to promote inclusion and 
participation under a globalised economic context. 
9.3. Municipal government as a broker 
This section focuses on the paradoxical strategies that the two municipal 
governments followed in order to cope with top-down policies and bottom-up 
pressures (local interests and fear of social instability). These strategies are 
termed 'paradoxical' as they are contradictory in themselves but, despite their 
contradictory nature they are reflected in the strategies (and projects) carried 
out by municipal governments. 
These paradoxical strategies arise out of the combination of three distinctive 
elements: repressive, instrumental and inclusive. Each of these strategies is 
associated with the three approaches to participation discussed in Chapter 8: 
expert councils (where historic-centre partnerships are included), 
neighbourhood boards and urban-popular negotiations. Figure 9.1 
depicts the 
relationships between these types of strategies and the participatory 
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approaches with which municipal governments responded. Both, strategies and 
participatory approaches, are considered as a response to top-down policies 
and bottom-up pressures. 
9.3.1. Repressive strategy. This strategy worked as a precedent to the 
negotiating sessions organised by municipal governments with opposing groups 
(see Appendix 1- Sec. 2). In the case of the historic centre of SLP and 
Queretaro, repression was used as an instrument to build the desired 
environment to start an urban regeneration policy. In the two case studies this 
policy was related to the increased importance of the city centre regeneration. 
This policy started as the need to control street vending accompanied by the 
need to improve the historic centre image. 
In the case of Queretaro the environment of control was attained through the 
repression of strong social organisations like FIOZ and FCPU who had a strong 
presence in the historic centre by the end of the 1990s. Once this environment 
was attained, the contingent form of participation emerged as a way of 
illustrating a more participative and inclusive society regarding the city centre's 
regeneration. The more structured and planned negotiations with street vendors 
were observed in their relationship with the Encuentros subprogramme. 
In the case of SLP the repression preceded the more tolerant organisational 
strategies that municipal government had created. These strategies were the 
Municipal Coordination for Citizen Attention (that complemented the decisions 
achieved by other participatory forms) and the negotiating sessions that existed 
during mid 2004 in order to standardise the street vendor stalls selling 
traditional food or handicrafts in the city centre. 
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Figure 9.1. Municipal response to top-down policies and bottom-up reactions in 
Queretaro and SLP 
Top-down pressures: national and international recommendations 
Participative approaches: ECs and Neighbourhood boards 
Paradoxical strategies: 
Inclusive: promotes consensus with certain groups of civil society but is undermined 
by informal arrangements. This applies to ECs such as historic-centre partnerships. 
Instrumental: enhances participation but is undermined by the unpredictability of 
informal and (personal) arrangements. This applies to ECs, neighbourhood boards, 
urban-popular negotiations. 
Repressive: promotes negotiation but repression is latent. This applies to urban 
popular negotiations. 
Participatory approach: urban-popular negotiations 
Bottom-up pressures: local market rivalries 
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It can be argued that the negotiating schemes followed by the repressive 
actions of local government worked as compensation for the damage done to 
the social cohesion enjoyed by urban-popular groups. However, I argue that 
that was not the case as these schemes intended to achieve short-term projects 
that would help develop the regeneration policy. It cannot be denied that these 
negotiations had the potential for strengthening participation and the inclusion 
that repression tore apart; but this potential was not realised insofar as there 
existed segmentation within the whole system of participation (i. e. lack of 
articulation between historic-centre partnerships and street vendor 
organisations). This extreme reaction from repression to negotiation, passing 
through exclusion and segmentation from other forms of participatory 
organisations, reflects a part of these paradoxical strategies. 
9.3.2. Instrumental strategy. This strategy is considered here as a mixture of 
exclusion and inclusion by municipal government applied in an unpredictable 
manner. Within this strategy, a sudden change of mind coming from 
governmental stakeholders was identified regarding the operation of the forms 
of neighbourhood participation. A first example of this unpredictability was 
observed within the flexibilities that municipal presidents enjoyed in determining 
the number of citizen councillors on the Municipal Council of Social 
Development in SLP. Another example was observed in the System of Social 
Participation Councils in Queretaro. In this case the unpredictability was 
observed in the decision making of the citizen consultative council where every 
final decision taken (regarding the expenditure of the budget coming from 
Branch 33) seemed to come from an unknown process (called `black box' in 
Section 8.2.1). Finally, a third example was observed in the minimal support 
given by Mayor Garcia's successor to a partnership like the Historic Centre 
Board, which weakened, as a result, the development of collaboration between 
public and private sectors. 
It can be argued that this type of unpredictability emerges from the lack of 
specific operational rules, regulations and documented codes of conduct. 
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However, it can also be that the operational failures within these organisational 
structures are used like a `carrot and stick' mechanism: the carrot being the 
open invitation for different social groups to participate in the policy decisions 
process of urban infrastructure, whilst the stick would be the flexibility or 
informal arrangements that municipal authorities use to limit the social 
participation scope that these organisational structures provide. This logic can 
also be applied to the case of street vending negotiations (which simulate to the 
old authoritarian clientelistic measures). 
This carrot-stick mechanism reflects the pressures coming from above and 
below. Municipal governments react to international and national 
recommendations by promoting forms of participation that increase the 
awareness of civil society to participate. However, certain flexibilities are locally 
created to put limits on the scope of civil interventions that appear to threaten 
the municipal objectives related to urban development (for example, the limits 
put to the citizen councillors in the CMDS in deciding upon the funds that could 
be used for the construction of road networks). 
9.3.3. Inclusive strategy. This strategy was observed in the analysis of expert 
councils (including historic-centre partnerships Chapters 7-8), where inclusive 
participation was aimed for. This inclusiveness ranged from a mere consultation 
process (i. e. where privileged individuals or organisations were invited to the 
HCB or IMPLAN's workshops in Queretaro) to a more complex inclusion, where 
the private sector or citizens were able to define the policy agenda that the 
municipality had to follow on issues related to the development of minor urban 
works or regeneration (i. e. the HCB and thematic councils in Queretaro helping 
to set the agenda for urban planning). 
However, the existence of informal arrangements between public officers or 
politicians and members in the expert councils undermined the 
inclusive 
purpose as exclusive and personal arrangements prevailed. This was 
the case 
of the HCB and HCCC's member selection representing upper-middle class 
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organisations. The selection process coincided with the profile of local elite 
groups - which were distinguished and respected by the local society and which 
were also key in influencing the image for the city to develop. The informal 
arrangements were important in contributing to participatory segmentation (lack 
of articulation between participatory approaches and weak accountability 
among social groups). 
By structuring the argument in terms of these paradoxical strategies, it has been 
analysed how municipal governments in SLP and Queretaro showed a 
contradictory approach in each particular form of participation. However, each 
strategy (repressive, instrumental, inclusive) seemed to be necessary when 
governments played a broker role in an arena where interests came from 
different directions. 
These paradoxical strategies were used by the municipal governments in 
Queretaro and SLP to guide the relationships between interdependent 
stakeholders and organisations involved in the urban policy process 
(specifically, the city centre regeneration). Through a segmented system of 
participation municipal governments accentuated the differences between 
stakeholders (local elite and upper-middle classes) and those citizens who 
lacked the resources (skills and knowledge) needed for the formulation and 
implementation of the regeneration process. 
The paradoxical strategies allowed municipal governments to steer the 
relationships towards desired outcomes that maintained the participative 
rhetoric, at the same time as they maintained an environment of urban 
entrepreneurship. This environment did not imply the elimination of what has 
been referred to as market rivalries. As a result, municipal governments sought 
to minimise obstacles in order to cope with the rivalries between privileged 
groups (commerce vs. tourism, formal vs. informal, small vs. big commercial 
firms). By excluding popular organisations that impacted on the city centre, the 
combination of paradoxical strategies helped to avoid unwanted effects, such as 
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a more inclusive participation of urban-popular groups into the historic-centre 
partnerships. Municipal governments sought to establish mechanisms to 
improve coordination between tiers of government and the private and public 
sectors (through the creation and modification of regulatory frameworks). But 
the lack of integration between participatory forms placed limits on the 
achievement of coordination and articulation. 
The paradoxical strategies allowed municipal governments to cope with the 
pressures from above and bellow. In particular, segmented participation 
facilitated contradictory and discretionary decision-making in the formation and 
enactment of municipal strategies. Despite the negative impact of repression, 
the limits to citizen participation, and the predominant inclusion of privileged civil 
groups, the policies and projects that emerged were not inconsistent with the 
national and international discourse of accountability, participation and 
inclusion. 
Conclusions 
This chapter discussed how international policies had an impact upon municipal 
government through the regeneration policies that Queretaro and SLP have 
followed since the 1990s. The regeneration of their historic centres was seen as 
a niche for investment that helped to maintain the entrepreneurialism of these 
cities. The role of federal government in relation to these policies revealed part 
of the pro-activeness of the state which can be related to the task of linking 
what has been internationally established and what municipalities have to meet 
in order to be in accordance with the former. This task, in other words, is a way 
of interpreting the trend of internationalisation of the state. 
Nevertheless the operational failures within the organisational structures that 
municipalities created, revealed ways in which the action of municipal 
governments can undermine the extent of accountability, participation and 
inclusion. Furthermore, market rivalries contributed to municipal governments' 
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paradoxical strategies which were reflected in the approaches adopted in 
seeking to reconcile top-down polices and bottom-up pressures. Paradoxical 
strategies were developed in order to find a balance, between both pressures. 
It is concluded that with the use of these paradoxical strategies, municipal 
governments in Queretaro and SLP played a broker role in promoting a 
regeneration policy in the city centre. On the one hand, they were influenced by 
top-down policies to cope with global economic and political changes. On the 
other hand, they had to respond to local operational structures, interests and 
understandings to maintain economic and political stability. Inclusion and 
participation were promoted, but they encountered constant limitations that 
favoured those groups that sustained the locality's `weak' urban 
entrepreneurialism and its required organisational structures. 
The segmentation between different forms of participation and the lack of 
coordination between different municipal bodies reflected a strategy used to find 
a balance between pressures. This strategy was based on the flexibility that 
governmental stakeholders had to change the rules of the game with regards to 
citizen participation within a context of urban entrepreneurialism. Although it 
was not proved how urban entrepreneurial ism had a direct relation to 
globalisation, there were two factors that tend to support this relationship. The 
first factor, was the development of trade and services (tourism and leisure 
businesses and retailers); and the second was the modification of the locality 
and the construction of organisational structures. The modification of the locality 
(city centre regeneration) was important as it housed the development of trade 
and service markets. The construction of organisational structures, such as 
regeneration partnerships and other forms of participation, helped 
to enhance 
the municipality's urban planning and development. 
The trends of urban entrepreneurialism, discussed throughout 
Chapters 7-9 
have reflected the changes that SLP and Queretaro experienced with regard 
to 
their organisational structures and their impact upon 
their historic centres. 
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These changes have been subject to the reconfiguration of the state which has 
been accompanied by a discourse of participation, underlining the importance of 
the locality and the increased but limited inclusion of civil (privileged) society. 
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Chapter 10 - Conclusions 
This chapter is divided into three parts: The first part summarises the argument 
of the thesis; the second considers the strengths and contributions of the thesis; 
and the final part reflects upon its limitations and how these can be addressed 
in developing future research. 
10.1. The argument summarised 
I began by discussing the way in which neoliberalism was introduced by the 
Mexican federal government as an economic strategy that helped to overcome 
the 1982 financial crisis. The implementation of neoliberal policies (i. e. 
liberalisation of trade and interest rates, fiscal and monetary reforms, 
privatisation) prompted Mexico's economic integration to the global market 
economy. NAFTA was considered a critical point in the redirection of Mexico's 
economy. It was argued that neoliberalism had an impact not only upon the 
economy but also upon political and social organisational structures and 
relationships. Accompanying these neoliberal policies, a democratisation 
process took place, which also was a response to the democratic aspirations 
that civil society expressed through various social movements against an 
authoritarian regime. The combination of neoliberalism with democratisation 
had contributed to the state's reconfiguration. This reconfiguration consisted of 
a shift towards the national-state, characterised by a multiple production of 
organisational scales (supranational, national, subnational) and by state pro- 
activeness (coordinating networks, initiating strategies and policies that help to 
adapt the country to a global context, while inheriting past forms of 
organisation). 
By considering, first, the liberal democracy perspective, it was argued that 
Mexico's democratisation process emphasised the creation of electoral 
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institutions but that these were enhanced through civil society freedom of 
association and expression, the state's reforms upon constitutional rules and 
accountability, and the autonomy of the market economy. Second, considering 
democracy in a global context, it was recognised how the reconfiguration of the 
state had implications upon the structure of social class and its shift away from 
the concepts of state-centrism and traditional territoriality. This second 
perspective helped to contextualise Mexico's democratisation process within the 
process of globalisation to which the country was subject. 
State reconfiguration was analysed at the urban scale; particularly in relation to 
Jessop's description of the three trends characterising the entrepreneurial city 
and its relationship with the state (destatisation of the political regime, 
denationalisation of statehood, internationalisation of the state). The creation of 
new organisational forms such as partnerships between government and other 
non-public stakeholders was considered a phenomenon that promoted urban 
entrepreneurship. Mexico's decentralisation policies favoured the development 
of urban governments. This type of government possessed the material and 
human resources to develop accountability, streamlined administrations and a 
fiscal policy that could help municipalities achieve more autonomy. This 
autonomy aimed to integrate urban municipalities into the rhythm of the global 
urban system. However, the dependence of urban municipalities on other tiers 
of government was evident, especially the dependence on federal government. 
Federal government's importance was threefold: (a) in providing financial 
resources for the municipalities to develop urban infrastructure; (b) in bypassing 
subnational structures when they reflected a weak coordinating capacity; and 
(c) in creating national regulatory frameworks that met with international 
organisations' interests. These points underlined the proactive character of 
federal government which promoted organisational forms such as public-private 
partnerships through subtle techniques of steering (i. e. regulatory and policy 
frameworks). These techniques aimed to create a balance between the 
supranational recommendations and subnational contexts. 
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By being aware of the ambiguity of governance theory, the thesis categorised 
the term into two: general and particular. In the former sense, governance was 
used to close the analytical gap between the macro process (democratisation, 
reconfiguration of the state) and the micro process (partnerships, forms of 
political participation, informal and formal arrangements). In the latter sense, the 
thesis interpreted governance as a process nested within democratisation. 
Political participation and accountability worked as common denominators to 
link insights from the literature on governance (in its p articular s ense) and 
democracy. In particular, the implementation of governance through 
partnerships was emphasised. However, the existence of governance failures 
(domination of stakeholders over others, lack of accountability, weak 
coordinating capacity) prompted me to use other conceptual tools. Urban 
regimes underlined the importance of stakeholders' resources, and the informal 
arrangements among them, within policymaking. Political participation 
highlighted the significance of accountability within the initiatives created by the 
state and the political opportunities built by social movements. Accountability 
involved open informational processes to the public and transparency in 
decision making. New institutionalism underscored the importance of analysing 
simultaneously informal rules and formal conventions, within a changing context 
where old and new institutions coexist. 
Drawing on conceptual approaches concerning the reconfiguration of the state 
at the urban level, I developed a series of theoretical propositions to structure 
my analysis of partnerships and participation in Mexican urban politics: 
" Public-private partnerships are organisational forms that express a tendency 
towards urban governance 
" Municipal government prefers public-private partnerships over other forms of 
participation as a means to promote the locality's urban entrepreneurship 
" Municipal governments play a brokerage role to maintain organisational 
forms of `governance' (promoted by national and international standards) 
within a context of specific local pressures. 
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These propositions resulted from bridging the macro level and the meso level 
processes. These propositions led to a discussion of the Mexican federal 
government's shift towards an intermediary role between international forums 
and subnational governments and the interventionist nature of all levels of 
government, aiming to guarantee an urban entrepreneurial infrastructure and 
environment. 
Based on this framework, I chose as case studies the historic centres of 
Queretaro and San Luis Potosi and three approaches of political participation 
within these areas (regeneration partnerships, neighbourhood boards and 
urban-popular negotiations with street vendor organisations). These 
municipalities were considered `typical cases'. They were selected based on the 
`opportunity to learn' about urban entrepreneurship (geographical location, type 
of economic investment), and the `how' and `why' of civil and social 
organisations playing a role within this type of partnership (previous 
experiences of collaboration between sectors and history of collective action). 
The data collection was carried out through the methods of documentary 
review, semi-structured interviews and non-participatory observation. The data 
provided information on decentralisation projects promoting regeneration 
partnerships; the participation of civil organisations within these partnerships; 
and the nature of the partnerships. 
The data were categorised and contextualised according to the theoretical 
propositions, which at the same time were related to the three trends 
characterising entrepreneurial cities. The analysis of the findings underscores a 
close linkage among the three trends, which seem to depend on and enhance 
the development of each other. 
The destatisation of the political regime and its link to historic-centre 
regeneration partnerships. This trend involved the redrawing of the public and 
private divide and the re-articulation of the relationship between organisations at 
various state levels. This trend was analysed at the urban scale drawing upon 
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governance theories. In particular, its implementation was studied through 
Queretaro and SLP's historic-centre regeneration partnerships. The 
partnerships showed the strong role of federal government as their promoter 
(i. e. federal laws that prompted local regulations). The promotion of these 
historic centres was considered a niche for the municipality to develop. This 
development involved the establishment of innovative organisational structures 
in which the public and private sectors were able to collaborate, such as the 
historic-centre partnerships. The strategic selection of the members of the 
historic centre partnerships (locally prestigious individuals), in addition to the 
projects that they carried out (promoting urban re-imaging) highlighted a weak 
entrepreneurship. The promotion of governance as partnerships was observed 
at the same time that traditional political and social relations prevailed, 
including: (1) informal arrangements among the local elite, which created a 
limited accountability between the members of the partnerships and the rest of 
the public; (2) strong interventionism of federal and state governments over 
municipal government in the promotion of regeneration partnerships; and (3) a 
lack of involvement of the private sector when social conflict had the potential to 
disrupt the actions of the partnerships, leading as a result, to some 
governmental intervention. The operation of these partnerships did not 
ultimately enhance the participation of other civil groups nor accountability in the 
decision making of regeneration polices. However, the partnerships' creation 
and operation was relevant for legitimising the discourse of participation, which 
was expressed in collaborative, accountable and inclusive terms. Participation 
formed part of the institutions promoting urban entrepreneurship, which had 
been neglected by the institutions of the old regime. 
The denationalisation of statehood and its linkage with municipal forms of 
participation. This trend involved the federal (central) government conceding 
capacities to societal actors or to peripheral (supra/subnational) levels of 
government (i. e. municipal governments). These capacities can be reflected in 
the promotion of decentralisation policies, such as the Mexican decentralised 
planning system, which had started to be implemented since the 1980s. As a 
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result, new agencies such as the COPLADEs and COPLADEMs emerged. It 
was argued that these agencies were the broader umbrella covering municipal, 
official approaches to political participation such as expert councils or 
committees (ECs) and neighbourhood boards. Parallel to the official category, 
contingent negotiations between municipal governments and urban-popular 
groups (street vendors) existed. However, based on the case studies' 
experience, a social segmentation was created through the promotion of all 
these approaches. This participative segmentation responded partly to the 
municipal governments' interests in promoting urban entrepreneurship, at the 
same time as promoting the discourse of participative democracy. This 
segmentation also reflected differences in the interests of citizens participating 
(upper-middle class groups, neighbourhood boards, and popular groups). 
These differences had an impact upon the approaches to participation existing 
in the historic centres' policymaking. Participation tended to follow the rhetoric 
of inclusion, which was associated with the legacies of particular social 
movements: Navismo in the case of SLP; upper and middle classes and 
popular groups in both case studies. Governmental bodies (at all levels) 
promoted and implemented municipal participatory systems; however, a lack of 
coordination between the different forms of participation prevailed. The lack of 
coordination enhanced the segmented system of participation observed through 
administrative limitations within regulatory frameworks and the existence of 
informal arrangements. These aspects undermined accountability when based 
on the municipal presidents' perceptions of participation. These perceptions, on 
the one hand, tended to include private-sector stakeholders in the regeneration 
policies, which created, on the other hand, low levels of trust between municipal 
government and street vendors. In other words, this segmented system of 
participation seemed to be based on class: local stakeholders (professionals, 
experts) versus ordinary citizens (basic education); municipal government 
being 
a primary agent in supporting or enhancing social segregation. 
The strategy of 
municipal governments in dealing with segmented forms of participation, 
in 
addition to the existence of informal arrangements 
that undermined 
accountability, simulated the strategies followed by the authoritarian regime. 
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The internationalisation of the national-state and its relation to municipal 
governments' strategies to cope with local pressures. This trend involved the 
federal government conceding capacities to supranational entities or the 
adaptation of international recommendations, at the local level, promoted by 
federal government. This adaptation was observed through federal 
government's formulation of policies and programmes related to issues on 
decentralisation and participation. An example was the guidelines for municipal 
governments to regenerate urban areas in which civil society could participate. 
The municipalities of Queretaro and SLP followed national guidelines and 
international recommendations by promoting their historic centres. This reaction 
underlined themes of accountability, prevalence of the rule of law, participation 
and collaboration between different tiers of government and between sectors. 
Nevertheless, the role of federal bodies was significant in defining the 
guidelines that the municipalities followed with regard to conservation, urban 
planning, multi-level agreements, laws, and the forms of participation (official 
type). Municipal governments encountered challenges (failures in organisational 
structures and local market rivalries) in order to adapt themselves to top-down 
declarations. Organisational failures undermined the process of accountability 
and inclusion. Even though a greater degree of pluralism was observed in 
regeneration policies than under an authoritarian regime, such pluralism 
(restricted in many ways) was subject to dominant stakeholders' interests and 
their awareness of participatory, democratic principles. The market rivalries 
between different local groups (informal vs. formal, commerce vs. tourism, big 
vs. small shops) maintained a level of ambiguity regarding the definition of the 
city centres' space. A common denominator, however, seemed to satisfy the 
upper and middle classes; this was the strategy of excluding street vendor 
groups from historic-centre policy decisions. The paradoxical strategies of 
municipal governments (inclusive, instrumental, repressive) worked adequately 
through the segmented system of participation as long as each strategy was 
applied to a specific social group (upper-middle class groups, neighbourhood 
boards, popular groups). Finally, it was argued that the paradoxical strategies 
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were a useful mechanism that allowed municipal governments to cope with the 
pressures from above (national and international) and below (local interest 
groups). 
10.2. The contributions of the thesis 
To understand participation within urban governance I sought to create a 
linkage between the macro and micro level processes through the theoretical 
premises of governance. The macro level processes, such as the 
reconfiguration of the state and democratisation were considered of structural 
character. These processes were contextualised in terms of the existence of 
global modes of capital production. Within this context a tendency to create 
spaces beyond the concepts of state centrism and territoriality was analysed. 
The macro level processes were studied through theoretical approaches of 
democratisation, political economy and urbanisation. 
In building a bridge between the macro and micro processes, the research was 
based on the local level and how the reconfiguration of the national-state was 
related to both levels: supranational and subnational. The supranational level 
was studied through formal reports and recommendations stated by 
international organisations (i. e. World Bank, UNESCO). The subnational level 
was studied through the regeneration of the historic centres of Queretaro and 
San Luis Potosi. This thesis demonstrates the value and importance of 
governance as a theoretical tool that is able to link different dimensions of 
analysis (including various levels of spaces, institutions, organisations and 
agents). 
In focusing upon micro level processes, I found it useful to draw also upon 
theoretical insights from urban regimes, political participation and new 
institutionalism. These premises were particularly relevant for the analysis of 
agency. They also served to highlight three concepts that were relevant 
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throughout the argument of the thesis: accountability, inclusion and informal 
arrangements. 
Accountability referred to the creation of open information processes to the 
public and the transparency of policymaking, in particular, regarding the 
regeneration of the historic centres of Queretaro and SLP. Inclusion referred to 
the extent to which different types of civil groups (upper and middle classes, 
neighbourhood boards and urban-popular groups) were involved in the 
regeneration of the historic centre. These two concepts were considered in 
relation to the democratisation process to which Mexico had been subject. 
These concepts were identified through the spaces and institutions created by 
government (at all levels) and by past social movements. The governmental 
initiatives were the municipal participatory systems (linked to Branch 33), in 
which open, transparent performance and financial management were sought 
(this included the historic-centre regeneration partnerships and the 
neighbourhood boards). The social movements' created structural opportunities 
through their members' representation within political parties or through their 
transformation into legally recognised civil organisations involved in 
policymaking (i. e. members in the ECs and street vendors' more formal but still 
limited negotiations with municipal authorities). Accountability and inclusion 
have been concepts commonly mentioned in rhetorical terms (laws, reports, 
written and oral text), but they have been limited by practices in which the 
dominance of some stakeholders over others and the exclusive and informal 
arrangements between dominant stakeholders prevailed. These limitations were 
interpreted as the prevalence of old institutions within the creation of a new 
institutional context of local governance. 
In combining insights from governance and other theories that focused upon 
micro level process, a serious consideration was given to the place of 
partnerships within the broader context of political participation. Even though it 
is true that public-private partnerships promote participation of other 
stakeholders that were previously excluded from policymaking, it was also 
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focused that partnerships could create obstacles that undermined the principles 
of inclusion and accountability. The lack of definition in the codes of practice 
and regulations, and the negative effects of informal arrangements prevailing 
between social relations, were some of the reasons that limited their 
performance. Thus it is important not to simply equate partnerships with 
participatory democracy principles, as seemed to be the cases in the 
municipalities of Queretaro and SLP which, in response to the decentralised 
planning system, tended to overestimate the expert councils' role. 
10.3. The approach of the thesis developed further 
It is possible to identify some limitations of the thesis, which can be addressed 
further through the potential for extending the scope of the methodology and by 
considering other theoretical arguments. 
10.3.1. Methodological considerations. The thesis was limited in terms of 
developing the linguistic dimension of a formal discourse analysis. The thesis 
used the `social practice' dimension of discourse analysis to identify some of the 
mechanisms that political institutions (i. e. partnerships and a segmented 
participation system) pursued to shape practices, which included the 
reproduction of `collaboration', `coordination' and `participation', all of which 
favoured ideas supporting governance. 
A source of information that was not analysed in detail was local newspapers 
that captured many of the events relevant to the case studies. Instead, other 
documentary sources were used such as official documents, public and private 
reports, laws and regulations and specific newspaper articles that provided 
evidence of the events studied. A more thorough and broader newspaper 
analysis could provide greater information on how local groups understood or 
interpreted the regeneration policies and help to identify the social networks that 
supported informal arrangements and the cliques between elite groups. 
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Furthermore, informants such as journalists and people involved in the media 
could provide additional perspectives and evidence. This source of information 
was under-used due to constraints of time and human resources. 
The thesis could have given further consideration to other contextual variables 
that had an impact on how participation developed within urban governance. 
These variables were first, the influence of the Catholic Church upon the 
political and cultural identity in Queretaro and San Luis Potosi; second the role 
of political parties at the local level, especially with regard to their understanding 
of participation, and the mechanisms to promote it; and third the role of the 
municipal congress which, in the discourse of decentralisation and horizontal 
counterweights between governmental powers, attains great relevance. The 
three types of variables were not ignored by the thesis, but time constraints 
limited the scope of the analysis. 
Finally, the argument of the thesis was based on a two case-study approach. 
This raises questions about the analysis of the theoretical propositions in 
relation to other urban municipalities. Queretaro and SLP were considered 
`typical' cases with characteristics that could be found in other medium cities, 
especially in the Bajio Region. Furthermore city-centre regeneration projects do 
not only comprise historic centres of national and world value; such projects 
also involve modern style city centres and areas outside of the city centre, many 
of which are probably run by public-private partnerships. While the case studies 
provide good examples of the issues at stake, the research propositions could 
be used to analyse changes encountered in other cities and indeed in other 
countries. Comparison between further cases is of particular interest given the 
context on globalisation that seems to homogenise economic, political and 
social relations between localities in and across different countries. 
10.3.2. Other theoretical perspectives. The coexistence of old institutions 
(organisations, beliefs, formal and informal arrangements) with new institutions 
was relevant throughout the thesis. The thesis identified institutional elements 
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created during authoritarian times within the context of the municipalities of 
Queretaro and SLP between 1997 and 2004. These elements were: cooptation, 
informal arrangements, presidentialism, and the lack of coordination between 
municipal bodies. However, the thesis could not provide a detailed analysis of 
the social and political relations emerging in the transformative process of new 
institutions arising and old institutions decaying. The following paragraphs 
suggest how these four elements can be developed further in the context of 
debates about governance. 
The political approaches to participation, such as ECs and neighbourhood 
boards, could be interpreted as new forms of co-opting civil society. It could be 
argued that through these approaches government (at all levels) is trying to 
legitimise governance strategies by creating different expert councils, 
partnerships, neighbourhood boards, and informal negotiations. During the 
authoritarian regime, co-optation of certain social groups was used as a 
mechanism to legitimise the state's internal organisation and policy strategies. It 
is then significant to analyse further the distribution of power between the 
parties involved in the policymaking process; for example, by analysing if the 
decisions are made unilaterally by the local traditional elite or if the members of 
this elite have changed between the authoritarian stage and the period of study. 
Another point that could be assessed is the difference between co-optation 
strategies that political stakeholders have created (as a response to state 
reconfiguration - i. e. decentralisation policies), and the government's 
(at all 
levels) responsibility for promoting the lines of action for a more participatory 
democracy (which has also respond to the legacies of social movements - i. e. 
Navismo). This thesis considered that the creation of COLPADEMs in 
Queretaro and SLP were projects in which government promoted citizen 
participation. However, the findings showed that internal mechanisms and 
arrangements had limited this participation. The thesis was not able 
to asses 
the advantages and disadvantages of having an interventionist government 
sponsoring participation, within a context where 
dynamic and global social 
relations were being developed. 
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The thesis identified the existence of informal arrangements among the local 
elite (politicians and private stakeholders) in the historic centre regeneration 
policies. Debates on networks as a mode of governance propose that informal 
arrangements can create positive results by increasing trust and thus achieving 
specific projects or goals that otherwise would not have been possible to attain. 
However, this thesis showed that informal arrangements can have a negative 
effect when these are exclusive to the local elite and, as a consequence, 
undermine accountability and transparency to the rest of the public. This is 
paradoxical insofar as accountability and transparency are also considered as 
part of the benefits that governance can provide. It is precisely the negative 
effects of informal arrangements that simulate the relationships within the 
authoritarian regime. Hence, it is interesting to develop further an analysis of the 
distinction between the positive and negative effects of informal arrangements. 
This might contribute to the debate on the forms that should be developed in 
order to accentuate the positive effects of networks in policymaking. 
Presidentialism in authoritarian times was partly characterised as an individual 
leader being able to govern arbitrarily, unconstrained by party structures, 
parliamentary processes of legal or bureaucratic norms. The freedom that the 
city mayor or state governors in Queretaro and SLP had in promoting different 
approaches to participation (at the same time that new obstacles were created 
to limit the participation of ordinary citizens in regeneration policymaking), raises 
questions about the extent to which the local executive is acting arbitrarily 
despite local regulations, national programmes, and international 
recommendations promoting an inclusive participatory environment. More 
detailed analyses could be developed in order to identify the type of leadership 
that local politicians have to create in order to cope with top-down and bottom- 
up pressures. Maybe some aspects of presidentialism might be required in 
order to cope with all these pressures. Thus a combination of presidentialism 
with entrepreneurial leadership could be assessed as a mechanism to bind 
multiple local contrasts within a global urban network. 
269 
The thesis identified the lack of coordinated capacity among participatory 
bodies (ECs, neighbourhood boards, urban-popular negotiations). This was 
partly due to the lack of capacity building of municipal and state governments to 
create organisational communication or organisational networks. This can be 
justified as a municipal governments' lack of experience in dealing with a more 
responsive administration (especially since the national decentralised system 
started to be implemented). However, it would be interesting to investigate 
whether this uncoordinated system is an accidental result due to a lack of 
capacity building or whether it is a legacy of old institutions where weak 
communication between governmental bodies and among civil organisations 
was created deliberately, in order to support co-option strategies. In the cases 
analysed here, the rhetoric of participation and urban entrepreneurialism was 
promoted, but the lack of coordination between municipal bodies appeared to 
enhance political exclusion and weak entrepreneurialism, simulating to some 
degree certain authoritarian strategies. 
It would be interesting to explore the potential of a neo-Gramscian approach to 
understand the (re)configuration of local governance in Mexico, in particular 
through the concept of `hegemony' understood as a worldview of ideological 
control and socialisation that can be diffused into every area of daily life. 
According to this approach the distribution and implementation of power is given 
further attention. This thesis underlined that inequalities prevailed between 
partners. The thesis also argued that power at the local level was embedded in 
socio-political institutions, which are partly shaped by top-down guidelines and 
institutional templates circulating in politics and culture. However, the thesis was 
not able to analyse in detail how the ability of the local elite made `ordinary 
citizens' accept that their interests lay in regenerating the city centre; nor 
if the 
subordinate classes would have acted differently if the local elite 
had not 
implemented mechanisms for regeneration. By developing these types of 
questions, new tools might reveal how informal arrangements operate and offer 
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Appendix 1. Social mobilisations and their impact on national 
and local politics in Queretaro and SLP 
This appendix contains examples concerning the relationship between social 
mobilisations and political parties, in their attempt to promote political 
participation in policymaking. These social mobilisations are categorised into 
three groups: social movements with an impact on national politics, urban- 
popular mobilisations, and middle-class mobilisations; the latter two having a 
greater impact at the local level 
Section I. Social movements and their impact on national politics 
The Barzön Movement is a first example. It represented the interests of the 
urban and rural middle class. This class was affected by the economic crisis of 
the mid 1990s which caused currency devaluation and, among other things, the 
constraint to financial credits and high interest rates, affecting small and 
medium enterprises. Even though the Barzön started in northern states of the 
country, the strength gained after the urban middle class of the city of Queretaro 
joined, gave to the movement a significant national recognition. Through the 
urban faction of the movement, a renegotiation of the exorbitant and un-payable 
debts of small and medium entrepreneurs was achieved, making these debts to 
represent more moderate amounts (Lara, 2002). After this achievement, the 
movement's impact decreased; while its leaders joined the PRD to 
counterweight the policy decisions of President Zedillo that favoured a 
neoliberal economy, considered by the barzonistas as an attack against 
national sovereignty (Shadlen, 2001). Even though the participation in the 
movement was very instrumentalist (searching for immediate interests), it was 
able to increase a social awareness of issues related to citizen participation in 
policymaking. 
The Navista Movement, a second example, has been known for having two 
phases. First, it originated in the end of the 1950s when its leader Salvador 
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Nava fought against the political boss and governor, Gonzalo N. de los Santos 
in San Luis Potosi. This movement aimed to weaken de los Santos' political 
power which imposed its own people as candidates, controlled the press, and 
violently repressed those who opposed the state government regime. Despite 
that federal government was aware of the de los Santos' authoritarianism, it did 
not seem to put much attention to it as he was a good ally for attracting votes 
for the priista national regime. However, the rivalry between President Adolfo 
Lopez Mateos (1959-1964) and de los Santos, helped Mr. Nava to achieve the 
municipal presidency of San Luis Potosi in 1958 (Bezdek, 1996). 
During Nava's period as mayor, he corrected the abuses generated by the de 
los Santos regarding financial issues. As a result, an accountability policy began 
by publishing the administration's expenditures outside the city hall. 
Additionally, the coverage and improvement of urban services was attained 
regarding drainage, electrical services, running water, and paved streets 
(Bezdek, 1996). These successful attainments, and the apparent support by 
federal government, promoted Nava to look for a place as a governor candidate 
within the PRI. However, the National PRI Committee denied its support. 
Navistas demonstrated against the candidate appointed by federal government, 
and as a result Mr. Nava was imprisoned and many of the movement's 
members repressed. 
The second phase began in the early 1980s when Mr. Nava mobilised people 
against corrupt acts of Governor Carlos Jongitud (1979-1984). Mr. Jongitud was 
not liked by the urban middle class as he represented the interests of the 
biggest teacher's union in the country (Foweraker, 1993). Thus his activities 
were more focused on the interests of the union rather than on the state's urban 
needs; additionally his thirst of money increased corrupt deals within his 
administration (Bezdek, 1996; Pansters, 1996). Consequently, Salvador Nava 
searched to confront Mr. Jongitud by becoming SLP's mayor for a second time. 
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It is important to notice how the winning of municipal elections in 1958 and 1982 
gave Mr. Nava an opportunity to confront state government and, indirectly, the 
national regime. During the first phase Mr. Nava fought against Governor de los 
Santos by becoming mayor during a priista regime. During the second stage, 
Nava became mayor but this time supported by the coalition, between the PAN 
and the conservative (religious) party the PDM, against the priista regime. 
In 1991, Mr. Nava became the opposition candidate for state government, this 
time supported by a coalition with the PAN, PDM, and PRD. The multiplicity of 
allies turned Navismo into an important mobilisation which aimed to weaken the 
centralist and interventionist role of national government. This movement was 
contemporary to the national democratisation discourse, in which the country 
was living at the time, as well as with the neoliberal policies strongly promoted 
by the Salinas presidency. The 1991 elections turned against Mr. Nava, 
favouring instead the priista candidate Fausto Zapata. These results caused a 
tremendous uproar at state and national levels as it was concluded that there 
was a clear electoral fraud (Puente et al., 1993). The social and political 
pressure from this national mobilisation rejected Mr. Zapata's victory and 
instead two interim governors were postulated between 1991 and 1993. In 
1993, new state elections were organised, where the winner turned out to be 
Horacio Sanchez from the PRI. 14 
Mr. Nava's strong support in 1991 was due to the support from the upper- 
middle class mobilisation favouring a multiparty democracy across the country, 
and the experience attained from the municipal administrations that he 
represented from 1983-1985, and from his co-partner, Guillermo Pizzuto, in 
1989-1991. 
114 In 1992 Nava died and thus a movement's fragmentation emerged. It is worth mentioning 
that family relations existed between the priista Governor Sanchez and the Navista movement. 
The link was the governor's wife, who was Mr. Nava's daughter, and who participated during the 
movement's crucial events. 
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The nucleus of Navismo was neighbourhood communities and groups, thus 
they prompted Mr. Pizzuto to focus upon the improvement of their quality of life. 
The marginalised conditions in which central and peripheral neighbourhoods 
lived in, led these communities to participate in the movement. The 
communities argued that their marginalised status was due to the past 
governors' corruption and the narrowed vision of national policies upon local 
needs (Castillo, 2002; Puente et al, 1993). 
The linkage of Navismo between its leaders and the communities and 
neighbourhoods, prompted Pizzuto to publish for the first time the municipal 
regulation for the integration and operation of the citizen and auxiliary organs. 
This regulation enhanced the creation of the neighbourhood improvement 
boards (NIB) as the core organs to collaborate with municipal government 
throughout neighbour participation, indistinctive from social position, political 
affiliation or religion (RNIB, 1990). This regulation explicitly states that the NIBs 
operate to improve their community. It also states the formation of the NIBs and 
their relationship with the correspondent municipal department. However, it was 
not until 1997 that the NIBs started to operate following a more detailed 
regulation. 
After Mr. Pizzuto, two more active members of the movement became city 
mayors, nevertheless they were candidates representing the PAN only: Mario 
Leal (1991-1994) and Alejandro Zapata (1997-2000). The administrative period 
between the latter two mayors was governed by a priista mayor who won the 
elections as a result of the strong socio-political repression during the Leal 
administration. Even though Mr. Leal came from Navista origins, his 
administration was considered harsh when compared to the one of Pizzuto's. 
He was criticised for doing little for the community and in some cases he was 
considered as an elitist mayor (interview SLP 20). His interest in abolishing 
corruption and bringing forward accountability (a principle that Navismo 
pursued), acted strongly against clientelism, which existed between popular 
organisations (i. e. street vendors) and municipal and state governments. The 
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radical repression that Mayor Leal and Governor Sanchez carried out against 
street vendors, in the city centre in 1993, brought to both high political costs on 
their political careers (i. e. lack of mass support). 
The administration of Mayor Zapata was more successful than that of Mr. Leal. 
He was more careful in negotiating simultaneously with local elite and popular 
groups. Mayor Zapata promoted municipal planning through collaboration 
between the public and private sectors, especially regarding urban 
development. Mr. Zapata was also careful to make society participative in this 
planning by improving the NIBs system. It was within his administration that a 
differentiation was made between citizen bodies (i. e. NIBs) from auxiliary bodies 
(i. e. partnerships). The most relevant element in his administration was the 
formal link built between the NIBs and the Municipal Social Development 
Council. Through this link `ordinary' citizens were able to participate in the 
decisions concerning urban infrastructure (interviews SLP 2, SLP 12) 
Despite these two last mayors followed more the political party's interests rather 
than the core values of Navismo (interviews SLP 5, SLP 6), it is interesting to 
notice how they implemented initial policies to fight corruption and social 
exclusion. These policies were not completely free from political and personal 
interests; however, it can be argued that they became part of the political 
agenda due to the background that the mayors had. 
It has been stated (Pansters, 1996) that the movement was a multi-class 
mobilisation as it enclosed people from different social classes from a wide 
range of political interests. However, I observed that after the movement 
reached its peak, the class origin became a factor that characterised individuals 
for being more influential in the new political sphere. People such as Salvador 
Nava, Guillermo Pizzuto, Mario Leal and Alejandro Zapata came from local 
middle-class families related to professional and business groups. In the case of 
Nava, his family background related to the medical elite in SLP, gave him 
significant credibility, especially as it gestated from the SLP Autonomous 
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University. 115 It even has been mentioned that the medical elite has had some 
type of link with the local estate business. 
A similar case was observed with Mr. Pizzuto and Mr. Leal, who were related to 
the local business sector. "' However, the alliance with the PRD in 1991 
diminished the support that strong businesses gave to Navismo due to a lack of 
trust upon the PRD's leader, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas. By the mid 1990s, as the 
Navistas started to merge with the PAN, the business' financial support 
benefited the party, rather than the movement (interview SLP 6). 
Section 2. Popular-urban mobilisations 
A third example is the Independent Front of Zapatista Organisations (FIOS/Z). 
The Front originated at the Vista Alegre Maxei neighbourhood in the city of 
Queretaro, by the end of the 1980s. It aimed to offer basic urban services to its 
people which were highly marginalised. This neighbourhood started as an 
irregular land due to the illegal settlements of labour migration and land- 
speculation costs that the industrialisation process had brought to Queretaro in 
the end of the 1960s. The mobilisation was led by middle-class school teachers. 
FIOS encountered an internal fragmentation which created two versions of the 
mobilisation: FIOS and FIOZ. The former allied with the PRD, whereas the latter 
kept its political independence; it is the second stream on which this subsection 
focuses. 
In 1994 a series of demonstrations were organised by FIOS/Z just in front of the 
city hall. The demands in those days were related mainly with the provisions of 
urban services that marginalised communities in the peripheries of the city 
115 From the university various professional and student mobilisations were organised by the 
end of the 1950s against the fiefdom of de los Santos. Salvador 
Nava initially headed the 
Federation of Professionals and Intellectuals of SLP. 
116 Especially Pizzuto's post as president of CANACO gave him part of the entrepreneurial 
support, a similar case happened to Mario Leal as a 
local owner of a car appliances firm. 
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encountered. The demands that FIOS/Z made during those demonstrations and 
the radical way that they demonstrated were not well accepted by the 
conservative middle class and local businesses (especially those in the city 
centre). These sectors of society stated their dissatisfaction with the irregular 
city growth, caused partly by illegal settlers such as FIOZ. Also, middle-class 
groups complained about FIOZ's lack of hygiene as its members used the street 
as public toilets during their camping nights in the main plaza (St. Claire, 2002). 
In 1998, a crucial political decision finished the FIOZ mobilisation and, indirectly, 
this decision affected many of the street vendor organisations established in the 
city centre. In 1997, both state and municipal governments of Queretaro began 
to be represented by the PAN. They followed the conception that autonomous 
popular organisations should be dismantled and, instead, individual citizens and 
legally registered organisations (i. e. civil associations, NGOs, business 
chambers) were to be the means in which society had to communicate with 
government. 
During the official visit of President Zedillo to the City of Queretaro, in February 
1998, various popular organisations representing street vendors and 
marginalised communities decided to demonstrate outside the venue where the 
president's cabinet and state and municipal governments were gathered. After 
the event was over, the official version stated that, riots organised by FIOZ 
members attacked the coaches transporting federal ministers. Organisations 
like FIOZ and the Felipe Carrillo Puerto Union (FCPU), in that occasion, 
demonstrated against Governor Loyola's political negotiations which opposed to 
the clientelistic methods of the priista regime. These methods consisted in the 
delivery of goods and services to organisation leaders to obtain in exchange 
their political support for the PRI. It is important to mention that neither FIOZ nor 
the FCPU had links to the PRI. However, the local panista governments 
seemed to categorise all these groups as one same thing. Hence the sudden 
change in the way negotiations were carried out provoked popular groups to 
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demonstrate against municipal and state governments during an event of 
federal impact. 
This demonstration became historical for Queretaro as it has been considered a 
city where political stability and negotiations prevail. This event prompted many 
conservative Queretans (middle and upper classes, businesses and Church) to 
demand local governments for political control to achieve social order and 
respect for the rule of law (Diario de Queretaro, 11/02/1998). Consequently, by 
the end of 1998, FIOZ main leaders were imprisoned. 
At the same time, state and municipal governments began working together in a 
policy that controlled street vending in the city centre. Street vending, since the 
early 1990s, became a social problem due to the confrontations that established 
shops, neighbours and businesses had against street vendor organisations. On 
the one hand, the collaboration between state and municipal governments was 
important to control this phenomenon, especially because the orders given to 
police or security bodies during that time came from state government. 
Furthermore, the detention or imprisonment of any of the vendor leaders 
needed as well of the State Justice Attorney. Thus if municipal government 
wanted to have an effective policy, it needed of a close collaboration with state 
government. 
On the other hand, both the imprisonment of the FIOZ leaders and the close 
collaboration between subnational governments in ordering and controlling 
street vending, sowed fear to various other organisations. Fear consisted on 
dismantling organisations, being the most affected FIOZ and Los Palomos 
(interview QRO 1). Others as the FTEQ and Los Triquis were weakened, and 
to some extent the FCPU. However, the FCPU's large number of members 
nationwide and its range of sectors including peasants and popular groups, 
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such as street vendors and settlers of unregulated lands, gave the organisation 
the force to overcome the dismantling threats (interview QRO 8). 117 
Immediately after the period of threats and repression, the municipal 
administration started a phase of peace and negotiation with street vendors. 
This political situation helped Mayor Garrido to attain a pro-participatory and 
partnership discourse, continued by the 2000-03 administration. 
A fourth example is the Antorchista Movement (AM), which considers itself as a 
political movement with direct relationship to the PRI. The mobilisation started in 
the mid 1970s in the state of Puebla to help marginalised communities to 
develop. However, its links with the PRI allowed the AM to grow nationwide, 
becoming an important community mobilisation in the states of Queretaro and 
SLP. 
The AM's organisation is divided in sectors: peasant, urban (street vendors and 
marginalised settlers), and education. In Queretaro State the stronger sectors 
were the peasantry and the urban marginalised communities; however, their 
demands were overlooked, and to certain degree ignored by the state 
administration, especially during 2003-09 (www. antorchacampesina. org. mx/ 
articulos/acm/2004). The AM's urban sector in SLP played a more active role in 
trying to push certain policy implementations to its favour. AM street vendors 
were important agents in the city centre as it was the largest organisation in the 
area by 2004 (whereas in Queretaro was the FCPU). However, AM vendors 
were not as many in 1993 when the repression against street vendors was 
carried out. The interesting thing is that the repression of 1993 
did not stop the 
proliferation of street vendors. On the contrary, it increased since 
1995 - the 
case of Antorchista vendors is an example of this proliferation. 
Before 1998 they 
did not have many affiliates, but since 1995 their number started 
to increase 
(Census 2000-03). 
117 It also helped that the UFCP had very close links 
to the PRD. In 2004 the union's leader was 
also the state political representative of that party. 
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On the one hand, Antorchista vendors were not welcomed by other street 
vendor organisations and federal agencies. This rejection was due to their 
`anarchic' behaviour which consisted of ignoring the tacit arrangements that 
vendor organisations established (interview SLP 19). One governmental 
agency against this organisation was the regional INAH office which stated that 
Antorchistas did not care in conserving old buildings in the city centre. 1e 
(interview SLP 18). On the other hand, the AM had the ability to build networks 
with municipal government to attain its needs and demands. This was observed 
through the Municipal General Secretary's Office. 
Making a comparison between SLP and Queretaro, I observed that SLP 
municipal government's ability for having a special department dealing with 
opposing groups allowed an extra flexibility for communication with social 
organisations that Queretaro refused to have. Queretaro's orthodoxy in treating 
all citizens individually, increased the government's collective intolerance, which 
SLP did not follow, at least not since the 1993 street vendor repression. It might 
have been that the political costs of Potosin politicians encountered in 1993 
(lack of mass support), which stopped SLP's forthcoming governments from 
being repressive and to have instead a steam-escape valve for contingencies. 
This difference between the two cases shows how social mobilisations can 
contribute to the changes in organisational mechanisms and methods that 
municipal governments use to include other social actors in the policymaking 
process. 
Section 3. The middle class mobilisation 
A fifth example of mobilisation illustrates the highly active participation of 
businesses and civil associations ran by middle and upper classes. Even 
though this participation has not been considered as a mobilisation in the past 
118 Even though street vendors sold on the streets, in many cases they used historic and 
abandoned buildings for storage. 
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fifteen years, its origins come from an important mobilisation wave during the 
end of the 1970s and throughout the 1980s. It refers to the mobilisation 
promoted by the right and its aim for electoral democracy 
The mobilisation's objective in promoting democracy was also understood as a 
break from the authoritarian regime. Authoritarianism was defined by the central 
state's interventionism and limited pluralism within the policymaking process 
(see Section 2.3). The members forming this mobilisation started being the right 
wing representatives, such as entrepreneurial groups, the Church, and middle 
and upper classes in the northern region of the country. However, the infiltration 
of the mobilisation through the structures of the PAN reached other regions in 
the country, such as the Bajio. 
The PAN has been considered as a class party which canalises the demands of 
the middle and upper classes (Loaeza, 1991: 9). The privileged groups - 
through the organisational structures of the PAN, their financial resources and 
education - were able to publicise their discourse through mass media (Espino, 
2003, Loaeza, 1991; 1994). As a result, their understanding of democracy was 
included in the national political discourse. The mobilisation's aim for 
democracy was circumscribed to the electoral and political party grounds. 
Under this understanding political pluralism became one of the key attainments 
reflected nationally. This pluralism also came accompanied by liberal ideologies 
regarding the importance of the private and thus of particular interests; a reason 
that can explain partly the weakening of collective organisations and the 
promotion of individual methods of participation within panista projects. 
A characteristic observed about this mobilisation was the encouragement that 
entrepreneurs had in getting involved into politics in a publicly and 
organisational way (Loaeza, 1991; 1994). The serious involvement of 
organisations like Coparmex and CONCANACO in the defence for a multiparty 
culture, in addition to the autonomy from government acquired 
by 
CANACINTRA, made out of business groups important participants within 
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politics at the national and local levels. 1' Thus it is not surprising to read 
throughout these chambers' websites and monthly bulletins their emphasis 
upon the importance about democracy, accountability and the need to negotiate 
with both the executive and the legislative power representatives. 
In the cases of Queretaro and SLP, it was unsurprising to see how the 
politicians competing for electoral posts came from entrepreneurial 
backgrounds, such as the cases of Mayor Garcia and Governor Loyola in 
Queretaro and Mayors Pizzuto and Leal in SLP. Furthermore, the close links 
between local electoral posts and the presidency of the various different 
business groups is an example of the political participation of business-people. 
Other examples were two mayor candidacies in the 2003 elections. These 
candidates represented the Queretaro's Historic Centre Entrepreneurial Group 
(HCEG) - Federico Ibarra, and CANACO and Nuestro Centro in SLP- Fernando 
Perez Espinoza. It is worth mentioning that none of these candidates 
represented the PAN. Mr. Perez represented the PRI, while Mr. Ibarra was 
candidate for a local political party in Queretaro called Fuerza Ciudadana. This 
shows that the interests of entrepreneurs were not homogeneous, but that a 
wide range of interests prevailed, especially regarding the small and local 
businesses as opposed to big national and even transnational groups. 
Both of these candidates were important promoters of the street vendor 
relocation carried out in 1993 and 1998, respectively. Their respective business 
associations the HCEG and Nuestro Centro organised the closing down of the 
city centre's shops and the demonstration outside the city hall and the state 
government headquarters. In the case of Queretaro, the interruption of one of 
the state congress' session by Mr. Ibarra, put pressure on passing the 
regulation regarding the municipalisation of the police in order to enhance social 
order (interviews SLP 8, SLP 13, QRO 12). 
119 CANACINTRA was known to be a co-opted business organisation under the PRI regime. 
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The increasing public intervention that business groups had during the past 
years can be partly to the active legacies inherited by the middle and upper 
class mobilisations of the 1980s. However, the inclusion of many of these 
groups within the policy networks has stopped them from being a mobilisation 
becoming, instead, part of the political restructuring. This inclusion illustrates the 
continuous participation of various representatives from business groups, 
professional/academic groups, and civil associations in local expert committees, 
where collaboration between the private and the public sectors has been 
enhanced. In various cases, collaboration sessions have contributed to the rain 
of ideas to establish a policy agenda, in others they have influenced the policy 
formulation or implementation, and to a lesser degree they have been able to 
manage a fund. 
The similar ways of canalising middle class' demands into Queretaro and SLP's 
municipal agendas does not mean that this fraction of society is monolithic. 
Fractions within this class exist and one possible way in which municipal 
governments deal with these differences is by giving to each group different 
tasks. To local and small businesses, the task of promoting the city centres (as 
it is in these areas where the number of small business prevails), on the one 
hand. To chambers as CANACINTRA and the Chamber of Construction 
(CMIC), projects dedicated to change the industrial space, on the other hand 
(i. e. the creation of an industrial park for small firms to free the city centre from 
factories and workshops that supply larger firms, or the construction of 




Appendix 2. The evolution 
decentralisation policies 
of electoral institutions and 
r becentrafw6,0an Pd is s Policies to create,:. competitive 
election (electoral reforms 1947 National tax convention 
envisioned a centralised fiscal 
system. 
1977 Reform to the Law of Political 
Organisations and Electoral 
Procedures (LOPPE) in which 
proportional representation in 
Congress was stated. 
1980 National System of Fiscal 
Coordination promoted 
administrative decentralisation. 
Paradoxically, the last tax 
convention was signed to 
centralise consumer tax. 
1983 Reform to the 115 Constitutional 
Article gave municipalities more 
autonomy to formulate and 
administer service delivery. 
1986 Reform to the LOPPE promoted 
proportional representation in 
state and municipal congresses. 
1989 First state (Baja California) 
governed by the opposition 
(PAN). 
1990 The Electoral Federal Institute 
became a decentralised agency. 
1988-1994 Through 26 budgetary branch the 
PRONASOL federal programme 
was designed and implemented 
to promote infrastructure in 
marginalised communities. The 
federalist system was bypassed. 
1992 100 Cities federal programme 
was implemented to promote 
urban infrastructure in big and 
medium cities. In 2000 it 
increased its coverage to over 
300 cities. 
1991-1996 Citizenship became an important 
element to legitimate electoral 
processes. 
1995-2000 New Federalism searched for 
subnational autonomy (states 
and municipalities . 
1997 Reform of the Fiscal PRI lost absolute majority in 
306 
Coordination Law. Congress. 
1998 Creation of the 33 budgetary International organisms 
branch as a source of promoted multi-actor 
decentralising infrastructure responsibility in local governance 
planning at the municipal level. (including the private sector and 
Among other strategies to citizen participation). 
decentralise education and 
health programmes at the state 
level. 
2000-2006 New Federalism revisited. For the fist time in 70 years an 
opposition party won the 
residential elections (PAN). 
2004 First National Treasury 
Convention that aimed to 
decentralise more than fiscal 
matters by promoting local 
development. 
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Appendix 3. Laws and programmes where governance terms 
are identified. 
The way I identified the understanding of governance was through the 
normative and political discourse within the urban legal frameworks affecting the 
localities of Queretaro and SLP. In many of these frameworks (summarised in 
table A. 3) there were various articles referring to the collaboration and 
coordination between the three levels of government, as well as between the 
public, the private and the social sectors. Particularly, in those laws and 
regulations regarding planning and cultural heritage `collaboration' was 
commonly mentioned. Even though the word governance was not explicitly 
used, conceptual ideas of what it meant were found. Box A. 3 contains examples 
from some regulatory frameworks, where the relevance of interorganisational 
networks was implied in the urban policy process. 
Box A. 3. The use of governance as a concept in national and local legal 
frameworks 
Example 1. National Development Plan: 
'Changes are particularly powerful when they emanate from society and it is society the 
one participating in their implementation and evaluation. Consequently, it is necessary 
to assure that the responsibility for national development is shared between 
government and the population' (PND 2001-06, p. 29; my translation and emphasis) 
Example 2. Federal Law of Archaeological, Artistic, and Historic Monuments and Sites: 
`The National Institute of Anthropology and History and the National Institute of Arts 
and Literature... will organise and authorise civil associations, neighbourhood boards, 
and peasant unions as auxiliary organisms to avoid archaeological ransacking and to 
preserve national cultural heritage' (1972, art. 2; my translation and emphasis). 
Example 3. Urban Code of the State of Queretaro: 
The State Governor may: 
`Sign agreements with other state secretariats o parastate agencies, municipal 
authorities and citizens to coordinate the solution to the problems that affect urban 
development' (CUEQ, 1992, art. 7; my translation and emphasis). 
Example 4. Urban Development Plan of the State of San Luis Potosi (2001-2020): 
`... social participation [through State Urban Development Councils] will consist of: 
Formulating, modifying, evaluating and monitoring urban development plans and 
programmes... 
... Financing and operating strategic 
urban, housing, industrial, trade, and tourism 
projects 
... Protecting cultural 
heritage within population centres... ' 
(PDU SLP, 2001; my translation and emphasis) 
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In the documentary review, words such as `co-responsibility', `collaboration', 
`co-investment', and `coordination' were easily identified. Collaboration and 
coordination were commonly implied between different levels of government 
and the public and the private sectors. The terms business or entrepreneurial 
were not directly used; however, a clear reference focused towards some 
business chambers (especially those related to construction and housing which 
are relevant for urban development). Also, professional and academic groups 
were mentioned as supervisors or providers of technical knowledge. Other 
forms of civic associations were mentioned as well, such as neighbourhood 
boards, school boards, and peasant or workers associations. The word `co- 
investment' was found, meaning that the pool of financial resources could be 
attained by public and private sectors, but no other regulation was found about 
the way of attaining or managing these resources. The lack of complementary 
regulations might be considered a factor that helped to maintain informal 
arrangements between the parts involved. 
In several of these documents it was mentioned that citizen participation should 
be included, promoted and stimulated in the planning and development of a 
place. However, the way each document interpreted participation was very wide 
and confusing. This participation could be understood under the participatory 
systems promoted by each locality (which are highly linked to the fiscal 
decentralisation policies promoted by central government in the use of federal 
allocations through Branch 33). Sometimes this participation, as in the case of 
the Organic Municipal Law of Queretaro State, referred to civil society in 
general, which can be interpreted by civil associations and individual citizens. 
However, in the same Law, participation referred to a diverse range of 
organisations and civil groups representing communities and citizens; implying 
that social organisations sponsored and not sponsored by government were 
taken into account. In other cases, it was stated that only the organised society 
had the right to participate, which can be interpreted as only legally registered 
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organisations could participate (based on State Urban Development Law of 
SLP). 
This wide range of understandings shows how local authorities did not structure 
in an orderly and clear way the forms of participation. Nevertheless, this does 
not mean that they did not make a classification about these forms. The 
classification existed, but it was not fully written or documented as a whole 
system of participation. I observed that each form of participation had either its 
explicit (regulation framework) or tacit arrangements. The explicit way showed a 
more complicated organisational and functional structure as with the case of 
neighbourhood boards; whereas with expert councils or popular negotiations 
the operation and structure were more relaxed. The word partnerships was not 
used in the regulatory discourse; however, it was identified through public- 
private associations that formed part of the state and municipal citizen 
participation systems. 
The three approaches to participation (expert committees, neighbourhood 
boards, and urban-popular negotiations) reflect the operational side of what was 
established by national and local programmes and legal frameworks, such as: 
" Plan of National Development (promotes coordination between different 
levels of government and social participation) 
" Programme for an Authentic Federalism (enhances municipal government's 
capabilities for urban planning) 
" Social Development Agreement and Law of Fiscal Coordination (indicates 
how federal transfers and allocations should be used by state and municipal 
governments to promote urban development, among other issues) 
" Planning Laws (federal and state level which ensure municipal development 
plans are elaborated, introducing social or citizen participation) 
Table A. 3 provides more detail: 
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Table A. 3. Urban planning coordination between tiers of government 
Mill 
National Plan of Urban 
Development, 1995-2000 
National Programme of Urban 
Development and Territorial Ordering, 
2000-06 
Plan of National Development, 2000-06 
Programme for an Authentic Federalism, 
2000-06 
Law of Federal Planning, 2002 (Art. 20, 
20 bis) 
Law of Fiscal Coordination, 2003 
General Law of Human Settlements, 1993 
(Art. 49 - frac I; 50) 
Federal Law for Archaeological, Historical 
and Artistic Monuments and Sites, 1986 
(Art. 2) 
Programme of 100 Cities, 1992 
Terms of governance 
In summary all these laws, plans and 
programmes aim to promote urban 
competitiveness. A special emphasis is 
given to the primary urban system where 
118 metropolitan areas (SLP and 
Queretaro included) are identified. These 
documents respond to the urban 
decentralisation process that Mexico has 
experienced since the early 1990s and 
respond to the economic national 
development (influenced by economic 
globalisation changes). These documents 
aim to improve the quality of urban 
services, equipment and infrastructure in 
order to enhance municipal government's 
planning and managing capacity (i. e. 
territorial ordering, land use, conservation 
of historic sites, urban poverty). All of them 
underline the importance of coordinating 
efforts between the three levels of 
government and collaborating between 
public and private sectors, as well as 
promoting social participation to formulate, 
implement and evaluate urban plans and 
programmes. 
iueretaros, -' Terms related to SLP Terms related to 
overnance governance 
State Planning Planning requires of State Planning Strategic planning 
Law, 1996 (Art. civil society's Law, 2001 (Art. 8, requires 
8,22,23) incorporation, this 12,15,38,40) coordination 
responds to a scheme between three levels 
of democratic of government and 
agreement. This law the participation of 
establishes the the social and 
management of the private sectors. This 
social participation last aspect 
councils and enhances 
coordination between democracy. 
the three levels of 
government. 
311 
Urban Code Enforces that the state State Urban Municipal authorities 
1992 (Art. 7,11, governor and the Development Law, should promote the 
242,243) Secretariat of Urban 2003 (Art. 9,19, participation of 
Development and 97) different social 
Public Works promote groups in 
social participation elaborating plans 
(particular citizens and and programmes 
popular groups). It regarding the 
establishes the State ordering of 
Urban Development population centres. 
Commission that works 
as an advisory 
organism represented 
by public and private 
organisations. It 
suggests that municipal 
governments can 
create similar advisory 
bodies with municipal 
inherence [i. e. expert 
councils]. 
Municipal Establishes the social Administration Law Enforces the 
Organic Law of participation municipal for Transferred creation of Municipal 
the Municipality councils in Queretaro Allocations to State Councils of Social 
of Queretaro, State. These councils and Municipalities Development as the 
2001 (Art. 70, are a space for the of SLP, 2003 (Art. main organs helping 
126) community to 65) municipal 
participate in the government in the 
formulation, validation decision making of 
and evaluation of the resources 
municipal programmes. coming from Branch 
The councils should be 33. 




and the community. 
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Law of Cultural States that the Law of Cultural Establishes the Heritage architectural heritage Heritage creation of the State Protection, 1991 and urban conservation Protection, 2003 Council of Cultural 
require of community Heritage Protection 
participation and as a councillor body 
governmental agencies with technical 
to define, monitor, and knowledge to advice 
execute the actions on the regulations of 
that rescue invaluable cultural heritage. 
heritage. This council is 
formed by state 




and Public Works, 
the institutes of 










within the state. 
Coordination Establishes an Intergovernmental The INAH, state 
and agreement between Agreement for the government, 
Collaboration the INAH, state Protection, municipal 
Agreement for government and the Conservation, government of SLP 
the Protection, municipal government restoration and and the Chamber of 
Conservation, of Queretaro to simplify Diffusion for Commerce (in 
Restoration, paperwork for building Architectural and particular Nuestro 
Recovery and restoration and Historical Centro) agree to 
Diffusion of the construction in the city Monuments, 1995 elaborate a 
Cultural centre. campaign for 
Heritage in preserving the 
Queretaro City, municipality's 
1995 cultural heritage, 
directed to all 
sectors of the 






construction in the 
city centre. 
313 
Review of the it promotes Urban It aims to Partial Plan of collaboration and Development State consolidate the main Urban support between Plan 2001-2020 cities in the state, Development of different levels of especially the the Historic government to achieve metropolitan area of Centre, 2002 urban infrastructure SLP. It also aims to 
and services necessary promote industrial 
to comply with national development 
and exterior through basic 
competitive markets. infrastructure and by 
The historic centre is promoting private 
considered as a key and social 
area due to its investment, This last 
population density, its point enhances the 
concentration of creation of the State 
cultural identity, and for Urban Development 
being the economic Councils that work 
and political core of the as advisory bodies. 
municipality and the 
state. 
Institute of Establishes that the Organic Law of the Establishes the way 
Municipal institute aims to Free Municipality, the system of citizen 
Planning formulate an integral 2000 (Art. 101-107) organisms and the 
Decree, 2002 sustainable planning. auxiliary organisms 
(Art. 5) This accompanied by work in all 
citizen participation municipalities within 
within the institute's San Luis Potosi 
deliberative council, State. 
also formed by 
municipal congress 
representatives, the 
city mayor, and the 
institute's director. 
Regulation for the Refers to the system 
Integration and of citizen organisms 
Operation of the which aim is to 
Citizen present proposals to 
Participation municipal 
Organisms in the government related 
Municipality of to urban planning 
SLP, 1997 and programming; 










the System of 
Social 
Participation 






planning and social 
participation in 
governmental 
management. It also 
underlines that the 
population should be 
informed about and to 
suggest solutions 
regarding its primary 
needs. Any citizen of 
Queretaro is able to 
participate in the 
system subject to an 
honest way of living 
and to service 
disposition. In the case 




knowledge on the topic 
the council is advisory 
of. 
Partial Plan for the 
Conservation and 
Urban 
Development of the 
Historical Centre, 
1993 
Regulation for the 
Integration and 
Operation of the 
Municipal Auxiliary 
Organisms in the 
Municipality of 
SLP, 1998 
Underlines that the 
promotion of the 
historical centre 




restoration, and of 
interaction between 














boards, and trusts 
between different 
level of government 
or between public 
and privates sectors 
that aim to offer a 
social or public 
service, the goods 
or resources owned 
by the municipality, 
scientific or 
technological 
research, and the 
pooling of resources 
for social assistance 
and security issues. 
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Appendix 4. List of interviews carried out in Queretaro and SLP 
s: 
-------------------------------------- ------ ---otes: N --- ---------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(*) These interviews were conducted during the pilot project. 
Interviews coded with an 'R' such as QR and SLPR refer to non-recorded interviews. 
--- - Queretaro. NGý 
------------ 
----- -------- Code Interviewee Post Date 
_ 
interviewed 
1; QRO_1 Manuel Ovalle Municipal officer: 18 May 2004 
responsible for 
e carrying out street 
!! ! vendor relocation 
! ! programme during 
1997-2000 
----- -------- ---------------- ---------- - 2 QRO_2 -------- 
; ------------------- -- Sergio --- -- -- -- --- -- --- --- Canacintra's 2 June 2004 
Villasenor president during 
fieldwork period 
----------------------------------- 3 QRO 3 Alfonso Garcia Queretaro's 7 June 2004 
_ president of the 
National Chamber 
of the 
! ! Development and 
Housing Industry 
! ! during fieldwork 
period 
---------------------------------------- ___ 
4 4 QRO Esperanza Members of the 16 June 2004 
_ Palacios and Fundaciön 
Francisco Encuentro 





_ __ cultural 
heritage i 
- ---------------- ------------ 5 5 QRO - ----- ------------------------------ Laura Duenas 
------------- _ - -1 Secretary of Social 15 June 2004 
_ Development 
'; ! ! during the Garcia 
administration 1 
ý_«--------------1_ --------------------------- 
--i---------- ---------- ----------- 
6' QRO6 Guillermina 
-- 
7-______________"_____----___---------___--T__----------------«--__«--__'i 
Neighbourhood ? 23 June 2004 
Gamboa committee 
president - ! Jardines de 
ueretaro ---- - ----------------------------------------------------- ---------------  7; Manuel Rivero Active member of 23 June 2004 7 QRO 
_ the Historic Centre 
! ! Board - _ -- - --- ------ ; _____ -- ---- ---- 8 g QRO -------- ------------------ 
------ - -- ---- --- ---- --- -- Enrique Jaime ! Active member of 24 June 2004 
_ Briceno the street vendor 
association - 
Felipe Carrillo 
---L---------------- ---1 -- - -__ -_- -i 
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--------- -------------- ------------- ---------------- -------- ------ 
-- -- ---------- -- ---------------- -- -------- --- 
------------- Puerto Union 
QRO_ 9 Yadira ------- Street vendor in 25 June 2004 
Gonzalez the Libertad Alley 
! 
--- --- 1 -- --- ---  --- 
in the city centre ! Ö 1 = QRO_ 10 ----- f Hector Benitez ------------------------------------ Street vendor   ý __ 16 July ul 2004_I 
leader of the 
Handcrafters 
Cooperative oft 
Libertad, located in 
____-_-_____ý_ ______  
the cit centre y 
QRO 11 Fermin Cano Neighbourhood 27 July 2004 
committee 
president during 
2000-03 - San 




----------------------- - ----------- ---------------- 12 QRO_ 12 1 Federico Ibarra Leader of the 1 29 July 2004 
r r Historic Centre 
Entrepreneurial 
Group and mayor 
candidate during 
the 2003 elections, 
representing the 
Fuerza Ciudadana 
-- - - ------------------ 13 1 QRO_ 13 -------- Carlos Lugo -- - Neighbourhood ___-- 7 August 
committee 20004 
president- 
` --------__-- - 
Alcanfores 
----------------------------------- -------------------------------- ------------------------------------------ -- -- --- -- ---------- 14 QRO_ 14 Jesüs Municipal 9 August 2004 
Rodriguez president 1994- 
1997 
,_ -_-- 15 ---------- - ----------------------------------- ------------------  ---------------------- L  QRO_15 Victor Morel* Director of the - - - --__ -__ 11 December 
Historic Centre 2003 
Board 
- - ----- 16 -------- ------ - - --- ---- QRO --- --------- 16/Qro ------  --------------  -------------- 16 Rolando -----------------------  Municipal ----------- 16 December 
_ bis _ Garcia* president 2000-03. 2003 and 12 
___-_________ _________-_-_____________-___________ __-_ _ 
i___________ _____---__-_____-____ ____ 
JanusnIy, 2004 





17 Carlos Garza* Queretaro's 8 December 
_ Coparmex 2003 
president during 
pilot project ý ' 
-- 18 -- --- ------------ QRO ---- ------- 18 -------- --------- Consolaciön - --ý- -------- - Municipal ----------------  10 December 
_ Gonzalez* congresswoman 2003 
representing the 
PRD, 2003.06 
-- - --- -- - ---- 19 -- - ---; - --------- QRO -------------- 19 ------------------------------------- Elsa Doria Member of Alianza 13 January 
_ Civica 2004 
20 --- ----- QRO --- -------------------- -- -- --------------------- 
+ 
20 Roberto Director of the  -- --- 13 January 
Ramos* Queretan 2004 
Environment Trust } 
--- ------ --- __-_-__; l- 21 ---- ---- 1 QR ------- ----- ---------- 
------------- - Jaime Font -- -- -- Director of Sites ; 22 June 2004 
L 
- 





-- ------ ------------- 
- ---------- ------------ ---------- ------ --------------- -------------------------------- ------- State Secretariat 
of Public Works in 
- E ------------- 1 ---- - --- - ---------- -- - ---- 
E 
Queretaro 
----------------  - --ý 22 QR_ 2 ! Diego Prieto Director of the ---- --- ---- - 29 June 2004 
- -- ------------- - 
INAH in Queretaro 
3 QR_ 3 -----------------  - Javier Lopez Conservation ------- -- --------------------- 30 July 2004 
-- ------ --- ! officer at I NAH 
! 
- QR_ - 4 Ernesto r Ex-member of staff -- ----------------- 8 July 2004 
Becerril of the Historic 
Centre Board and 
consultant in 
----------- --------- -- ---- ----------- --------------------------------- 25 QR_5 Solange Diaz 
ICOMOS 
 L------------- Ex-member of staff t _ 15 June 2004 
of the Historic 




Carlos Bringas Municipal officer in 9 June 2004 
charge of ordering 
street vendors and 
tianguis in 
- ---- - -----------------------  -------------- 
Queretaro 1 27 ! QR_ 7 Jeronimo FIOZ leader during 1 5- August 2004 
Sanchez 1998 riots 
28 QR 8 Salvador Member of the 16 June 2004 
Conchola PRD in Queretaro }- -- 29 ----- ------ _ -------------------------i   -- --- - ------------ QR 9 Fausto -- -_4 ----------------  ------  -- Municipal officer of 31 May 2004 
Marquez ý 'IMPLAN 
30 - -- - --- - QR_ ------------  --- - 10 _ ----------  --  Alfonso  ---------------- -- 1 Coordinator of the 16 July 2004  --- ---- 
Camacho Queretan Feast 
Board 
----- 31 -------- ---- ------------------- QR 11  ----- -------------  ----- - ----- ! Joel Perea ------------------------------------------ Head of Social 26 July 2004 ; 




--------- 32 ! QR 12 Mauricio Cobo Municipal officers 15 January 
and Salvador during 1997-2003. 2004 
Herrera* They participated 
in the Encuentros 
programme and in 
directing and 
managing the 
; IMPLAN ; --- - ------ 33 ------------ - ------- QR --- --- -- -- -------- -- -- ---------- ------ ---------- 13 Pamela Siurob ' Director of the -- ---- Between 21 
! _ ! Environmental June and 2 
! ! ! Information Centre August 2004 
and candidate for 




` ! ! Party ' - -- - -- -- QR 34 - 
14 ------------------------- Manuel _ ------------------------- --  President of the 26 July 2004 
-------- ----------- - ------- --- 
318 
------------------------ ------ 
Amieva Industrial Club in 
Queretaro in 1999 
} --------- San Lins Patost ý-y -- ---- - 
-- -------------- Code Interviews ----- - Post --= Date 
------------ 35 ------------------ ------------- ------------ -----T - 
interviewed 
-- -- SLP 1 Carlos ! Public officer in the 1 14 May 2004 
Garrocho State Secretariat 
of Economy in 
SLP during the 
1997-2003 
-------------- administration } -------4 --------------------------------------- S LP 2 ------- ------- - 36 + 
- 
Alejandro Municipal ------------- -------  - --- 7 July 2004 
Zapata president 1997- 
2000 
37 j SLP_3 1. Jorge Enrique ! Municipal Director 19 July 2004 
Correa I of Urban Planning 
and Development, 
2000-03. However 
he has worked in 
related posts since 
1997 
---- 
- --_--__ - 
! 38 - ---- 
-------- 
SLP_4 --- -------------- 
_ 
-------------------------- ---------------------- /SLP 4 ! Manuel Director of Historic 20 July 2004 
bis Vildösola Centre and 5 October 
Consultative 2004 
Council 
39 ----- ----: -- SLP 5 Guillermo -t-- -- ----------------------  Municipal  --  -i 18 September _ Pizzuto president 1989- 2004 
1991 and an active 
member of 
Navismo since the 
1980s 
--! --- -- - -- 40 SLP_6 - Eduardo Active member of 21 September 
Martinez Navismo in the 2004 
Benavante early. 1990s and 
current local 
J deputy 
e representing the 
!! ! PRD 
- ---- - --------- - 1_ 41 _-- SLP_7 - Adrian ------ --------------------- I Head of the - -- - 27 September-] 




! defensa dell 
Patrimonio 
Histörico, Cultural 
ly Natural dell 
jEstado de SLP ! I 
42 -------`- SLP_8 - i-Jose -- 
_ Luis Member of 15-- October 
Lozano Nuestro Centro 2004 





--------------- ------ --------- -------------- --------------f ---------------------------- - ---------------------------------------------- CA NAC O in SLP - ---- 
during the early 
--- --------  j --- ------ ---- -------------- ------------------- ------- 
1990s 
- --- -- ------------------- °° -- ---- 43 ? SLP_ 9 Jorge Luis ? President of the 19 October 
Mendez Chamber of the 2004 
Mexican 
Construction 
Industry in SLP 
during the 
-------------------------    
fieldwork period 
 44 SLP 10 
- 
Concepcion I Neighbourhood 19 October ? Paz committee 2004 
president - Prados ? 
San Vicente and 
member of the 
CDSM from 1997 
45 SLP-11 
to 2003 
----------i Juan Colorado ? Neighbourhood 1 20 October 
e committee s 2004 
I president - San 
Juan Guadalu e ' ----- -- -- 46 - ----------- ---------- ------------------ -SLP 12 ----------------  I-Fernando Municipal 
 ---- 20 -- ----- October 
Chavira subdirector of 2004 
? ? ? Citizen 
Participation 
during the 2000-03 
administration 
°--- ------------------------- - ------- 47 SLP_13 Manuel Garcia ------------- President of 20 --------------- October 
Porrero Nuestro Centro 2004 
during fieldwork 
'---- 
---' -- - -- -- --- -- ----- -------- ---------------- ------------------------------------- 1 
eriod 
48 SLP_14 Angel Mena Neighbourhood 22 October 
committee 2004 
president until 
2002 - San 
-- -- ------------- ------------- -------------- -- 
Sebastian 
----! --- -- - --° ---- 49 SLP 15 Urbano Diaz President of the 25 October 
_ de Leon Historic Centre 2004 
Consultative 
Council 
--------------------- ----- ------------------ ---- 50 ---; - ------ - SLP ----- ----- 16 ------------- ------------= ------------------ Ramon   ; Neighbourhood 26 October 
Alonso. committee 2004 
president 2000-03 
- Himno Nacional 
1a secciön 
---------------- ----- 51 SLP17 -------- --- 
; --------------------------------- ------ -- -- - Juan A. Former street 27 October 
Rodriguez. vendor leader of 2004 
Chessani the Historic Centre 
Association in the 
earl 1990s ----------- ----- - -- -- --------- 52 SLP -; -- ------ --- 
-- ----- 18 ? Begona Garay ; Conservative -- 29 October 
- ------- --------- 
_ 
--------- --------------------------------- 
officer at INAH, 1 2004 
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----------- -------------------------------------------------- 
__-_ . ____-__--__--------_-________-_----____-_- 53 SLP_19 ! Raül Perez Secretary of the 3 November 
Xicotencatl 2004 
Tianguis in San 
Juan Guadalupe 
ei bourhood - -- -- 
N 1------- ! 54 SLP 20 Romel Alanis . Leader of the 7 November 
i Antorchista 2004 
Movement in SLP 
during fieldwork 
-- ----------------------- _ period 55 SLPR_1 Jose Jottar Municipal director 21 October 
of Commercei 2004 
during 1991-1994 





during the 2003-06 
administration, but 
worked in related .. 
___! 
posts since 1997 
r 57 i SLPR_4 i Jose Luis Municipal officer at 22 October 
Mendoza the Coordination of 2004 
1 Citizen Attention, 
Municipal General 
Secretariat }------------------3------------------------------- ------------------- ----- ; --- _ --- -------- SLPR_7 Jose Luis ' Director of 19 July 2004 58 
Dorantes Coparmex in SLP 
during fieldwork 
period 
-------------------- ------------------------------------ ------------- -=- 
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Appendix 5. Case study questions and topic guides 
The case study questions were used firstly, to guide the data collection 
throughout the fieldwork and secondly, to compare both case studies across the 
same themes. These questions were grouped into five different topics: 
(a) Urban development 
" Is the city aiming to develop entrepreneurship? (be creative/ innovative and 
developing strategies to maintain this) 
" How has the city changed in the last 20 years? (socio-economically, 
politically, in population, shape/space) 
" Have decentralisation policies encouraged the municipality to become more 
proactive within the urban policy decision process? (pros and cons) 
(b) Partnerships 
" Do the relationships between the public (state/municipal) and private sectors 
tend to become a form of urban governance (to obtain resources otherwise 
not attainable)? 
" Are partnerships helping the city to build an entrepreneurial profile? 
" What is the nature of partnerships? 
" How do they operate? Who operates them? Who is part of it? 
(c) Trust 
" Are partnerships a mechanism that increases trust between public and non- 
public stakeholders? (as they are publicly known, legally constituted, more 
propensity to be accountable) 
(d) Capacity-building 
" Are partnerships willing to include other groups/sectors 
different to the public 
and local elite groups? What have been their strategies? 
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" Are partnerships an organisational form followed by municipal government 
to become more collaborative and inclusive? (in terms of accountability, 
management, citizen/community involvement) 
(e) Participatory methods 
" What participatory methods exist as a way to involve citizens and 
communities into the urban policy process? (i. e. informative, consultative, 
strategic in decision making) 
" Are these methods linked to the partnerships' aims and strategies or do they 
work independently from partnerships? 
9 Have these methods increased social organisations' capacity of negotiation 
with government and other sectors of society? (more of a say in 
policymaking and more solid12' social networks) 
Documentary analysis: 
The case study questions were operationalised for the purposes of data 
collection. The following questions were used to structure the documentary 
analysis. 
" What is the role of municipal government in promoting urban development? 
" What is the role of federal/state governments within municipal urbanisation? 
" How do transnational corporations/ international organisations intervene 
within municipal urban policymaking? 
" What are the factors that promote/ facilitate public private partnerships 
regarding urban development? 12' 
" What other collaborations have been formed apart from public-private 
partnerships -regarding urbanisation? With whom? 
120 Solid is understood by proactive and long lasting relationships within social organisations 
and between social organisations and other sectoral groups. 
121 This question includes factors regarding the modernisation of the municipal government 
through new public management strategies as a form to enhance capacity building. 
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" What collective participatory methods exist to complement public-private 
partnerships regarding urbanisation? 122 
" How the partnership's work organised? (aims, strategies, activities, 
operation and practice) 
" What mechanisms are followed to attain a long lasting collaboration/ 
partnership - regarding urbanisation? 
" Are these mechanisms flexible to incorporate new demands or changes? 
Semi structured interviews: 
Based in the case study questions, the following topic guide was used during 
the interviews. 
Topic: Partnerships regarding urban development (regeneration) 
" How would you describe the evolution of public-private partnerships at the 
municipal level? 
" Can you describe the procedure of a decision taken by the partnership? 
" Is there a group/person that dominates the partnership's sessions? 
" Can you describe any reaction to such partnerships coming from a group of 
society? 
" How would you consider partnerships within the municipal policy process? 
Questions asked to municipal politicians/officers and members of private groups 
Topic: Trust 
9 Can you recall any past experience in collaborating with the local authorities 
(or private/social groups)? 
" Is it possible to identify a leader within the organisation? 
" Can you describe the leader's abilities and skills? 
" Do you meet with any other members (of the organisation) out of established 
meetings? 
122 Participation methods refer to expert committees, neighbourhood boards, and urban popular 
negotiations 
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" What is the contribution of your organisation within the partnership? Has this 
contribution been successful? 
Questions asked to municipal politicians/officers and local private and social 
groups 
Topic: Capacity-building for collaboration 
" Can you describe the mechanisms that the partnership (or organisation) 
follows in order to inform the community benefiting from the projects carried 
out? 
9 Do you think the partnership (organisation) has developed a capacity for 
community involvement in regeneration issues? 
Questions asked to municipal politicians/officers and local private and social 
groups 
Topic: Collective participation (regarding urban development) 
" What are the ways for social organisations to participate within the urban 
policy process? 
9 How social organisations perceive public-private partnerships regarding 
urban development? 
" Can you describe the development of your organisation in the last ten 
years? 
" What new relationships has the organisation built in the past years? 
" Do you consider that the actual methods of citizen participation are an 
achievement of past social mobilisations? 
Questions asked to members of social groups 
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